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INTRODUCTION
N  UISANCE  law  holds  a  special  place  in  the  development  of
law  and  economics.  From  Ronald  Coase's  article  on  social
cost and continuing on through the present day, the analytics of the
classic  nuisance  dispute  have  been  the  touchstone  of  economic
theories of law.' When the question is how to internalize pollution
externalities  or whether people bargain under the shadow of prop-
erty rules and liability rules, economic  models present  the dispute
as  a conflict  between  plaintiff and defendant,  and  very often  be-
tween  polluter  and  pollutee.2  I  did  not  say "polluter  and  victim"
because  one  of the  prime results  of the  economic  analysis  of law
has been to cast doubt on ordinary notions of causation in favor of
an economically more sophisticated  view in which use conflicts  ex-
hibit  symmetric  causality:  the pollutee's  nose causes  the use  con-
flict just as much as the polluter's smokestack.  Only an economist
might be  surprised that the  world has stuck with ordinary notions
of causation even in the face  of the insights  of Coase  and his  suc-
cessors.
What these  approaches  to  nuisance  have  in common  is a  very
un-property-like  view  of entitlements.  One  reason  that  causation
R.H.  Coase, The  Problem of Social Cost, 3  J.L. &  Econ. 1 (1960).  For a sample
bibliography of the vast literature  on nuisance  within  the law and economics  frame-
work, see Timothy Swanson & Andreas Kontoleon, Nuisance, 2 Encyclopedia of Law
and Economics 380, 397-402 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000).
2Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property  Rules, Liability Rules, and In-
alienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1115-17 (1972).  Most
liability rule literature employs nuisance as the leading example. For some  recent ex-
amples, see, e.g., Ian Ayres & Paul M. Goldbart, Optimal Delegation and Decoupling
in the Design of Liability Rules, 100  Mich.  L. Rev. 1, 2 (2001)  [hereinafter Ayres  &
Goldbart,  Optimal  Delegation]  (detailing  nuisance  dispute  between  Polluter  and
Resident); Lucian Arye Bebchuk,  Property Rights and Liability Rules:  The Ex Ante
View  of the Cathedral,  100  Mich.  L. Rev. 601,  602-03  (2001)  (detailing  dispute be-
tween Factory and Resort);  Richard R.W. Brooks, The Relative Burden of Determin-
ing Property Rules and Liability Rules: Broken Elevators in the Cathedral, 97 Nw. U.
L. Rev.  267, 291-92 (2002)  (using "the  familiar  example  of a  dispute  between a pol-
luter and a resident  who is affected  by the pollution"); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shav-
ell, Property Rules Versus  Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis,  109 Harv.  L. Rev.
713,  715 (1996)  (arguing  for liability rules in pollution context, as opposed  to entitle-
ments to tangible  things);  James  E. Krier  & Stewart  J. Schwab, Property  Rules and
Liability  Rules: The  Cathedral in Another  Light, 70  N.Y.U. L. Rev. 440, 442  (1995)
(using a pollution  example  in arguing  for the importance  of administrative  costs and
for a  new type of liability rule).
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can  be  regarded  as  reciprocal  in  situations  of land-use  conflict  is
that  Coase-and  law-and-economics  scholars  more  generally-
assume that entitlements are decided on a use-by-use basis.'  In this,
Coase and his successors reject the traditional idea of property as a
right to a thing good against  the world  in favor  of a realist picture
of property  as  a collection  of use rights, the  so-called  "bundle  of
sticks."  If transaction  costs were  zero, the maximum  value of pro-
duction would  be  achieved  through  private  bargaining  regardless
of the initial assignment  of entitlements;  when,  however,  transac-
tion costs are positive,  a collective  decision as to who has the enti-
tlement-each stick in the bundle-may be the final word and  can
affect  overall  efficiency.!  Thus, it would  seem that when  conflicts
between  actors and  their activities  arise,  a court's job, particularly
where transaction  costs  are  high, is  to decide  which use  shall pre-
vail. The hallmark  of nuisance law then  becomes  reasonableness,
where  each  use must be justified  in  terms of a grand cost-benefit
analysis.  This  has become  the  prevailing  view  among commenta-
tors, the  Restatement,  and  treatises  But  while  many  contempo-
rary courts use a balancing approach, they often have paid no more
than lip service to balancing and have instead hewed to a more tra-
ditional mode of analysis.6
Under the balancing approach, nuisance starts looking like core
areas  of  tort  law,  particularly  the  law  of  negligence.  The  cost-
benefit  approach  to  nuisance  can  take  one  of  two  forms,  corre-
sponding to two strains both in law  and economics and in the law
of torts itself. On the one side of the discussion  are those like Rich-
ard Posner who  advocate  a "direct"  cost-benefit  analysis,  akin  to
3In Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and
Economics?,  111  Yale  L.J. 357  (2001)  [hereinafter Merrill  & Smith, What  Happened
to Property in Law and Economics?],  Merrill  and  I pointed out the hyperrealist foun-
dations  of  the law-and-economics  approach to  entitlements  and drew on  the frame-
work  of  exclusion  and governance  discussed  in  Henry  E.  Smith,  Exclusion  versus
Governance:  Two  Strategies  for Delineating  Property Rights,  31  J. Legal  Stud. S453
(2002)  [hereinafter Smith, Exclusion versus Governance],  to suggest  briefly that nui-
sance law has some exclusion-like  elements. In this Article,  I will explore the implica-
tions of the exclusion  and governance framework, focusing on the theories of tort and
nuisance  law.
4 Coase, supra note 1, at 19.
'See  infra Section II.B. 'See  infra note 83 and accompanying text.
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the Learned  Hand test for negligence.'  Under this  approach, con-
flicts between the uses proposed by the plaintiff and defendant  are
decided by finding out what combination of the two parties'  activi-
ties  and  related  precautions  would  maximize  value.  Not  surpris-
ingly, pro-negligence  commentators  favor  direct  balancing  in  nui-
sance.
8
On  the  other  side  of  the  discussion  are  those  such  as  Guido
Calabresi  who carry  over  cheapest-cost-avoider  analysis  into  nui-
sance  from their strict-liability  approach in accident law. This ana-
lytical  device  is  very  often  associated  with  strict  liability,  under
which  courts  would  not  try  to  solve  the  allocation  problem  di-
rectly. 9  Instead, taking a more  indirect approach,  courts  in cheap-
est-cost-avoider  mode  would  perform  a  higher-order  analysis  of
which  "activity"  can  more  cheaply  gather information  about  the
benefits and costs of activities and act on that information. By plac-
ing liability on this "cheapest  cost-avoider,"  courts can  move soci-
ety closer  to optimal resource  allocation  because  the  liable  party
will weigh the costs of taking precaution (including foregoing some
or all of the activity)  against the expected liability and choose  the
most  cost-effective  combination  of  activity  and  precaution.  The
cheapest-cost-avoider  approach is more indirect than the balancing
espoused  by Learned  Hand and Richard Posner in that it chooses
the chooser but leaves the first-order choice of whether the activity
is worth its costs to the one on whom liability has been placed.
'United  States  v.  Carroll Towing  Co.,  159  F.2d  169,  173  (2d  Cir.  1947);  see,  e.g.,
William  M.  Landes  & Richard  A. Posner, The .Economic Structure  of Tort  Law 291-
92  (1987);  Richard  A. Posner, A Theory  of  Negligence,  1 J. Legal  Stud.  29,  32-33
(1972).
See  Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 62  (6th ed. 2003)  ("The  alter-
native to absolute rights is balancing, and is the approach taken by the most important
common  law remedy for pollution,  which is nuisance, the tort of interference with the
use  or  enjoyment  of land.  The standard  most  commonly  used  for determining  nui-
sance is  unreasonable  interference,  which permits a comparison between  (1) the  cost
to the polluter of abating the pollution  and  (2)  the lower  of the cost to the  victim of
either  tolerating  the  pollution  or  eliminating  it  himself.  This  is  an  efficient  stan-
dard .... ") (citations omitted).
9See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents:  A Legal and Economic Analy-
sis  135-73,  261-63  (1970);  Guido  Calabresi  & Jon  T. Hirschoff,  Toward  a Test  for
Strict  Liability in Torts, 81  Yale L.J.  1055,  1060  (1972);  Harold Demsetz, When Does
the Rule of Liability Matter?,  1 J. Legal Stud. 13,  27-28 (1972).  Commentary  employ-
ing cheapest-cost-avoider  analysis is voluminous.
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Both the direct Learned  Hand-style approach and the cheapest-
cost-avoider  analysis maintain  the Coasean procedure  of assigning
entitlements  as an ongoing list of use rights-building up the prop-
erty bundle stick-by-stick.  Indeed, if there is one thing upon which
commentators  seem  to agree,  it is  that  the  standard  for  nuisance
law should be assimilated to that of accident law. With a negligence
test, parties  would gain rights to activities  by having a court estab-
lish that  the  activity  is  "reasonable,"  in the  sense that  it passes  a
cost-benefit  test.'" If carried over to nuisance, this means that if ac-
tivities-accompanied  by  cost-effective  precautions-are  worth
more than the damage they cause, then they do not generate liabil-
ity.  Cheapest-cost-avoider  analysis  likewise  assumes  that  entitle-
ments are built up use-by-use,  stick-by-stick. On the cheapest-cost-
avoider view, parties would gain rights by being at the other end of
a conflict from a party deemed to be a cheapest cost-avoider. Thus,
if polluters are-as they often but not necessarily are-found to be
the  cheapest  cost-avoiders  in  pollution  situations,  then  the  pollu-
tee-resident  will gain  a right to be free from pollution. 1" Under ei-
ther  of  these  two  strains  of  nuisance  analysis,  the  question  has
shifted  from  a  traditional  one  of whose  (antecedent)  rights have
been  violated  to  an  evaluation  of  activities-either  their  direct
merits or their indirect cost-avoiding capacities-and consequently
involves  assignment  of sticks in a bundle  of entitlements. When  a
new use conflict arises, we move on to the next analysis and a fresh
determination  of who  gets  the new  "stick"  in  their evolving  bun-
dles. 2
Negligence theorists bemoan the retention of strict liability for invasions of rights in
land instead of developing a single overarching negligence  standard that would apply in
nuisance. See,  e.g., Louise A. Halper, Untangling the Nuisance Knot, 26  B.C. Envtl.
Aff. L. Rev. 89, 115-16 (1998).
" Compare Calabresi, supra note 9, at 254  (arguing that factory is the "best briber"),
with Frank  I.  Michelman,  Pollution  as  a  Tort:  A  Non-Accidental  Perspective  on
Calabresi's Costs, 80 Yale L.J. 647, 667-68 (1971)  ("The most sweeping arguments for
strict liability  and liberal  'standing'  criteria would  apparently  assume  that  polluters
are  nearly  always the cheapest  cost-avoiders, and  while that assumption  may have  a
certain  gross  plausibility  for the whole universe of pollution-nuisance  cases, there  is
no a priori  reason for believing it to be valid in any particular case.").
12 See, e.g.,  George P. Smith & Griffin W. Fernandez, The Price of Beauty: An Eco-
nomic  Approach  to  Aesthetic  Nuisance,  15  Harv.  Envtl.  L.  Rev.  53,  53  (1991)
("Scholars  have characterized the history of nuisance as the articulation and valuation
of a 'bundle  of rights'  pertaining to the enjoyment of real property."); cf. J.E. Penner,
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But this  is not  at all  how the law  usually proceeds.  Courts  rou-
tinely speak in terms of who has injured whom, and they often ask
simply  whether  the  plaintiff's  rights  have  been  invaded. 3  And
much  of the  time in nuisance  cases this  inquiry involves  a search
for physical invasions flowing from the defendant's to the plaintiff's
land. Indeed, commentators  in the corrective justice tradition tend
to  emphasize  the physical  invasion aspect  of nuisance  to an  even
greater extent than the weight of current American  case  law, with
the latter's tentative steps towards balancing. 4 In light of these con-
flicting  strains  of  thought  about  nuisance,  the  law  of nuisance  is
widely  regarded  as  a  "mess,"'5  a  "'wilderness'  of  law,''16  a  "legal
garbage can,""  and a "mystery."'8
In this Article, I propose that nuisance  is not so much  a mess or
a  mystery  as  a  hybrid  between  different  methods  of delineating
rights, and that this hybrid reflects  the  information  costs incurred
in employing  these strategies. Information  costs go  a long way to-
ward explaining why and how nuisance law rests on a foundation of
exclusionary property rights-and, in particular, why physical inva-
sions  are important in nuisance  law.  Information costs include the
costs  of generating  information about rights  in the process  of de-
Nuisance  and  the  Character  of the  Neighbourhood,  5  J.  Envtl.  L. 1,  14-25  (1993)
[hereinafter  Penner, Nuisance  and the Character  of the Neighbourhood]  (explaining
and criticizing the "bundle of rights" view).
"The approach based on invasion  of rights was at its zenith in the nineteenth cen-
tury, but still retains some  force.  See, e.g.,  Robert G. Bone,  Normative Theory  and
Legal  Doctrine  in  American  Nuisance  Law:  1850  to  1920,  59  S.  Cal.  L.  Rev.  1101
(1986);  Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass,  Nuisance,  and the  Costs of Determining Prop-
erty Rights,  14 J.  Legal Stud.  13,  26-35  (1985)  (documenting four  tests for nuisance
and their continuing use); see also infra notes 84-88 and accompanying text (referring
to tests distinguishing trespass and nuisance).
14 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian
Constraints,  8  J. Legal  Stud.  49,  53-56  (1979)  [hereinafter  Epstein, Nuisance  Law].
For an even more uncompromising  defense of the English bright-line  property-based
approach  to nuisance against some  recent developments,  see Penner, Nuisance  and
the Character of the Neighbourhood,  supra note 12.
15  Halper, supra note 10, at 130.
"'H.G.  Wood,  A  Practical  Treatise  on  The  Law  of  Nuisances  in  Their  Various
Forms; Including  Remedies  Therefor  at  Law and in  Equity iii  (San  Francisco,  Ban-
croft-Whitney  3d ed. 1893).
" William  L. Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 Tex. L. Rev. 399, 410 (1942).
"Warren  A. Seavey,  Nuisance:  Contributory  Negligence  and  Other  Mysteries,  65
Harv. L. Rev. 984, 984 (1952)  (quoting Delaney v.  Philhern Realty Holding Corp., 21
N.E.2d 507,  510 (N.Y. 1939) (Crane, C.J., concurring)).Exclusion and Nuisance
lineating  and  publicizing  them,  as  well  as  the  costs  incurred  by
third parties in processing information about the scope, nature, and
validity of those rights. I will argue that giving owners a right to ex-
clude from  a thing good against the world is  a rough but low-cost
method  of generating  information  that is easy  for  the  rest of the
world to understand. These exclusionary rights can be justified on a
number  of grounds: libertarianism, autonomy, personhood, desert,
and  so  on,  but  I  will  focus  on  an information-cost  rationale  for
broad rights. It is often assumed that nonutilitarian  theories always
justify  strong property  rights,  and that utilitarian theories inevita-
bly undermine them. 9 Both propositions  are questionable,  and this
Article will focus on the second.
As  for  the  first  proposition-that  nonutilitarian  theories
uniquely explain  strong property rights-I suggest that these theo-
ries do not always tell us the exact form property rights should take
and, in particular, how and why property rights tend to encompass
as many uses  as they do. Imagine  a world in which each resource
has exactly  two  known uses.  In  such  a world,  one  could  advance
liberty, personhood,  and  so  on  by  specifying rights  over the  two
uses, or perhaps over just one of them. To what extent these values
could be vindicated  by  giving people  rights in  activities  (as  in the
core of tort law) rather than a right to exclude others from "things"
remains an open question. What degree of control over the world's
resources  would be required to vindicate the  values  at the root  of
the property system, and could this control be specified in terms of
rights to engage  in tort law's  "activities"  rather than property-like
rights  to  "things?"  As I  will  argue, information costs  do not fully
explain  why  we  have the  entitlements  we  have, but  they  do help
explain  why  entitlements  are  exclusionary  in  many,  but  not  all,
contexts.
The information-cost  theory can also  be brought to bear on the
second  proposition-that  law  and  economics,  or  any  utilitarian
analysis,  will favor narrow use rights-and  can bridge some  of the
gap between  utilitarian  and corrective justice  theories of nuisance
and  of  torts  more  generally.  Conventional  utilitarian-style  eco-
nomic analysis furnishes  little reason to think that conceptualizing
property as the right to exclude  the world from a thing makes  any
" For typical discussions, see the sources cited in supra note 14.
2004]Virginia Law Review
sense  at all. In response  to traditional concerns  in property  for in-
vestment, security,  and internalization,  an  economic  theory could
advocate  a tailored  approach  that would  assign  entitlements  and
liability according to the  "goods"  and "bads"  associated with vari-
ous  activities.  Resources  would be no  more than the  backdrop  of
this use-by-use delineation, and a  law of "things"  would be largely
superfluous. Notice, however, that this delineation is costly because
it  requires  specification  of  informational  variables,  or  "measure-
ment proxies,"  that  will isolate  the various  uses  and help identify
the  value  of  each. °  In  many  cases,  particularly  where  the  gains
from multiple use and the transaction  costs of achieving coordina-
tion are high, it makes sense for the law to engage in precise tailor-
ing. At the hypothetical extreme, the law would implement  a list of
use rights  holding between  all  potential  pairwise  combinations  of
persons with respect to any (at least heretofore)  conceivable  activ-
ity  that  has  any  impact  on  anyone.  The  costs  of  this  approach
would  be prohibitive,  but it  is  the vision  lurking  behind  the  eco-
nomic approach to tort, and especially nuisance, law.
Instead of this comprehensive approach, the law often grants an
"owner"  the right  to exclude  others  from  a resource  or "thing."2
This type of legal arrangement  relies on what I  have called an ex-
clusion regime.  Under  an  exclusion regime,  the  law  uses  a rough
informational  variable  or  signal-such  as  entry-to  define  the
right, and thus bunches together  a range of uses that juries, judges,
and  other  officials  need  never measure  directly.  The  right  to ex-
clude  is  best  understood  as a gatekeeper  right-the  owner's right
to determine the use of the thing,"  and is protected by common law
2This use  of  the  words  "measurement"  and  "proxy"  is  characteristic  of  neo-
institutional  economics  and especially  of the work of Yoram  Barzel, who  points out
that measurement  is the operationalization  of information.  See Yoram Barzel, Meas-
urement Cost and the Organization of Markets, 25 J.L. & Econ. 27, 28 & n.3  (1982).
21The right  to exclude  is  especially  important in  property  and  some  have  argued
that it  is its essential  feature.  See, e.g.,  J.W. Harris, Property  and  Justice  13  (1996);
J.E. Penner, The Idea of Property in Law 71  (1997)  [hereinafter  Penner, The Idea of
Property];  Felix S.  Cohen,  Dialogue  on Private Property, 9  Rutgers L. Rev.  357,  374
(1954);  Thomas  W. Merrill,  Property and  the Right to Exclude, 77  Neb. L. Rev.  730
(1998).
22 See, e.g., Penner, The Idea of Property, supra note 21, at 29-30, 71; Merrill, supra
note 21,  at 739.
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actions such as ejectment, trespass, and nuisance.2 3 Because such an
exclusion  regime  builds on simple  on/off signals  such  as boundary
crossings, rights to exclude are typically protected with injunctions
and  supracompensatory  damages.  Exclusion  is  associated  with
what Guido  Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed  termed "property
rules," under which a remedy is strong enough to deter nonconsen-
sual takings, as  opposed to liability  rules under which nonconsen-
sual takings are allowed  as long as officially determined compensa-
tion  is paid.2 4 From  the perspective  of judges  and  other  officials,
exclusion grants  owners  a gatekeeper  right that protects  the  own-
ers' interests in a wide and indefinite class of uses without the need
ever  to  delineate-perhaps  even  to  identify-those  uses  at  all.
Having a right to exclude from Blackacre, an owner can build on it,
grow crops on it, park cars on it, and so on. This set of uses  is in-
definite and open-ended, and it need not be individually defined in
advance.
Some  of the uses may be prohibited under covenants  or zoning,
arrangements  that suggest  another mode for delineating rights. In
contrast  with  exclusion,  at  the  other  end  of the  spectrum  of  de-
lineation  methods,  resides  a  governance regime  that  focuses  on
proper  use. The law-and-economics  approach  to nuisance-which
advocates  a  reasonableness  or  cost-benefit  inquiry  into  uses-is
just such a governance regime. Thus, a prohibition on certain odors
wafting  from  a factory  at certain times  and in certain directions  is
about  a  given  class  of  uses,  not simply  an  on/off  question  about
whether  a boundary has been crossed.  Between these  poles of ex-
clusion  and governance  are  various modes  of delineating  entitle-
ments  that  differ in terms  of how directly  tied to uses-how pre-
cisely tailored-are the informational  variables employed to police
the rights.
23On trespass  versus nuisance,  see  infra Section  II.A. In the law  of personal  prop-
erty,  the right  to  exclude  is  vindicated  through  the  actions of conversion,  replevin,
trover, detinue, trespass to chattels, and the various theft offenses. 24 Calabresi  & Melamed,  supra  note  2,  at 1092  (distinguishing property  rules from
liability  rules  in the domain  of transferable  entitlements);  see  also  Henry E.  Smith,
Property  and  Property  Rules,  79  N.Y.U.  L.  Rev.  (forthcoming  2004)  [hereinafter
Smith, Property and Property Rules]  (draft on file  with author and Virginia  Law Re-
view  Association)  (explaining  why  exclusion  is  strongly  associated  with  property
rules).
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In concrete  situations, the right to  exclude requires  a degree  of
deference-or  "delegation"-to  owners in their choice  to exercise
one or more of the indefinite set of use-privileges protected  by the
exclusion right. The law of trespass is the most deferential. Thus, if
A  owns  Blackacre  and  decides  not to  allow  a neighbor  to  have a
mobile  home transported  across  it, A  can  sue  as trespassers  those
who  may  have  very  good,  cost-justified  reasons  for  wanting  to
move  mobile  homes  across  the  land. Furthermore,  A  may do  so
without having to show that the  refusal was reasonable.25 The law
of nuisance  also requires deference  to owners, but less consistently
SO.
Nuisance introduces elements of governance that require courts
to  directly  evaluate  uses.  If  odors  waft  over  from  neighboring
Whiteacre, the owner of Whiteacre would, under the common law,
normally  be  liable  to A  without  inquiry  into  whether  the  odor-
producing  activity  is more important than A's use of his land. But
the law  of nuisance  puts  more  of the direct  evaluation  of uses  in
judges' hands than does the law of trespass; thus, if the odors con-
form  to  reasonable  use  in the locality  or  are  de minimis,  no nui-
sance will be found. Under one approach, courts will refuse injunc-
tions  if  the  injunction  would  cause  great  waste  and  economic
dislocation.26 In contrast, a purer exclusionary  approach like that of
trespass  delegates  this assessment-even the discovery-of uses  to
the owner by making her the gatekeeper through an exclusive right
based  on  rough  informational  variables  such  as  entry  across  a
boundary.
In this Article,  I  will show that the  information-cost  theory can
explain  some  otherwise  very puzzling  cases in which  the law  pre-
fers  exclusion  but  where  conventional  law  and economics  would
lead one  to expect  a preference  for a more tort-like evaluation  of
activities-governance,  in  terms  of  the  proposed  framework.  In
Part  I,  I further  distinguish  exclusion  from governance  and show
how they work together to define  entitlements in a  way that takes
"For  a dramatic recent example, see Jacque v.  Steenberg Homes, Inc.,  563 N.W.2d
154 (Wis.  1997)  (upholding  an  award  of punitive damages where only nominal  com-
pensatory damages were found), which I discuss  further at notes 49-55  and accompa-
nying text.
6 The leading case  is Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.,  257 N.E.2d 870  (N.Y. 1970). I
discuss Boomer, infra Section IV.D.Exclusion and Nuisance
information  costs  into account.  In general,  property  and  property
rules are favored where the law reflects  a second-order  decision to
delegate first-order  information gathering  and choice  of use to  an
owner  and  to  avoid  official  inquiry  into  the  sphere  of  delegated
choice.  Part II will then show how the relationship of trespass  and
nuisance-including  the  association  of  property  rules  with  tres-
pass-is  explained  by  the  information  costs  associated  with  gov-
ernance  regimes.  Even  the  nuisance  disputes  upon which  Coase
based his  original  discussion  of social  cost  point strongly  toward
the  important  roles  of location  and  exclusion  in lowering  the  in-
formation  costs associated with  nuisance  disputes. Part III will ex-
plain  why plaintiffs  are generally  not permitted to invoke  the law
to force  the polluter either to abate  the nuisance  or to shut  down
upon payment by the plaintiff of "damages"  in the amount  of the
polluter's  costs  of doing  so. The information-cost theory will help
explain  why  such compensated  injunctions-Guido  Calabresi  and
A.  Douglas Melamed's  famous  "Rule  4"-are not  as common  as
one might expect under various theories of liability rules. Conven-
tional  liability  rules  that  compensate  victims  for  pollution  with
damages-Calabresi  and Melamed's  "Rule  2"-  still  capture  the
information-cost  lowering  benefits  of the  "thingness"  of property
entitlements,  whereas  Rule  4  undermines  the  basic  exclusionary
regime. Part IV will show that treating exclusion and governance  as
complementary  elements  in a system  of entitlements  not only fur-
nishes a better descriptive theory, but also sharpens the most press-
ing normative issue in areas such  as nuisance. Part IV explores the
question  of when  the presumptive  and foundational  exclusion  re-
gime  should  give  way to  more nuanced  tailoring through govern-
ance.
I. INFORMATION COSTS AND THE DELINEATION OF ENTITLEMENTS
Information  costs play an important role in both torts and prop-
erty, but it is widely assumed that the impact of such costs are simi-
lar in that they both bear on the evaluation of competing  and con-
flicting uses.  In this Part, I  argue that much  of property law-and
some  of tort law-reflects  a  very  different  approach  to  informa-
tion, one based on a strategy of delegating  informational questions
to owners  by  delineating  exclusive  rights  to  a thing,  enforceable
against all others. Upon this rough but basic exclusion strategy, fur-
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ther refinement  and precision  are  sometimes  achieved  through  a
supplementary governance  regime-a set of rules of proper use.  It
is these latter use rules that look more like realist, Coasean  "prop-
erty,"  but they are best seen as  supplements  to the rules  of exclu-
sive  access  that give  the  tort of trespass, property's  basic  protec-
tion, its distinctive,  hard-edged  character. 27 Nuisance  employs  this
exclusion regime when it comes to gross invasions of clear bounda-
ries, but supplements the exclusion regime with fine-tuned govern-
ance rules. Exclusion and governance  each have a distinctive set of
costs  and benefits,  and, in this Part, I show that legal entitlements
can be delineated in a low cost fashion if they rest on a foundation
of exclusion  supplemented  by  fine-tuning  governance  rules.  Nui-
sance  turns  out to be  an  area  of law in  which the  shift from  one
strategy to the other is especially pronounced.
Tort  law  is  the  regulation  by  courts  of  harmful  activities.  Al-
though institutional constraints prevent courts from taking as com-
prehensive  or  as  detailed  a  view  of  harmful  interactions  as  can
other officials,'  core tort law is all about proper use. In this respect
it differs  very  much from  core property  law, which  is,  from  a  lay-
man's  perspective,  about  "things."'29 For  a variety  of reasons,  law
and  economics  tends  to  take  a very  realist  view  of property  as  a
27 Coase treated property  rights as lists of use rights rather than  as rights to things.
See  Merrill  & Smith,  What Happened  to  Property  in  Law  and Economics?,  supra
note 3, at 369-71.
s Richard A. Epstein, Possession As the Root of Title, 13  Ga. L. Rev. 1221,  1222-23
(1979)  [hereinafter  Epstein,  Possession]  (arguing  that  because  of courts'  modest  re-
medial  powers  their "definition  of rights is  therefore  apt to  be made  along certain
'natural  lines';  there will  be  broad general  propositions  that can  apply to  all against
all,  and  there will be  no reference  to the numbers or formulas ...  that can be gener-
ated by direct administrative  controls, such  as zoning"); Thomas W.  Merrill  & Henry
E.  Smith,  Optimal  Standardization  in  the Law  of  Property:  The  Numerus Clausus
Principle,  110 Yale  L.J. 1, 62-63  (2000)  [hereinafter  Merrill & Smith, Optimal  Stan-
dardization in the Law of Property]  (arguing that legislatures can provide comprehen-
siveness in devising new property  forms better than can courts); see also Neil K. Ko-
mesar,  Imperfect Alternatives:  Choosing Institutions  in Law, Economics,  and Public
Policy 7-8 (1994)  (presenting a theory of comparative institutional choice  centered on
bias and expertise).
'9  Bruce A.  Ackerman,  Private Property and the Constitution  26-31,  97-103  (1977)
(contrasting  "scientific"  perspective  about the  meaning  of property  as  a bundle  of
rights with the "layman's"  perspective that persists in thinking of property as rights to
things); Merrill  & Smith, What  Happened to Property in Law and Economics?,  supra
note 3, at 357-58.Exclusion and Nuisance
"bundle of sticks." 3  In a manner similar to Hohfeldian analysis, law
and economics  breaks legal relations down into their smallest con-
stituent parts but, unlike Hohfeld, then  asks whether they serve ef-
ficiency  and,  occasionally,  other  goals  such  as  fairness. 1  Where
property  meets  tort, this  atomizing  tendency  is  magnified  since
many areas of tort law, beginning with the paradigmatic problem of
accidents,  are  naturally  carved  up  into  conflicting  activities.  To
Coase and his successors, it was an easy step to see harmful interac-
tions that come under the heading  of "nuisance"  in similar terms.
Two  activities  conflict  and  the  resolution,  however  effected  and
through whichever  institutions, can  be evaluated  as to how well  it
promotes  the  efficient  use  of  resources.  Resource  scarcity  is  re-
duced  to a  bilateral  conflict  over  use, and rights  to  resources  are
conceptualized  as being  built up from the determinations  in cases
involving these conflicting  uses. If A  is causing pollution that both-
ers B, the  question  is  not who  caused  injury  to whom  but rather
which activity is more valuable  (or who is able to take precautions
more cheaply), with that determination  resulting in the entitlement
(or liability) being assigned to the performer of that activity.
But property  law speaks  of the right to exclude the rest of soci-
ety from a thing. To the legal economist thinking in tort mode, this
is an unnecessary and unfortunate locution that only obscures what
is  really  going  on.  For  example,  Coase  disparaged  analogies  of
3 0 See, e.g.,  Ackerman, supra note  29,  at 26-29 (reporting that the bundle-of-rights
conception  of property  is  so pervasive  that  "even  the  dimmest  law student  can  be
counted  upon  to parrot  the  ritual  phrases  on  command");  Arthur  Linton  Corbin,
Taxation  of Seats on the Stock Exchange,  31  Yale  L.J. 429,  429 (1922)  ("Our concept
of property has  shifted; ....  '[P]roperty'  has ceased  to describe  any res, or object  of
sense, at all, and has become merely a bundle of legal relations-rights, powers, privi-
leges,  and  immunities.");  Edward  L.  Rubin,  Due  Process  and  the  Administrative
State, 72  Cal.  L. Rev. 1044,  1086  (1984)  ("[Pjroperty  is simply  a  label  for whatever
'bundle of sticks'  the individual  has been granted.").  Greg Alexander has traced  the
first known use  of the metaphor to a late nineteenth-century  treatise on eminent do-
main.  See  Gregory  S.  Alexander,  Commodity  &  Propriety:  Competing  Visions  of
Property in American  Legal Thought, 1776-1970,  at 323, 455  n.40 (citing John Lewis,
A Treatise on the Law of Eminent Domain in the United States 43 (3d ed. 1909)).
31  See  Wesley  Newcomb  Hohfeld,  Fundamental  Legal  Conceptions  as  Applied  in
Judicial  Reasoning  (Walter  Wheeler Cook  ed.,  1919)  (analyzing  legal  relations  into
four sets of jural opposites and correlatives and replacing in rem right with a compos-
ite  of rights  holding between  pairs of individuals);  Calabresi  & Melamed,  supra  note
2,  at  1116-18  (discussing  criteria  for  selecting  basic methods  of protecting  entitle-
ments).
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broadcast spectrum to air rights over land as "tend[ing]  to obscure
the  question  that  is  being  decided."32  Instead,  Coase  thought
about  all  resource  allocation  questions  in terms  not just  of the
realist  bundle-of-rights  picture  of property, but,  in  some  sense,
not as property at all:  "[W]hether  we have the right to shoot over
another  man's  land  has  been  thought  of  as  depending  on who
owns  the airspace  over  the  land.  It would be simpler to discuss
what we should be allowed to do with a gun." 33 In Coase's view-
and  in  most  law  and  economics-legal  rules  are  evaluated  in
terms of how well they can allocate  a resource between  two peo-
ple who have announced incompatible uses.'
Property law proceeds very differently. Rather than being a list
of use rights, property responds to uncertainty  over uses by bun-
dling uses together, often without needing to specify them at any
stage.  Property  gives  the  right  to  exclude  from  a  "thing,"  en-
forceable  against  everyone  else-it  is  an  in  rem  right-and  a
crude delegation to the owner avoids the costs of delineating use
rights.  On  the dutyholder  side, the  message  is  a  simple  one-to
"keep out"-and this simultaneously protects  a reservoir  of uses
for  the owner without  officials  or  dutyholders  needing  to know
what those might be. 35 This is what I have  called elsewhere  an ex-
clusion  strategy,  in  which  very  rough  signals  or  informational
variables-such  as presence  inside  or outside the  boundary  line
around  a parcel  of land-are  employed  to protect  an indefinite
32 R.H.  Coase,  The  Federal  Communications  Commission,  2  J.L.  &  Econ.  1,  34
(1959).
33Id.  (emphasis  added). For a discussion  of this  hyperrealist aspect  of Coase's as-
sumptions  about  property, see Merrill & Smith, What Happened to Property in Law
and Economics?, supra note 3, at 366-75.
34  See Coase, supra note 1, at 15-28. For a discussion of how Coase presupposes that
property  can  be treated  as the  list of use  rights  that emerges  from  decisions  of the
type  A  v. B and  how this approach  is carried  forward  in the literature  on property
rules and liability rules, see Merrill  & Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and
Economics?, supra note 3,  at 369-71, 379-83.
" Many theorists have noted the tight connection  between the right to exclude  and
property.  See supra note 21.  Building on the work of Steven  Cheung, Carol Rose de-
velops  a typology of pollution controls and  uses the term "keep out" as a shorthand
for simple  rules of exclusion.  Steven  N.S.  Cheung, The Structure  of a  Contract  and
the  Theory  of  a  Non-Exclusive  Resource,  13  J.L.  & Econ. 49,  64  (1970);  Carol M.
Rose, Rethinking  Environmental  Controls: Management Strategies  for Common Re-
sources,  1991  Duke L.J.  1, 9-36  [hereinafter  Rose,  Rethinking  Environmental  Con-
trols].Exclusion and Nuisance
class of uses with minimal precision.'  The right to exclude  is built
around  a signal-presence  inside  or  outside  a boundary-that  is
not directly tied to use but that when invoked protects the owner's
interest in use indirectly. If A  owns Blackacre  in fee  simple, A  can
vindicate  her interest in using  Blackacre  for growing  crops,  living
on it, running  a parking lot, or engaging in any of an indefinite set
of other uses by exercising her right to exclude others from Black-
acre.37 By contrast, what I call a governance  strategy is one in which
the  internalization  problem  is addressed  on  something close  to a
use-by-use  basis;  rights  are  delineated  using  signals  (sometimes
termed "proxies"  or "proxy  variables"  in the economic  literature)
that pick out  and protect  individual  uses  and  user behavior.3  Be-
tween these two extremes are strategies of a mixed sort that bunch
uses  together  under  signals  of intermediate  precision.  Easements
are  a  prime  example  in  that  an  easement  gives  a  hard-edged,  in
rem right to exclude, but from  a narrow and sometimes  highly  de-
tailed set of uses.3 9 For example, we move further from exclusion to
governance  when  a  railroad  easement  might  give  the  easement-
See Smith, Exclusion versus Governance, supra note 3, at S454-56, S467-78.
Not all  such  uses may  be permitted  where  this basic exclusionary  regime  is sup-
plemented by governance regimes such as zoning and  other land-use regulations.
See Smith, Exclusion versus Governance, supra note 3, at S455,  S468-78.
See id. at  S455  (citing  Preseault  v. United  States, 100 F.3d  1525  (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(determining nature of railroad grant as easement rather than fee simple)). The ques-
tion of the scope  of an easement  often  involves  a court in detailed  consideration  of
the nature  of a use.  See,  e.g., Beloit Foundry  Co. v.  Ryan,  192  N.E.2d 384,  390 (Ill.
1963)  ("However,  an easement  appurtenant may  not be extended  by the owner of a
dominant estate  to  accommodate  other  lands which he  may  own and  for which  the
easement was not originally intended."); Hayes v.  Aquia Marina, Inc., 414 S.E.2d 820,
823  (Va. 1992)  (affirming trial court's finding that expansion of an  easement holder's
marina  did not impose  an additional  and  unreasonable  burden  and that paving of a
roadway  was a reasonable  improvement  of the  easement);  Brown  v.  Voss, 715  P.2d
514,  518  (Wash.  1986) (rejecting  traditional  approach  and upholding trial court's re-
fusal of injunction  and  award  of damages based  on balancing  factors  in  case where
plaintiff used  easement for ingress and egress to a parcel  and to an additional parcel
on the other side from the servient parcel); Restatement  of Property § 478(e)  (1944)
(proposing  a flat rule of misuse  if the purpose  of one traversing servient  land is to go
to a nondominant parcel).  Under one  approach,  what uses are  permissible may  turn
not on whether  they expand  the easement but whether they can be presumed to have
been contemplated  by the parties  in light of the  purpose of the grant. See Preseault,
100  F.3d  at 1542  (citing  3  Powell on Real  Property  § 34.12[21  (Patrick  J.  Rohan ed.,
1996)).
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holder a right to traverse a parcel for any purpose, only for running
trains, or  merely for a given volume of train traffic, and so forth.
The information-cost  theory explains  the preference  for injunc-
tive remedies  and sanctions where core property is at stake.'  Prop-
erty rules  provide  for  such  a strong  remedy that,  in theory,  they
would deter  all  takings  of  entitlements  without  the  owner's  con-
sent. 41  They  include  injunctions  and supracompensatory  damages
that would make a nonconsensual taking of an entitlement  less at-
tractive  than  bargaining  to  a  consensual  price  with  the  present
owner. By contrast, liability rules rely on officially determined non-
market "prices,"  and allow  others to take the owner's entitlement
as long as these officially determined damages are paid. 2 Situations
are quite common in which a rough but low-cost  and stable  exclu-
sion-type signal can capture many uses and delegate choices among
uses to owners, and property rules  are suited to reinforce this dele-
gation to owners by forcing anyone who wants to engage in a use to
bargain with the  present owner.  Liability rules  tend to be  associ-
ated with governance  rules,  which are  used to  fine-tune  basic ex-
clusionary regimes in high-stakes  contexts.3 Interestingly, this the-
ory allows us to explain  why liability  rules feature prominently in
the  literature  even  though  they  are  less  common  than  property
rules  in the  law.  Legal  analysis  tends  to  focus  on borderline  and
high-stakes  cases,  where  we  expect  governance  rules  to  be  more
favored than they are overall. And because  liability rules are asso-
ciated more with governance than with exclusion, liability rules will
get a great deal of attention from commentators with their focus on
governance.
Where  economists  do  acknowledge  that exclusion  and  govern-
ance  can be  used  to internalize  externalities,  they are at pains  to
deny any essential difference between them. In his thorough explo-
ration of the  notion  of  externality,  for example,  Andreas  Papan-
dreou argues that in fact there is no such distinction, that exclusion
4'  See Smith,  Property and Property Rules, supra note  24 (arguing that information-
cost theory explains  the law's preference  for property rules over liability rules despite
the attractiveness of liability rules in most commentary).
"For the original formulation, see Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 2, at 1092.
42  See id.
41  See Smith, Property and Property Rules, supra note 24.Exclusion and Nuisance
is just another form of governance.'  Conversely, governance  rules
can be  said to  "exclude"  agents, but in terms of activities, and  all
entitlements  are  likely  to be  characterized  by  "exclusion"  in  this
broad sense.45 Under this view,  there is no essential  difference be-
tween drawing  and  defending  a boundary  around  an asset  on the
one  hand  and prescribing  and enforcing  norms about  permissible
activities with respect to the asset on the other.
I  will  argue  that  it  does  make  sense  to  distinguish  between
methods  of delineation  based  on how  much  they  bunch  uses  to-
gether and that the benefits of delineating rights can be achieved  at
lower  information  costs  when  using  particular  combinations  of
strategies  along  the  exclusion-governance  spectrum.  Under  this
view the terms "exclusion"  and "governance"  can be used to refer
to the poles of this resultant spectrum, and these poles of exclusion
and governance  differ crucially in their cost structures. Exclusion is
a low-cost, but low-precision,  method that relies on rough informa-
tional variables  like boundaries to define  legal entitlements.  Add-
ing precision to rights using these variables starts out cheap but can
quickly become prohibitively expensive. Capturing the impact on a
resource  of  multiple  uses-for  example,  the  proper  amount  and
timing  of grazing  by  sheep-cannot  easily  be  accomplished  with
better fences or better trained dogs. 6 By contrast, rules prescribing
proper use  start out expensive.  Imagine  trying to delineate the  le-
gal  relations  holding  between  potential  pairwise  combination  of
citizens  with respect  to each  thing by spelling  out what each per-
son-Coase's  person shooting a gun, for example-can  do to eve-
ryone else and who can sue when to stop what. At least as a rough
Andreas A. Papandreou, Externality  and Institutions 207-08 (1994).
41  Id. at 208; see also Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 3.1, at  35 (4th
ed. 1992) ("We could,  of course, preserve exclusivity in a purely notional sense by re-
garding the property right in a given  thing  as a bundle of distinct rights,  each  exclu-
sive; that is in fact the legal position."). Relatedly, having a right means having a claim
that others not  interfere with the  exercise of the right, and having a liberty seems  to
be  more than  having a Hohfeldian privilege. See Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm
of Rights 53 (1990).  Defining exclusion  as being able to invoke the law or social sanc-
tion to prevent an interference with any of a given set of activities makes exclusion so
broad as to be characteristic  of any right, not just property.
'  See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in  Land, 102 Yale L.J.  1315,  1329 (1993)  [here-
inafter Ellickson, Property in Land]. For a detailed case study of such restrictions, see,
for example, Karen J. Friedmann, Fencing, Herding, and Tethering in Denmark, from
Open-Field Agriculture to Enclosure,  58 Agric. Hist. 584,593-94 (1984).
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first pass, it does make  sense to talk of air rights and not what one
can do with a gun (and all other conceivable  activities). But as pre-
cision becomes more valued-perhaps  because the gains from spe-
cialization  through multiple use become more important-at some
point  governance  may  become  more  desirable  than  crude  exclu-
sion, at least from an information-cost perspective:  The very multi-
ple-use  situations that  fences  and barking dogs  cannot handle  are
fertile ground for rules of proper use-a governance regime.
Exclusion  allows courts to avoid dividing rights into component
use rights.  Thus, exclusion carries  with it information-cost  savings
even where transaction  costs are high. Even where present transact-
ing may not be  cost-effective,  exclusion  can  still make sense.  The
owner  can  select  among  uses  (and  "nonuse"),47  can  contract with
others  for  access  now, or  can  contract  later.  For example,  if the
owner  of Blackacre  believes  that  its  woods  and rock  formations
will be  a tourist attraction ten years from now, the owner can wait
and  see. Delegation through  the  gatekeeper right  of exclusion  al-
lows the owner to make this decision without having to justify it to
third  parties,  including courts  and  other  officials.  The  owner  can
choose  among  uses  and can  act  as  a  broker between  the present
and the future. 8 The  optimal transaction  may not occur  until well
into the future. A judicial governance  regime  would allow another
to take part or all of the entitlement by paying a non-market price
determined  by  a  court.  Under  this  regime,  a taker  can  force  this
substitute for a transaction to happen now, which may be far more
expensive  than  a transaction  in  the  future.  Thus,  even if present
transaction  costs  are  high,  one  should  not  automatically  assume
that private ordering is not working.
The exclusion strategy  is low cost because it relies on crude sig-
nals that capture  fewer  of the benefits  of specialized  multiple  use
than higher cost governance  rules can. Presence inside or outside a
boundary  around  Blackcare  is both  overinclusive  and  underinclu-
sive as a signal of harm to the land. It is overinclusive  because not
" Rights falling towards the exclusionary end of the spectrum do not suffer from the
"antiwilderness bias"  that balancing courts may introduce into property law. See John
G. Sprankling,  The  Antiwilderness  Bias  in  American  Property  Law,  63  U.  Chi.  L.
Rev. 519 (1996).
4 Harold  Demsetz, Toward  a Theory  of Property  Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev.  (Pa-
pers & Proc.) 347, 355 (1967).Exclusion and Nuisance
all those present on the  land would be causing  harm, and it  is un-
derinclusive  because  one can  cause harm  to  a person's interest  in
land without entering  it, as  by blocking access  to  it. Nevertheless,
the roughness  in exclusion  is part  and parcel of the  delegation  of
the information-gathering  function to owners.  This delegation  can
seem extreme at first blush. In Jacque  v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., the
Wisconsin  Supreme  Court upheld  a jury  award  of punitive  dam-
ages  of $100,000  in a trespass case  in which  the jury had awarded
nominal compensatory  damages  of only one dollar.9 The plaintiffs
sued  a mobile home company for traversing their land to deliver a
mobile  home to  a neighboring tract. For the deliverymen, travers-
ing the Jacques'  tract would save  a lot of time, trouble, and possi-
ble danger in navigating  a sharp bend in the snow."  The company
representatives  asked  for  permission  and  offered  compensation,
but the Jacques  refused even in the face of an unofficial mediation
by  the  town  chairman. 1  The court  noted  that  the  Jacques  "were
sensitive  about allowing others  on their land because they had lost
property  valued  at over  $10,000  to other  neighbors  in  an adverse
possession action."  After  all the back and forth, there could be no
doubt  that the  company's  entry  was  intentional;  in  addition,  dis-
puted  testimony suggested  that  the  exasperated  foreman  told the
workers to cross the Jacques'  land using epithets for emphasis. 3 On
the face  of it, a remedy of punitive  damages  might not seem to be
in order because the Jacques  seemed to be holding out for no good
reason."  But the court allowed punitive damages  in order to vindi-
cate the  right to exclude and noted that without them, intentional
violations  of the right to exclude  could  not be deterred."  In other
words,  the right to exclude was protected  by a property  rule, with
no inquiry into owner reasonableness  or the benefits  of the defen-
,9563  N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997).
Id.  at  157.
Id.
52 Id. Their belief was mistaken because permission negates the hostility required  for
adverse  possession or prescription.
53  Id.
'4  A  claim of adverse possession or prescription  must be hostile; the claimaint  must
possess or use the property without  the owner's permission.  See 3  American  Law of
Property  § 15.4 (A.  James Casner  ed.,  1954);  William  B. Stoebuck  & Dale A. Whit-
man, The Law of Property § 8.7, at 453-55, § 11.7, at 856-57 (3d ed. 2000).
"Jacques, 563 N.W.2d  at 158-62.
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dants'  actions. I will argue that this strong form of delegation of the
"gatekeeper"  right to owners-even in the face  of facts  like those
of Jacque-makes sense on an information-cost  theory: Judges and
juries  need  not  individuate  and  evaluate  the  reasonableness  or
value of uses of the land.
Delegating  the  information-gathering  function  through  the  ex-
clusion strategy lowers information costs. First and most basically,
it frees  actors, including  courts, from having to develop first-order
information about things. The information-cost  savings go beyond
avoiding the familiar problems of estimating damages.  Courts need
only  deal  with  second-order  information  about  the  delegation  it-
self. They  do  not  even  need  to  differentiate,  much  less  evaluate,
individual potential  uses. This  avoidance  of information gathering
by courts allows  owners to undertake  the choice  among uses with-
out having to justify the decision to third parties, unless the owner
chooses  to  transact  with  another.  Thus,  the  owner  of Blackacre
who believes  that the land will be a tourist site in the future can act
on a hunch, and property protection  allows  the owner  to bear the
consequences  of this bet  on the future  without  needing to  articu-
late it to others. Owners can deal with these use choices at an intui-
tive level because for most purposes they are not subject to review.
Further,  the  delegation  achieved  under  the  exclusion  regime
sends a simple message  to dutyholders-to  keep off-and this has
value where many nonexpert third parties  must heed the warning.
This  third-party information-cost  advantage  is  relevant  to  private
transactors  who  want  to  determine  the  rights  they  can  acquire
through  transactions,  but it  is also  valuable  for  those  who  simply
need to respect rights in order to avoid liability for violating them.
And  because  the rules  of  exclusion  are  simple,  it  is  easy  to  an-
nounce  them  ex  ante. At  the  cost  of  some  roughness  and  error
from lack of tailoring, ex ante certainty and stability is possible un-
der the exclusion  regime. For this reason, I will  argue that the re-
sults in trespass and the exclusionary  physical invasion part  of nui-
sance law are far more predictable  than is the balancing of utilities
approach that has been gaining favor, especially among commenta-
tors. And, again, the delegation to owners through exclusion allows
courts  to avoid  evaluation of uses in the first place.  Nuisance  is it-
self  more  exclusionary  than  is  conventionally  thought,  and  this
quality reflects the benefits of delegation to owners.
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Because  the  "things"  that  are  the  subject  of  property  law  are
heterogeneous  collections  of  valued  attributes,  the  delegation
through  exclusion  also  avoids  an  opportunism  problem. 6  Given
positive information costs, there is good reason to think that using
the exclusion  strategy often yields  a better result than would  com-
bining governance  rules  and devices  to  minimize  strategic  behav-
ior. Under governance  rules, a court has to weigh the value of vari-
ous uses, the ones announced by the owner and the conflicting one
of the taker-the polluter in the classic nuisance  example. This bal-
ancing becomes  even more informationally  demanding  where the
governance  rule  is  implemented  with  a  liability  rule-a  judicial
price for a use right. Where courts have limited abilities to identify
and  evaluate  the  competing information  about  uses presented  by
parties to a nuisance  dispute, potential takers can engage in strate-
gic behavior that defeats the owner's investment in the asset.
Exclusion  and property rules provide robust protection for own-
ers. Owners are closest to their assets and will be in a position both
to develop information about (and  attachment to) their assets and
will be the recipients of information  in the form of offers from po-
tential  purchasers. 7  Owners  are  likely  often  to  be  the  least-cost
generators  of information  about assets,  even if this information  is
not verifiable  to third parties. Takers will likely be closer to  assets
than courts,  and  will be  able  to evaluate  assets currently  held by
owners.  Under  exclusion  and  property rule  protection,  people  in
this position  have to make  offers,  but under  liability rules, which
are often used in a governance  regime,  takers can use information
about assets and their owners to cherry-pick those undervalued  by
damages  rules. 8 An owner may  not be  able  to communicate  to a
56  For a more detailed version of the following opportunism  argument in the context
of the property rule-liability rule debate, see Smith, Property and Property Rules, su-
pra note 24, at 34-46.
" That owners are in a particularly good position to maximize the value of resources
they own is a common assumption among traditional property theorists, see Merrill &
Smith, What  Happened to Property in Law and Economics?,  supra note  3,  at 360-66
(discussing  and  quoting  expressions  of  concern  for  investment  among  traditional
theorists),  and  in much of the liability  rule literature, see, for example, Ian  Ayres &
Eric Talley, Solomonic  Bargaining:  Dividing  a Legal  Entitlement  to Facilitate  Coa-
sean Trade,  104 Yale  L.J.  1027,  1083-86  (1995)  (discussing investment  incentives  for
owners); Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 2, at 768-69 (arguing for systematic protection
of owners over takers on grounds that owners are creators of value).
" Smith, Property and Property Rules, supra note 24.
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court the  value  of a use  (or nonuse)  such that  damages  could  be
given to reflect it. Takers, knowing this, can  then select vulnerable
owners  for  taking  or  extortion. 59  Even if a  court  could  detect  all
opportunistic takings, the effort to do so is likely to be costly.'  Ex-
clusion allows courts to avoid evaluating or even inquiring into the
identity of uses of property. 61
A court will be faced with an owner claiming a high value and a
taker  claiming  a lower  one.  If a court  engages  in use-by-use  enti-
tlement determination, then one of three problematic  results could
obtain. First, under property rules or liability rules one stick in the
bundle  of use  rights  is  hived  off and given  to  the  party who  can
convince the  court that  its  use  is more  valuable.  Speculative  uses
discovered  by entrepreneurs  (and  idiosyncratic  value  to ordinary
owners)  will be  the least credible  uses and  will systematically  find
too little favor. Second, courts could automatically accept claims  of
self-styled  entrepreneurs,  but then such  people  will  be  wastefully
overcompensated  (and will invest in fake projects in another form
of strategic  behavior).  Finally, a court  could  try to develop  infor-
mation about the  speculative  use independently, but  it is likely to
be a higher cost producer and user of such information than the en-
trepreneurial  owner,  almost  by  definition. Even  if the  court cor-
rectly guesses that the current owner has discovered  the higher use
but finds that the  taker is in a better position to use the asset as  a
tourist site, it would  be very  easy for the court to over- or under-
compensate  the  existing  owner  for  developing  the  information
about the use as a tourist site.
Basic  reliance  on  exclusion  and  property  rules  and  reserving
governance  and  liability  rules  for  supplementary  fine-tuning  can
reduce problems of opportunism. Problems for liability rules arise
9 See id. at 47-49 (showing that a wide range of liability rules can lead to opportun-
ism); David D. Haddock  & Fred S.  McChesney,  Do Liability Rules Deter Takings?,
in The  Economic Consequences  of Liability Rules:  In Defense  of Common Law  Li-
ability 29, 38-39 (Roger E. Meiners  & Bruce Yandle  eds., 1991)  (showing that market
damages  will  invite  opportunistic  takings  and attendant  waste);  see also  Kaplow  &
Shavell,  supra  note 2,  at 765-77  (arguing that nonbiased  average  damages  can  lead
takers to be attracted to things that are undervalued by the liability rule).
60  For  an  argument  that courts  stepping  in  with  liability  rules  to  solve  bargaining
problems will lead parties to bargain less cooperatively and lower transaction costs on
their own, see Krier & Schwab, supra note 2, at 464.
61 For a more detailed analysis, see Smith, Property and Property Rules, supra noteExclusion and Nuisance
where  takers  or owners  can  anticipate  the  proxy  variables  that  a
court will use to determine value  and alter their behavior  in order
to exploit the proxy's inaccuracies. As an (oversimplified) example,
if a court  measured value  by referring to market transactions  over
nearby  parcels,  a taker might  single out an owner whose  parcel  is
more valuable than it would appear in light of market transactions
over "comparable"  parcels. These problems even extend to a situa-
tion where  a polluter is seeking to extort from an owner part of the
value of a parcel-for  example,  the value of a future tourist  site. 62
Conventional  analysis of liability rules assumes that the conflict has
been framed in terms of identifiable uses, about which probabilistic
information  about  values  is  readily  obtainable.  Simply  saying,  as
law-and-economics  commentators  do,63 that all courts need to do is
get such situations right on average  is not persuasive where owners
and  takers are better than courts at developing information about
multi-dimensional  assets  in  the presence  of uncertainty.  In prop-
erty disputes, however, the difficulty often is that of identifying the
relevant  uses of a multi-attribute  asset  and placing each  asset and
use in its appropriate  actuarial class to begin with.
One  type  of evidence  supporting  this  information-cost  theory
about delineating rights is that exclusion does seem to be the more
basic and foundational  strategy in a wide variety of property situa-
tions. In common pool resources,  commoners first exclude  outsid-
ers and then institute rules of proper use among themselves.'  The
62  Kaplow  and Shavell  discuss  the  situation  in which  an  owner and  takers place  a
common value in excess of "average"  damages, which will lead to a problem of multi-
ple takings. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 2, at 765-77. But see Ian Ayres & Paul
M.  Goldbart, Correlated Values in the Theory of Property and  Liability Rules, 32 J.
Legal  Stud.  121  (2003)  [hereinafter  Ayres  & Goldbart, Correlated  Values]  (arguing
that sophisticated  liability rules can solve the correlated value problem). They further
believe that this problem arises primarily in the case of takings of things and not with
externalities.  Kaplow  & Shavell,  supra, at  771-73.  If,  however, the basic problem is
opportunism  in response  to  inadequate  actuarial  classes,  problems  can  arise even in
the absence  of many takers and even  in the  case of externalities. See Smith, Property
and Property Rules, supra note 24.
'3 See, e.g.,  Kaplow  & Shavell, supra note 2,  at 719, 765-77  (arguing for superiority
of liability rules  based  on "the average  harm for cases characterized  by the facts  the
court observes"  but arguing for property rule protection in the case of tangible things
even if courts can get damages right on average).
6
4 See, e.g., James M. Acheson, The Lobster Fiefs Revisited: Economic and Ecologi-
cal  Effects  of Territoriality  in the  Maine  Lobster  Industry, in  The  Question  of the
Commons  41,  61-63  (Bonnie  J. McCay  & James  M. Acheson  eds.,  1990);  James  M.
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simple message  to keep  out is all that is needed  in order for most
people  to bring  out the  value  of the  resource,  and more  detailed
use rules can then be  directed to  those with high  stakes and good
information  about  it. Robert  Ellickson  hypothesizes  that  institu-
tions  developed  among  close-knit  groups  will  be  wealth-
maximizing for the members of the group, but not necessarily effi-
cient  in any  wider sense. 65  Consider  this in connection  with close-
knit groups'  efforts  at exclusion, which come in two broad types-
exclusion  of nongroup members  and  exclusion of group members
by  owners  within the  group.  As  for  the  former,  one might  think
that groups  excluding  nonmembers  are doing  no more than grab-
bing resources,  but it does seem that the ability to exclude  outsid-
ers  often  promotes  conservation  and  sustainability  of  common-
pool resources.'
We have even more reason to think that institutions are efficient
when their costs and benefits are more internalized to the members
of the group; importantly, close-knit  communities not only exclude
outsiders  but they  often  institute  rights  to  exclude  among  them-
selves. The rise of family beaver-hunting territories  among the Na-
tive  Americans  of the  Labrador  peninsula  is  a famous  example,67
Acheson,  Variations  in  Traditional  Inshore  Fishing  Rights  in  Maine  Lobstering
Communities,  in  North  Atlantic  Maritime  Cultures:  Anthropological  Essays  on
Changing Adaptations 253, 262  (Raoul Andersen ed., 1979)  (arguing that there would
be little point in the lobster gangs'  maintaining strict norms of proper use without lim-
iting their membership);  Carol M.  Rose, The Several  Futures of Property:  Of Cyber-
space and Folk Tales,  Emission Trades  and  Ecosystems,  83  Minn.  L. Rev.  129,  144,
155 (1998)  (pointing out that common-property  regimes  may look like a commons  on
the inside but act like property on the outside); Smith, Exclusion versus Governance,
supra note 3,  at S482-83.
See Robert C. Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbors  Settle Disputes  169
(1991)  [hereinafter Ellickson, Order without Law]; Ellickson, Property in Land, supra
note 46, at 1400.
See,  e.g., James M. Acheson, The Lobster Gangs of Maine 55-58 (1988)  (discuss-
ing the  superiority  of lobster stocks  in areas  with more exclusive  territories);  Elinor
Ostrom,  Governing  the Commons:  The Evolution  of Institutions for  Collective  Ac-
tion 90 (1990)  (listing "clearly  defined boundaries"  as a design principle  illustrated by
long-enduring  common  pool  resource  ("CPR")  institutions,  where  "[i]ndividuals  or
households  who have rights to withdraw resource units from the CPR must be clearly
defined,  as must the boundaries  of the CPR itself").
67 Demsetz, supra note 48,  at 351-53;  Ellickson, Property in Land, supra note 46, at
1320-21.  Demsetz used  the example  of the  rise  of family  beaver-hunting  territories
among the  Native  Americans  of the  Labrador peninsula as  an example  of property
rights  that emerged  when  the fur trade caused  the gains  from  defining  territories to
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but far  from  unique  among  aboriginal  societies"  and  other close-
knit groups.69 In our terms, such societies employ a mix of exclusion
and governance. In such  systems, we sometimes find exclusion op-
erating alone (especially with respect to outsiders), but it is unusual
to find governance  rules over a resource  with no exclusion whatso-
ever,  which  is  consistent  with  an  exclusion  regime  as  being  the
"first  cut" in terms of information  costs.7" Further, as the  pressure
on and value of resources rise, we often find a  shift from exclusion
to governance  of a resource. 71 These patterns suggest that exclusion
is  more  basic  and  that  governance  serves  a  supplemental  fine-
tuning function, as information-cost theory would predict.
As  the  common  pool  situations  remind  us,  these  governance
rules  can  come  from  judges,  as  in  nuisance,  or  they  can  emerge
from  either  private  contracting,  the  development  of  informal
norms,  or  the  activities  of regulatory  authorities.  These  different
institutional  suppliers of use rules  have their own  advantages  and
weaknesses, but what they have in common is an ability to achieve
exceed the costs. The questions of whether  the family  hunting  territories among any
of the Northern Algonquin tribes antedated  the fur trade and whether the strength of
territories correlates  with  the length of the fur trade  or the lack of importance  to  a
tribe of big game have  been debated for almost a century and are still hotly contested.
See, e.g., John C. McManus,  An Economic Analysis of Indian Behavior  in the  North
American  Fur Trade,  32 J.  Econ. Hist. 36,  39 n.10  (1972);  see  also William Cronon,
Changes in  the  Land: Indian,  Colonists,  and  the  Ecology  of New England  104,  194
n.40  (1983)  (noting  and  citing  contributions  to  the debate  over Algonquian  family
hunting territories  and taking a moderate  position for some precolonial  parcelization
that became more fixed in the trading era).
6 Martin J. Bailey, Approximate  Optimality of Aboriginal  Property Rights, 35 J.L.
& Econ. 183,  183 (1992)  (finding  widespread use of exclusive rights among more than
fifty aboriginal groups).
69 Smith, Exclusion versus Governance,  supra note  3,  at  S484-85;  Henry E.  Smith,
Semicommon  Property  Rights  and Scattering  in the  Open Fields,  29  J. Legal  Stud.
131,  144-54, 161-67  (2000). Ellickson surveyed societies that can  be termed close-knit
and found widespread private  rights. Some of these-such as rights to crops and hunt-
ing territories-fall towards  the exclusion end of the spectrum, while  others-such as
usufructs and rights to withdraw flows-fall  further towards the governance  end. El-
lickson, Property in Land, supra note 46, at 1331-32, 1367-68.
7 0 Smith, Exclusion versus Governance, supra note 3, at S485-86.
71 See id. at S486 (noting that "[a]s  resource values increase, we can get either more
governance  or more fine grained  exclusion"); Rose, Rethinking  Environmental  Con-
trols, supra note 35,  at 8-24  (arguing that as pressure on  a given  resource  increases,
the  optimal  commons  management  strategy  shifts  from  simple  exclusion  to  more
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high levels of precision more efficiently  than can pure strategies  of
exclusion.
II. LOCATION IN THE LAW OF TRESPASS  AND NUISANCE
In  the  context  of  land,  the  right  to  exclude  is  implemented
largely through the law of trespass and nuisance.72 Roughly speak-
ing, trespass  is  concerned  with  invasions that  interfere  with "pos-
session,"  and possession,  generally  speaking,  is  a right  to control
not identical with full ownership.73 Possession, in turn, tends to use
very simple signals that are aimed at a large and indefinite  (in rem)
audience  of those who have to "keep  off."74 The law of private nui-
sance  presents  a more complicated  picture  than trespass,  because
at times nuisance law is highly exclusionary and resembles trespass,
but at other times  nuisance  is concerned  with  balancing  the  costs
72  The  law of personal property vindicates  the right to exclude  through trespass  to
chattels. Trespass  to chattels  is similar to trespass  to land in  conditioning liability on
obvious interferences with the chattel but does not allow for nominal damages in the
absence of provable harm. See Restatement (Second)  of Torts § 217 cmt. e (1965). On
how the right to  exclude  operates  in the context of intangible  rights like intellectual
property, see, for example, Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property  as Property: An In-
formation-Cost  Approach (draft on file with author and the Virginia Law Review As-
sociation) (analyzing  right to exclude from uses of information as relying on relatively
low  cost but  rough signals); see also Penner, The Idea of Property, supra  note  21,  at
50,  111-27 (discussing the thesis that the thinghood of objects of property stems from
their separability from the current holder).
" A leading case on possession  is Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R.  175, 179  (N.Y.  Sup. Ct.
1805)  (considering whether pursuit of a wild  animal constitutes possession), and a re-
cent,  famous example  is Popov v. Hayashi, No. 400545,  2002 WL 31833731  (Cal.  Su-
per.  Ct.  Dec.  18,  2002)  (analyzing  the  disputed  possession  of the  infamous  Barry
Bonds home run ball). See also, F.H. Lawson, Introduction  to the Law of Property 33
(1958)  ("In practice indeed possession is often  said to be a social rather than  a physi-
cal fact, in the sense that a person will be held to possess a thing if he has the sort and
extent  of control  that society,  considered  as  being represented  by  the ordinary rea-
sonable man, would  regard as appropriate  to the kind  of thing and the circumstances
of the case."); Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev.
73,  73  (1985)  (addressing  the puzzle  of how things  come  to be  owned)  [hereinafter
Rose,  Possession];  Henry  E.  Smith, The Language  of Property: Form, Context,  and
Audience,  55  Stan.  L. Rev.  1105,  1115-25  (2003)  [hereinafter  Smith,  Language  of
Property]  (demonstrating  that,  in the law  of possession,  courts seek clear  rules that
reduce  complexity).  In  a  bailment,  for  example,  possession  without  ownership  is
transferred to the bailee.
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and  benefits  of uses  and exhibits  the  hallmarks  of a judicial gov-
ernance regime. 75
Being  able  to  explain  the hybrid  nature  of nuisance  law  in  in-
formation-cost  terms  will  help  resolve  a  longstanding  puzzle.
Commentators  who  recognize  the  hard-edged  character  of tradi-
tional  nuisance  law  have justified  this  aspect  in corrective  justice
terms  and  have  conceded  that  it  conflicts  both  with  economic
analysis  and  other  utilitarian  approaches."  For  example,  early  in
his career Richard Epstein favored strict liability and a heavy reli-
ance on physical invasion tests in nuisance, subject to softening by
utilitarian constraints  such as "live  and let live"  that come in as de-
fenses  only."  More  recently  he  has  resolved  the conflict  in more
Coasean  and utilitarian  balancing  terms, but  still  sees  the conflict
between exclusion and tailoring as one between pure and less pure
corrective  justice  approaches. 8 The information-cost  theory, how-
ever, suggests  that  (what  I call)  exclusion versus  governance  does
not line up so neatly with corrective justice versus utilitarianism.  I
do not claim that the information-cost  reasons for exclusion consti-
tute the entire rationale for that type of rule and, as mentioned ear-
lier, an information-cost  theory extends many of the traditional ra-
tionales  for  property  based  on investment  and  stability  in  a  way
that  allows  them to  withstand  the  apparent  Coasean  logic of the
conventional  law and  economics of nuisance. But I will argue that
there are information-cost specific reasons to favor exclusion in the
law  of nuisance  that  cause  the  two  major  approaches,  corrective
75 In this Article, I focus on private nuisance. Public nuisance partakes more of pub-
lic  regulation, and as  expected on the information-cost  approach,  is  even  more  gov-
ernance-like  than the law of private nuisance.
76  See,  e.g., Epstein,  Nuisance  Law, supra note  14,  at 74-75;  see also Penner,  Nui-
sance  and the Character of the Neighbourhood, supra note 12, at 14-25 (arguing that
nuisance law in its traditional tort context of rights is more effective than  a regime of
nuisance law that hinges upon economic analysis).
77Epstein, Nuisance Law, supra note 14, at 60-75,82-87.
78See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Conceptual Approach to Zoning: What's Wrong
with Euclid, 5 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 277,  282 (1996)  ("[Nuisance]  law does not work on a
moral  or  deductive  principle.  Rather,  it works  on  a rough  empirical  generalization
that will be false in some cases but true in most: we should permit only those activities
in  which  the benefits  to  the land  owner  exceed  the  costs  from  dirt  and  filth to  the
neighbor."); Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single  Owner: One
More Salute to Ronald Coase, 36 J.L. & Econ. 553  (1993)  [herienafter Epstein, Hold-
outs]  (adopting  Coasean analysis in contrast  to earlier views and advocating a  "single
owner" principle for resolving use conflicts).
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justice  and utilitarianism, to coincide  here more  than  their adher-
ents would have admitted.
A.  Trespass versus Nuisance
Trespass and nuisance  both protect landowners'  interests  in the
use of their land, but they do so in very different ways.  The law of
trespass  applies to  gross physical  invasions  by  visible objects,  ap-
plies  a test  of strict liability,  and routinely allows for injunctions. 79
In our terms, trespass is an exclusion regime because it simply asks
whether  the  defendant  caused  some  physical  object  to  enter  the
column of space defined by the ad coelum rule.'  The informational
variables  used relate  to causation  and location,  leading  to a stan-
dard  for  liability  that  is  "exceptionally  simple  and  exceptionally
rigorous."'" Nuisance,  on the other hand, applies to other more in-
direct  intrusions  such  as  noise,  odor,  and  occasionally  aesthetic
blight,  that  interfere  with  an  owner's  use  and  enjoyment  of  her
land;  nuisance  is sometimes  based  on  a balancing  of the benefits
and  harms from the offending  activity, and may more readily  em-
ploy a remedy  of damages  than in trespass.'  Under more modern
approaches  to nuisance,  balancing tests are often invoked  at the li-
ability or remedy stage, although evidence of courts actually engag-
ing in cost-benefit analysis is surprisingly slight.'  In the law of pri-
" See W. Page  Keeton et al.,  Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 87, at 622
(5th ed.  1984)  [hereinafter  Prosser and Keeton  on  Torts];  Merrill,  supra  note  13,  at
14-20.
o  The  full statement of the  maxim is cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad
inferos (he  who owns the soil owns  also to the sky and to the depths). The maxim  is
routinely  followed  in  resolving  issues  about  ownership  of  air  rights,  building  en-
croachments, overhanging  tree limbs,  mineral  rights,  and  so  forth,  and  is subject  to
certain limited exceptions for activities like airplane overflights.  See Brown v. United
States, 73 F.3d 1100,  1103-04 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Merrill, supra note 13, at 26-35.
81  Prosser, supra note 17, at 63 (quoting 1 Thomas Atkins Street, Foundations of Le-
gal Liability 19 (1906)).
'  Prosser and Keeton on Torts, supra note 79, §§ 86-91.
William L.  Prosser, Handbook  of the  Law  of Torts  § 89,  at  596-602  (4th  ed.
1971)  (considering  the "reasonable  use" balancing  test and  citing  modem  case  ap-
plications).  Under the Second  Restatement,  a nuisance is  a substantial  nontrespas-
sory invasion of use  and enjoyment of land that is caused either by intentional  and
unreasonable  activities,  or  negligent,  reckless,  or  ultrahazardous  activities.  Re-
statement  (Second)  of Torts  §§ 821F,  822 (1979).  Intentional  nuisances largely  turn
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vate nuisance,  injunctions are awarded  for more serious  nuisances
and  where  damages  would  be  inadequate.  I  will  argue  that  nui-
sance partakes both of an exclusionary and governance-like  aspect;
for the  more serious  and clear  cases  of nuisance,  simple informa-
tional variables based on border crossing are employed, but the law
of nuisance supplements  the exclusionary  foundation with rules on
proper use, subjecting conflicting uses to various types of balancing
and reasonableness analyses.
The  tests for classifying  harms  as  trespass  or nuisance  reflect  a
greater  reliance  on  exclusion  in  trespass.  At  various  times,  four
tests,  each  of which  is  at least  occasionally  invoked,  serve  to de-
marcate  the boundary  between trespass and nuisance.'  First, tres-
pass may apply where there is a personal  entry by the defendant. 85
Second,  trespass  may be  reserved  for  "direct"  injuries  to  land  as
opposed  to  more  indirect  ones. 86  Third,  trespass  may  turn  on
An intentional invasion of another's interest in the  use and enjoyment of land
is unreasonable if
(a) the gravity of the harm outweighs  the utility of the actor's conduct, or
(b) the harm caused  by the conduct is serious and the financial  burden of com-
pensating for this and similar harm to others  would not make the continuation
of the conduct not feasible.
Id. § 826; see also id. § 827 (setting out factors relating to gravity of the harm, in-
cluding the  social value of the plaintiff's use);  id. §  828  (setting out factors relat-
ing to the utility of actor's conduct, including its social value);  6A American Law
of Property  § 28.22, at 66,  § 28.26, at 75-77 (A. James Casner ed., 1954)  (empha-
sizing  the  vagaries  associated  with,  and  importance  of, a  determination  as  to
whether  a defendant's conduct is unreasonable);  1 Fowler V. Harper  & Fleming
James, Jr., The Law of Torts §  1.24, at 70-74 (1956)  (discussing the importance of
reasonableness  consideration  in  nuisance  cases).  See  generally  Jeff  L.  Lewin,
Boomer  and the American  Law of Nuisance,  54 Alb. L. Rev.  189, 212-14 (docu-
menting  the  limited  adoption  of the balance  of the utilities  test  for reasonable-
ness,  and  citing cases).  Some courts  invoking  the Restatement  formulations  do
not  actually  engage  in  the cost-benefit  test and  appear to be  hewing  to a more
traditional  approach  to nuisance.  See,  e.g.,  Morgan  v.  High  Penn  Oil  Co.,  77
S.E.2d 682 (N.C. 1953).
,  Merrill, supra note 13, at 26-35.
85 Id. at 27. This is the oldest test.
6 Id. at 27-28. This  distinction  traces back  to the actions  of trespass  and case, the
latter of which was  for indirect injuries. Under a very traditional  view, then, an over-
hanging part of a building would  be the subject of a nuisance action rather  than tres-
pass because the  building does not directly touch  the plaintiff's  land.  See, e.g.,  Kafka
v.  Bozio,  218  P.  753,  755  (Cal.  1923)  ("The  wrong  here  complained  of  was  an  en-
croachment, not upon plaintiffs'  land, but upon the space above the land, and there-
fore was not a trespass but a nuisance."). Now such  a condition  would be considered
trespass. See,  e.g., Puroto  v. Chieppa,  62 A. 664,  665  (Conn.  1905)  (holding that  the
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whether  individualized  invading  objects  are  visible  to  the  naked
eye,  as  are  shotgun  pellets,  rocks,  and  people  (but  not  smoke,
odors, or aesthetic  blight, which  would fall under nuisance,  if they
are  actionable at all).'  Fourth, trespass may be  reserved for situa-
tions of substantial harm that constructively  deny possession to the plaintiff.'
Previous commentary  has identified a number of reasons for tai-
loring  nuisance  more  precisely  than trespass.  Thomas  Merrill has
argued that the tests for distinguishing trespass and nuisance reflect
courts'  greater willingness  to  incur higher  entitlement  determina-
tion costs in those cases in which high  transaction costs likely pre-
clude  a private  bargain  over  the  conflicting  uses.'  Merrill  argues
that the first three tests all serve roughly to single out situations of
low transaction  costs  for mechanical  treatment by  trespass?  Who
the invader is in a personal invasion is not difficult to discover. The
notion of direct intrusions  may be personal  and may therefore  in-
volve  only low  transaction  costs. The  dimensional test, in particu-
lar, will tend to pick out situations in which the source of the parti-
cles  is  known  and  relatively  close  by,  and the  problem need  not
involve  continuous monitoring.9'  Merrill's  analysis  fits in well with
what has been, until recently,  the conventional wisdom in  law and
economics: that property rules are best in situations of low transac-
projection  of flashboard  by one inch  over plaintiff's land constitutes a trespass enti-
tling  plaintiff to  at  least nominal  damages);  Cumberland  Tel.  & Tel. Co.  v.  Barnes,
101  S.W.  301,  302  (Ky.  1907)  (overhanging  telephone pole  arms  a  continuing  tres-
pass);  Smith v.  Smith. 110  Mass.  302,  304  (1872)  (overhanging  eaves are  a trespass);
Davies  v. Bennison  (1927)  22 T.L.R. 52 (Austl.)  (shooting  at cat on plaintiff's roof a
trespass even though bullets never reached the ground); Prosser and Keeton on Torts,
supra note 79, § 13, at 78-79 (discussing  and citing cases involving overhanging objects
and shooting over land); see  also Butler  v. Frontier Tel. Co., 79 N.E.  716,  718  (N.Y.
1906)  (overhanging wires  oust plaintiff from possession as required for ejectment  ac-
tion). See  generally P.H. Winfield, Nuisance  as a Tort, 4 Cambridge  L.J. 189, 201-06
(1931)  (discussing  origins of the distinction  between trespass and nuisance  in  the ac-
tions of trespass vi et armis and trespass upon the case).
See Merrill, supra note 13,  at 28-29  (citing cases).
See, e.g., Martin  v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d  790, 798 (Or. 1959);  Merrill, su-
pra note  13, at 30.
9 Merrill,  supra note  13. Some commentators focus on the likelihood of bargains  in
light of the nature of the entitlement bargained over. See,  e.g., Ayres & Talley, supra
note  57 (arguing  that  liability rules facilitate  bargaining); Jason  Scott Johnston, Bar-
gaining Under Rules Versus Standards,  11 J.L. Econ. & Org. 256, 259 (1995).
go  Merrill, supra note  13, at 31-34.
91 Id. at 33.Exclusion and Nuisance
tion costs and liability rules and tailoring are better for situations of
high transaction costs  because  in such  situations  the  court's  word
will be  final.'  In  a more  normative vein,  Richard  Epstein  argues
that for reasons rooted in corrective justice, nuisance  should be re-
conceived  as  being  about  physical  invasions  (in  a  manner  very
reminiscent of trespass). Epstein then identifies four utilitarian fac-
tors  leading  to  relaxation  of  a  strict  corrective  justice  approach:
high administrative  costs,  high transaction  costs  facing those  reas-
signing rights  voluntarily, low value  of the rights that nuisance law
qualifies,  and presence  of in-kind compensation  that prevents  sys-
tematic  wealth  transfers.93  In  our  terms,  exclusion  would  corre-
spond roughly  to  Epstein's corrective  justice-inspired  physical  in-
vasion approach.
Most  of  the  special  factors  identified  by  Merrill  and  Epstein
point  away  from  exclusion,  but  one  immediate  question  is  when
should high  administrative  costs  lead  us to  expect  simple rules  of
exclusion or a rule of no liability at all. Although  high administra-
tive  costs  can  justify  a  failure  to  find  liability-for  de  minimis
harms-it  can  also  be  a reason  to choose  exclusion over  govern-
ance.  In  trespass  to  real  property,  the  classic  exclusion  regime,
plaintiffs who cannot show substantial damage-or even who bene-
fited  from  the  trespass-can  nonetheless  recover  nominal  dam-
ages.'  Unlike in nuisance, there is no de minimis exception  in tres-
pass.95 One reason for the lack of a de minimis exception in trespass
follows from its nature as an exclusion regime.  Carving out the de
minimis uses would forego the cost-savings  of the simple informa-
tional variables of entry. A de minimis exception would also likely
capture  few  benefits  because  gross  physical invasions  tend  to  be
" Calabresi  & Melamed,  supra note 2,  at 1106-10; see  also, Robert Cooter & Tho-
mas Ulen,  Law and Economics  104-07 (4th ed. 2004)  (discussing the relationship be-
tween  transaction  costs and  efficient  remedies);  Ayres  & Goldbart,  Correlated  Val-
ues,  supra  note  62,  at  123  (noting  the  conventional  wisdom  and  summarizing
criticism);  Daphna  Lewinsohn-Zamir,  The  Choice  between  Property  Rules and  Li-
ability  Rules  Revisited:  Critical  Observations  from  Behavioral  Studies,  80  Tex.  L.
Rev. 219, 220 (2001)  (discussing  this traditional view and citing literature).
'3Epstein, Nuisance Law, supra note 14, at 74-79, 82-90.
9 Prosser and Keeton on Torts, supra note 79, § 13, at 75.
9'  Id. Some courts have  assimilated trespass  law somewhat to nuisance and  in effect
allowed a de minimis exception  for trespass, albeit probably more limited than that in
nuisance. See, e.g., Borland v.  Sanders  Lead Co.,  369  So. 2d 523,  529-30 (Ala.  1979);
Martin v. Reynolds Metals  Co., 342 P.2d 790, 795-96 (Or. 1959).
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easy for third parties to avoid. Indeed, part of the simplicity  of the
message  to keep off, directed at the world at large, is that compli-
ance  is  not  likely to involve  much  effort  or  sacrifice  in  terms  of
time and effort-at least as compared to the wide and protean class
of uses covered by the law of nuisance.
Likewise,  at the opposite end of the intensity spectrum, informa-
tion  costs  help  explain  the  fourth  test  for  trespass-substantial
harm that leads to constructive dispossession-despite its not doing
a particularly good job of identifying situations  of low transaction
costs (in the sense of bargaining costs).  While it is true that the di-
viding  line  between  substantial  harm  and  other  harms  requires
more judgment, once  a situation fits under substantial harm, it re-
quires  little measurement.  The idea is that  some intrusions are  so
severe that they not only interfere with use and enjoyment but are
a  "constructive"  interference  with  exclusive  possession.  In  our
terms, if an invasion is so severe that it interferes with all use, then
it  is  likely  that  any  hard-to-measure  use  is  also  being  interfered
with. If the  invasion  is  not so severe, further measurement  to de-
termine whether the uses interfered  with are being harmed is more
likely to be worth the cost.
B. Information Costs and the Nature of Nuisance Law
The  information-cost  theory allows  us to generalize  and extend
the  factors  favoring  a  more  governance-type  regime  in  nuisance
law. Why  would one want to move away  from a system of delega-
tion to owners of the function of gathering  and acting  on informa-
tion about uses, towards  a regime of off-the-rack governance rules?
On the information-cost  approach, the presence  of high stakes en-
sures that some precision (towards the governance  end of the spec-
trum)  will  be  worthwhile.'  If,  at the  same  time,  the  transaction
costs of private contracting  or the formation of informal norms are
high, then judicial governance can be worthwhile.
As mentioned  earlier, nuisance is  a notoriously slippery area of
the law, and  I argue that it is all the more so because nuisance con-
tains  within  itself  a  shift  from  the  exclusion  to  the  governance
strategy. Recognizing  this transitional aspect of nuisance will allow
a better  description  of the  apparent  disorder  in  the  case law  and
96 See Smith, Exclusion versus Governance, supra note 3,  at S471-78.
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the even sharper divergence  of views among commentators.  In ad-
dition, the  information-cost  approach  suggests  the  desirability  of
retaining  exclusionary  elements  in  nuisance  law that  have  fallen
somewhat out of favor.
As we have seen, trespass is more based on exclusion than is nui-
sance.  Trespass  protects  against  violations  of rights  of possession,
which have highly exclusion-like aspects. The notion of possession is
itself based  heavily  on  low-cost,  low-precision  informational  vari-
ables. Possession is a very crude proxy signal that does not involve
detailed information, particularly  of how the thing possessed is be-
ing  used.'  Instead,  the  law  of possession  is designed  to  declare  a
clear  owner  in  terms understandable  by the world  at large.98  Pos-
session forms the rough beginning upon which further refinements
in property  law  are  built. By contrast, nuisance  protects rights  to
the  quiet use  and  enjoyment  of land. Sometimes  this involves  an
evaluation  of particular  uses,  but  a generalized  concern  with  use
can veer into exclusion. When a nuisance is significant or obvious,
it can  be  regarded  as  interfering  with  any  imaginable  use.  If  so,
then  detailed  inquiry  into  use  is  not  necessary  and  an  approach
based on a general right to exclude emerges to vindicate the right
to  quiet  use  and  enjoyment,  without  needing  to  specify  exactly
what use is involved or what its value might be.
1. Substantial  Harm
The tendency  of nuisance  toward exclusion  in cases of substan-
tial harm makes sense in terms of the informational costs and bene-
fits of isolating and evaluating uses. In situations  of harm so great
as to preclude  multiple uses, there  is no point  in courts or others
incurring the costs of precision,  and here the law employs trespass
97 Epstein,  Possession,  supra  note  28,  at  1222-23  (arguing  that because  of courts'
modest remedial powers  their "definition  of rights is therefore  apt to be made along
certain  'natural  lines';  there will  be broadgeneral  propositions that can  apply to all
against  all, and there will  be no reference  to the numbers or formulas...  that can be
generated by direct administrative controls, such as zoning"). 9 8 Rose,  Possession,  supra note 73,  at 88 (noting  that the standards for determining
possession are based on "a  specific vocabulary  within a structure of symbols approved
and understood  by  a commercial people");  Smith, Language  of Property,  supra note
73, at 1115-25.
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and  trespass-like  nuisance  rules. 9 The  exclusion  strategy  can  be
found within the law of nuisance itself.
The  doctrine  of nuisance  per  se reinforces  the  exclusionary  as-
pect  of nuisance  law.  A  nuisance  per  se  is  an  activity  that  is  so
harmful that contextual information about the locality or the plain-
tiff is very  unlikely to change  the result.1" Nuisances  that count as
nuisances  per se are  not necessarily  characterized  by low  transac-
tion costs, but the information-cost  theory gives reasons other than
low  transaction  costs  for favoring  exclusion:  In  cases of nuisance
per se, the benefit  of further precision in court  efforts at delinea-
tion seems small. Consequently, the doctrine  of nuisance  per se al-
lows a conclusion  of nuisance  (and an injunction) without govern-
ance-like inquiry into the contextual details of a use-conflict.
2. Location
In a physical  context  such as land-use  conflict, exclusion is typi-
cally implemented using locational variables-for example,  has the
defendant  entered  into the column  of space  around the  resource?
Though  there is  a  tendency  to  think  of nuisance  as  being  about
balancing  the worth  of activities,  the most  striking aspect  of nui-
sance  disputes is how much  location matters. Despite  the  best ef-
forts of Coasean  thinkers  to argue that causation  is  reciprocal  and
to discredit traditional, ordinary notions  of one-way causation, the
law still takes the notion of "invasion"  by a tortfeasor of a victim's
rights surprisingly literally. Thus, if trespass looks for physical inva-
sions, especially by visible objects, nuisance  is  about invasions  of a
more  ethereal  sort. But the  disturbance  should  emanate  from the
defendant's land and cause harm on that of the plaintiff.
As I will argue, despite the growing utility-balancing approach to
the law of private nuisance,  this branch  of the law rests  on an  ex-
9 Recall that trespass is a rule of strict liability. Keith Hylton uses a missing markets
theory to predict that in situations where external costs are clearly greater than exter-
nal benefits and transaction costs are high,  the law tends towards strict liability. Keith
N. Hylton, A Missing  Markets Theory  of Tort Law,  90 Nw. U.  L. Rev.  977,  989-93
(1996).
"0  A nuisance per se is activity that constitutes  a nuisance wherever and whenever it
occurs. A nuisance per accidens is otherwise permissible activity that constitutes a nui-
sance only because of where or when  it takes place.  See, e.g.,  Morgan  v. High Penn
Oil Co., 77 S.E.2d 682, 687 (N.C. 1953).2004] Exclusion and Nuisance 999
clusionary foundation supplemented by governance  rules. Further,
institutions other than courts, ranging from private parties in com-
mon  interest  communities  to  legislatures  and  administrative  bod-
ies, are probably better suited than courts to achieve the benefits  of
the regulation  of harms  like aesthetic  blight. Traditionally, and to
commentators'  disappointment  today,  location  and physical  inva-
sion are  very important  informational  variables in the  law  of nui-
sance.
Consistent with the view that location is important is the relative
ease  with  which  courts  have  recognized  different  classes  of nui-
sances.  Those disturbances  involving  tangible  but non-trespassory
invasions  such  as smoke, odors, vibrations,  excessive  light or tem-
perature, are  well established." 1 ' Sometimes courts have found nui-
sances  in activities  that threaten future physical invasions,  such  as
stored explosives, fire hazards, and vicious dogs."°  Less tangible in-
vasions are more  difficult to shoehorn into nuisance. Apart from a
few categories like funeral parlors, moral nuisances  such  as public
nudity  are found only occasionally,  and purely  aesthetic  nuisances
such  as parking broken cars are almost never found at  all.' 3 Inter-
'0,See,  e.g., Grady  v. Wolsner,  46 Ala. 381  (1871)  (heat);  Higgins v.  Decorah  Pro-
duce  Co.,  242  N.W.  109  (Iowa  1932)  (odor);  Sam  Warren  &  Son  Stone  Co.  v.
Gruesser,  209  S.W.2d  817  (Ky.  1948)  (vibration);  The  Shelburne,  Inc.  v.  Crossan
Corp.,  122 A. 749 (N.J. Ch. 1923)  (light); Prosser and Keeton on Torts, supra  note 79,
§ 87, at 619-20  (identifying  kinds of nuisances). For disturbances like excessive light,
plaintiffs may have to contend  with the defense that they  are hypersensitive,  see, for
example, Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland  Meadows, 198 P.2d 847,  853 (Or. 1948). Very
few cases, however, have  found a nuisance exclusively  for excessive  light, see Kristen
M.  Ploetz, Light Pollution  in the United States:  An Overview of the Inadequacies  of
the Common  Law  and  State  and Local  Regulation,  36  New Eng.  L. Rev. 985,  1006
(2002).
'w  Prosser and Keeton on Torts, supra note 79, § 87, at 620 (citing cases).
103Id.  §  86,  at  626;  Smith  & Fernandez,  supra  note  12,  at 54-55  (lamenting  that
"courts continue to deny relief for injury to aesthetic interests of residential landown-
ers")  (footnotes omitted); id. at 66 (asserting that "[t]hroughout  the evolution  of nui-
sance law,  courts have  almost unanimously refused to recognize  actions for aesthetic
nuisance"  and citing cases); see also infra note 104. A few courts have found aesthetic
nuisance. See, e.g., Allison v. Smith, 695 P.2d 791, 788 (Colo.  Ct. App. 1984)  (holding
that  storage of  disused  cars  and  other junk  near  property  line  was  a  nuisance  for
which  an  appropriate  remedy  was  a  permanent  injunction);  Foley  v.  Harris,  286
S.E.2d 186,  191  (Va. 1982)  (finding that storage of wrecked cars on lots in subdivision
constituted a  nuisance); John  Copeland Nagle,  Moral Nuisances,  50 Emory  L.J. 265,
282-83  (arguing  that courts are beginning a trend  away from traditional  rejection of
aesthetic nuisance  claims); Note, Aesthetic Nuisance:  An Emerging Cause  of Action,
45  N.Y.U. L. Rev.  1075,  1076-80  (1970)  (arguing that there are signs that courts mayVirginia Law Review
estingly,  courts  routinely  deny relief for  aesthetic  nuisances  even
where the impact on the market value of the plaintiff's land is  ob-
vious and does not present problems of proving damages.
Modern  commentators,  by contrast,  are  quite  favorable  to  the
idea  of  aesthetic  nuisance,  because  they  do  not  see  nuisance  as
tethered  to cheap, rough informational variables relating to physi-
cal location. In their more tort-like approach, inspired by the law of
accidents,  they  perceive  that the  harms  from aesthetic  nuisances
are no less  real  than are  other, more  tangible, harms. As a result,
modern  commentators  believe  that  such  conflicts  should  be  as
amenable  to  judicial  intervention  as  other  more  traditional  nui-
sances.'  This  makes  sense  on  the  benefit  side,  which  relates  to
what harms might be abated, but ignores significant elements of in-
formation costs. Because impairments of aesthetic values are more
difficult to  meter than are noises, heat, and so on, an information-
cost  theory  leads us  to  expect  a  lesser  reliance  on finely  tailored
governance in this area.
Focusing  on  the  benefits  of addressing  individuated  activities,
law  and  economics  differs  from  nuisance  law  with  its  traditional
exclusion-like  concern with the locus of activities.  In his landmark
social cost article, Coase assumes a very realist picture of property,
particularly  where  property  intersects  with  the  law  of  torts. °5 To
Coase,  the  economic  problem  of externalities  was  essentially  one
of conflicting resource use. From an economist's point of view, the
set of uses that maximizes  the overall value  of all resources should
be chosen. To illustrate the problem, Coase took nuisance disputes
drawn from nineteenth-century English cases and analyzed them in
terms  of the economic problem of achieving  the highest  value  use
be beginning to move away from flat rejection of all aesthetic claims to a position that
aesthetic nuisance ordinarily  will not be actionable). ' 0See,  e.g.,  Robert  D.  Dodson,  Rethinking  Private  Nuisance  Law:  Recognizing
Aesthetic Nuisances in the New Millennium,  10 S.C. Envtl. L.J. 1, 3 (2002)  (suggesting
that "an  aesthetic nuisance should  be recognized  and  treated like any other nuisance
case"); Smith & Fernandez, supra note  12,  at  54-55 (asserting  that "[t]he  bases upon
which courts continue to withhold recognition of aesthetic  nuisance actions lack both
economic justification and legal coherence").
'0'  Coase,  supra note 1, at 8-15 (contrasting unfavorably the reasons given by judges
in hallmark nuisance cases with proper economic analysis in terms of choices between
valued activities);  see  also Merrill & Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and
Economics?, supra note  3, at 366-71  (arguing that Coase's approach  to land use con-
flict reflects a hyperrealist conception of property).
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of resources. In doing so, Coase assumed that property is the result
of decisions over use-conflicts and that property is, in essence, a list
of use rights."  A new  conflict  emerges  and  is  decided,  awarding
one more use-right stick to the bundle of one of the conflicting par-
ties.  Consider  Coase's  most  famous  example,  Sturges  v.  Bridg-
man,
07  the conflict between a confectioner  making noise and vibra-
tion  and the doctor who recently built his examination  room  next
to the common wall.'  Coase considers the causation to be recipro-
cal-the doctor's use causes the conflict just as much as the confec-
tioner's-and  believes  that  the  problem  is  to  resolve  the  use-
conflict  in such  a way that the land is put to its  highest use. In the
absence of transactions, the court's word on this will be final.'"
The Sturges court decided for the plaintiff doctor largely because
the doctor, in building the  examining room,  was doing something
to which he was entitled, whereas the confectioner was sending vi-
brations  across the boundary between  the two parcels. This seems
question-begging  or  arbitrary.  I  argue  that  in this  situation,  as  in
many nuisance  cases,  Coase's observation about the reciprocal na-
ture  of  causation,  while  correct  in  a  theoretical  sense,  is  not
particularly  helpful  in  deciding  actual  disputes.  In  fact,  the
treatment  of land-use  conflicts  under  nuisance  and easement  law
reflects  how  deeply  entrenched  the  locational  approach  is.  In
Sturges, for example, the  defendant  confectioner's  main  argument
was not that there  was  no  nuisance-everyone  agreed  that there
was one-but that the nuisance had been occurring for longer than
the period required to  acquire  an easement  by prescription. Thus,
there was a large degree of consensus on what constituted a legally
cognizable harm, and the disagreement centered on questions such
as  whether  Dr.  Bridgman  could  have  brought  a  nuisance  suit
before  he  built  his  examination  room.  The  fact  that  the  harm
emanated  from  Sturges's  land onto  Bridgman's  meant that there
was a strong presumption that there was a nuisance, and there was
a need to  think in terms  of an easement,  a right in someone  else's
...  See Merrill & Smith, What Happened to Property  in Law and Economics?, supra
note 3,  at 366-71.
1o7 1  Ch.  D. 852  (CH.  1879)  (Eng.);  see  Coase,  supra  note  1, at  8-10. For back-
ground  on the case and an argument that the judges in that case were not directly in-
terested  in  economic  questions,  see  A.W.  Brian  Simpson,  Coase v.  Pigou  Reexam-
ined, 25 J. Legal Stud. 53, 89-92 (1996).
10811  Ch. D. at 852-54.
109 See Coase, supra note 1, at 19.
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terms of an easement,  a right in someone else's land. This accords
with the  strongly locational  nature of the parties'  rights under the
exclusion regime.  By  contrast, in the  Coasean  world  there  would
be no need for separate notions of nuisance and easement:  Sturges
would  have  a package  of  individualized  use  rights  that might  or
might not include the right to send vibrations off in Bridgman's di-
rection.
In actual land-use  conflicts, much  delineation  cost can  be saved
by  paying  attention  to  those  factors-where  someone  is  doing
something-that appear to be least relevant to Coase. Whereas  for
Coase  the  baseline  that  defines  rights  and  duties  is  the  relative
value  of  two  selected  uses  that  are  in  conflict,  the  law  defines  a
package  of  rights  in  terms  of  locations  and  actions  that  cross
boundaries.  This package  has sometimes  been  termed  "Blacksto-
nian,"  and,  although  in  its  absolute  form it  is  an  exaggeration,  it
does describe  the  strong default  package  of rights emerging  from
the  exclusion  strategy."'  This  package  serves  as  a  baseline  for
evaluating disputes that  allows courts largely to avoid the  ongoing
evaluation of uses of the Coasean sort.
The  question  of baselines  also  highlights  the  mixture  of exclu-
sion and  governance  in nuisance  law. Sturges is also famous for its
statement of the "locality rule," under which the existence of a nui-
sance is partially determined with respect to where the activity  oc-
curs."'  As a governance  regime, nuisance requires courts to look to
"'.  See Ellickson, Property  in Land, supra  note 46,  at  1362-63  (discussing  what the
author  terms  idealized  "Blackstonian"  bundle  of property  rights);  Merrill  & Smith,
What  Happened  to  Property in  Law  and  Economics?,  supra note  3,  at  392-94.  Al-
though  Blackstone's  language  is,  perhaps  intentionally,  overly  absolute,  he  does de-
scribe  a powerful  default  package.  2 William Blackstone,  Commentaries  *18-19  (ex-
plaining ad coelum maxim); id. at *2 (describing the right of property as "that sole and
despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the
world, in  total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe"); see also,
Robert  P. Burns,  Blackstone's  Theory  of the  "Absolute"  Rights of Property, 64  U.
Cin.  L. Rev. 67  (1985)  (arguing  that this "absolutist"  reputation  is inconsistent  with
the balance  of Blackstone's treatment  of property);  Carol M.  Rose, Canons of Prop-
erty Talk, or, Blackstone's Anxiety,  108 Yale.  L.J. 601,  604  (1998)  (describing  Black-
stone's talk of an exclusive  right to property as  "a  rhetorical figure  describing an ex-
treme or ideal type rather than reality").
."  11  Ch. D. at 865; see  also Campbell  v.  Seaman, 63 N.Y.  568, 577  (1876)  (holding
that "[a]  use of property in one locality and under some circumstances  may be lawful
and reasonable, which,  under  other circumstances,  would  be unlawful,  unreasonable
and a nuisance").2004] Exclusion and Nuisance 1003
the use and its context to see whether it is out of the ordinary in the
locality. Traditionally, this test looked to the neighborhood context
to  discover  what the  proper  "threshold"  for  nuisance  should  be,
and this inquiry did not involve a court's weighing of the costs and
benefits  of various  activities."'  But  the classic  modern  reformula-
tion of nuisance law tracing back to the First Restatement  has ad-
vocated building some kind of utility balancing test into the locality
standard."3  Commentators  such  as  Robert  Ellickson  and  Edward
Rabin have argued for damages liability for activities deemed sub-
normal  or  unneighborly  in  light  of  community  standards.'
14  This
usually involves  a use-by-use  evaluation of activities  and need  not
make reference to traditional notions of boundary invasions.
The  traditional  approach  to  the  locality  rule  does  not  make
boundary-based  exclusion  absolute,  but  is  consistent  with tolera-
tions  of invasions that reflect  mutually beneficial  forbearance.  In-
vasions can be exempted from liability as long as the uses in a given
area  are  relatively  uniform  and  thus  each  landowner  gets  what
Richard  Epstein calls "implicit  in-kind compensation"  in the form
of an  ability by  the  (unsuccessful)  plaintiff  to engage  in the  com-
plained-of  use  as well."5  The traditional  locality rule had  a strong
"' See Bone, supra  note 13, at 1159-60, 1160 n.126 (documenting  opposition among
nineteenth-century  courts  and commentators  to balancing of the utilities in  nuisance
cases).
113  Restatement (First)  of Torts §§ 822, 826  (1939).
"' Robert  C.  Ellickson,  Alternatives  to  Zoning:  Covenants,  Nuisance  Rules,  and
Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 681, 728-33  (1973)  [hereinafter Ellick-
son, Alternatives to Zoning]; Edward Rabin, Nuisance Law: Rethinking Fundamental
Assumptions,  63  Va. L. Rev.  1299, 1317-21  (1977).  Ellickson employs neighborliness
to define the prima facie case for nuisance:
A landowner  who  intentionally  carries  out activities,  or permits natural  condi-
tions to develop, that are perceived as unneighborly under  contemporary com-
munity standards shall be liable for all damages  (measured by the diminution in
the market value of plaintiff's land plus bonuses  for diminutions  in widely held
subjective  values) to all parties who are thereby  substantially injured,  and  con-
tinuation  of the activity may be enjoined  by any party willing to compensate the
landowner for any losses he suffers from that injunction.
Ellickson, supra, at 748. Ellickson's approach is to define the threshold for strict liabil-
ity in terms of what is normal  for the locality. This could  be done on  an activity-by-
activity  basis,  or could  rely,  as I  am arguing  for  here, more  on  exclusion,  by asking
how significantly borders were crossed.
"' Epstein, Nuisance  Law,  supra note  14,  at 88;  see  also Penner,  Nuisance  and  the
Character of the  Neighbourhood,  supra note  12,  at 6-7  (relating  the locality  rule to1004  Virginia Law Review  [Vol. 90:965
flavor of live and let live; the locality mattered because  each owner
gained the right to do a  similar activity.' 6 Likewise,  as J.E. Penner
argues,  traditional  English  nuisance  law was  very  unlikely  to  ex-
cuse any harm that caused physical damage  to land."7 The physical
damage  can  thus  be  regarded  as  a  rough  informational  variable
that tends to push nuisance  back towards  the exclusion end of the
spectrum, in a manner very similar to the nuisance per se doctrine.
This  question  of baselines  and  the  locality  brings  us to  the  fa-
mous maxim  sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, "use  your  prop-
erty in such a way as not to injure another's," which used to be the
foundation  of  the  law  of  nuisance."'  Since  the  realist  era,  the
maxim  has  fallen somewhat  out  of favor  because  of its  apparent
question-begging  quality.  Specifically,  we  need  to  know  what
harms one has a right to be free from in order to apply the maxim,
but what  constitutes  such harm  is  the  question  to begin with."9  I
would suggest that the maxim, which is often cited in cases of con-
flicting land  use,  is  a  shorthand  for the  exclusion  strategy  and  its
limited  modification  through  governance  rules.  This  strategy  in-
cludes a heavier reliance on location and boundaries than would be
live and let  live through the notion that the plaintiff and defendant  gain  the  right to
engage in the same sort of activities).
, See Bamford  v. Turnley,  122 Eng.  Rep. 27, 33 (Ex. Ch. 1862);  Epstein, Nuisance
Law, supra note  14,  at  87-88  ("The  locality rule,  far from isolating the  defendant's
conduct from its environment, consciously  evaluates  its actionability in relationship to
its  surrounding  circumstances.  It  thereby  excuses  certain  invasions  solely  on  the
ground  that  other persons  with  sufficient  frequency  have  committed  like  wrongs
against other persons in the plaintiff's position.");  Penner, Nuisance  and the Charac-
ter of the Neighbourhood, supra note  12, at 4-11  (explaining  that  "[flights  to  cause
(non-actionable)  annoyances  are  'reciprocal'  in the sense  that every  land  owner has
the same rights in this respect").
117  Penner, Nuisance  and the Character of the Neighbourhood, supra note  12,  at 9
(citing Halsey v. Esso Petroleum Co.,  2 All E.R. 145,150-51  (Q.B.  1961)  (Eng.)).
"' See, e.g., Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty  Co., 272 U.S. 365,  387  (1926) ("In solv-
ing doubts, the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which lies at the foundation
of so  much of the common  law  of nuisances,  ordinarily  will  furnish a  fairly  helpful
clew.");  Lussier v. San Lorenzo  Valley Water Dist.,  253  Cal. Rptr. 470, 473  (Cal. Ct.
App. 1988)  ("The basic concept  underlying the  law of nuisances  is  articulated in the
ancient maxim  sic utere  tuo ut alienum non laedas, that is,  so use your own  as not to
injure another's property.").
" See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505  U.S. 1003,  1031  (1992)  (criticizing  invoca-
tion  of sic utere maxim  as conclusory);  Hale  v. Farmers Elec. Membership  Corp., 99
P.2d 454, 456 (N.M. 1940) (holding that although sic utere is a good moral precept, it is
useless  as  a grounds  for decision  because  it does  not  determine  any right or obliga-
tion, and citing cases and commentary to this effect).Exclusion and Nuisance
optimal  if the  delineation  of rights  were  costless. The law  defines
property  in land  by delineating  a location within which there  is a
strong (but not absolute) presumption that the owner can do what
she  wants. Where  two  owners  with rights  in nearby  parcels  come
into  conflict,  the  presumption  is  that  there  is  a  violation  by  the
more  active  party,  especially  one  sending  physical  objects,  sound
waves, vibrations, and so on across the boundary used in the defini-
tion  of the  other  owner's  property.  These  presumptions  can  be
overcome  if the intrusion is a de minimis nuisance,  or if the locality
is almost uniformly suited to  a special use,  or if the plaintiff is  hy-
persensitive. 12  The  maxim  sic  utere  simply  refers  to  this  back-
ground set of presumptions that piggyback on the locational defini-
tion of the property right.
3. Remedies
On the remedy side, the use of injunctions in nuisance law makes
sense  where  exclusion  is  called  for.  Property  rules  are  suited  to
protect  the  delegation  involved  in  an  exclusion  regime."'  To im-
plement  a property  rule,  courts  can just  monitor  the  rough  vari-
able-such  as entry-and impose liability without having  to evalu-
ate  individual  uses.  Liability  rules,  by  contrast,  do  involve
measuring  individual  uses,  and  a  liability  rule  regime  involves  a
partial  withdrawal  of  the  delegation  of  use-determination  from
property  owners.  Thus, to the  extent that this delegation  is worth
preserving, we should expect property rules  in the law of nuisance.
Traditionally,  injunctions were  freely available for substantial nui-
sances.
1 22
As multiple  use becomes  more important,  a governance  regime
of some sort should tend to emerge, either by contract, regulation,
120  A  hypersensitive  plaintiff will not  have  a  remedy  for  irritations  that would  not
disturb  an  ordinary  landowner.  On  the  hypersensitivity  defense,  see,  for  example,
Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows, 198  P.2d 847,  853  (Or. 1948).  See also El-
lickson, Alternatives to Zoning, supra note 114,  at 752 (noting that one reason hyper-
sensitive  plaintiffs "receive little sympathy is that they were probably the best  avoid-
ers of the losses they suffered").
121  See Smith, Property and Property Rules, supra note 24.
12A leading  case  of automatic injunctive relief for nuisance  was  Whalen v.  Union
Bag & Paper  Co.,  101  N.E. 805 (N.Y. 1913).  See also Bone, supra note 13,  at 1178-79
(discussing  traditional approaches  to injunctive  relief in nuisance cases); infra  Section
IV.D.
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or modification  of common-law rules. As a historical matter, as re-
source  use  became more  intense  and  specialized  in the  course  of
the  nineteenth  century,  nuisance  law  became  more  articulated.
Later  land-use  regulations  and  pollution  controls  then  partially
displaced  nuisance with  ever more  detailed  governance  regimes.l2
With the increase  in importance of multiple use, though, the cost of
achieving  this  tailoring  is  likely  to  increase  because  the  supply
curve for institutions  shifts outward.  In such a dynamic setting, the
benefits and the costs of both exclusion and governance can shift in
tandem.  But  if  the  cost  of  acquiring  and  acting  on  information
about uses does  not shift, rising resource  values should lead to in-
creasing precision of rights. For a given resource, this means a ten-
dency  to  move  to  supplement  exclusion  with  governance  rules.
With  rising  resource  values,  we  might expect  an  increase  in gov-
ernance  or  an  increasing  use  of  exclusion  based  on  more  fine-
grained parcels, in a sort of enclosure movement. 124
In  a static sense,  the difficulty  of determining  damages relating
to use can also push in the direction of injunctions, as information-
cost theory would  predict.  Traditionally, equitable  remedies were
available when the remedy at law was inadequate  or when a party
suffered an irreparable injury, that is one for which damages would
not be an adequate  remedy.25 The irreparable injury rule is consis-
121  See, e.g.,  Robert  D. Grinder, The Battle  for Clean  Air: The  Smoke Problem  in
Post-Civil War America, in Pollution and Reform  in American  Cities, 1870-1930,  at
83, 93  (Martin  V. Melosi ed., 1980); Rose, Rethinking Environmental  Controls, supra
note 35,  at 25-26. For an  argument that a reformed  nuisance law should  have  an im-
portant role  to play in land-use conflicts and  a proposal  for local nuisance  boards to
administer it, see Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning, supra note 114, at 762-71.
124 Smith, Exclusion versus Governance, supra note 3,  at S475-76, S481.  A  move to
smaller parcels,  for example in the enclosure of a commons, is another method  of in-
creasing precision.
125  See Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S.  197, 214 (1923)  ("Equality jurisdiction will be
exercised to enjoin the threatened  enforcement  of a state  law  which contravenes  the
Federal  Constitution wherever  it  is essential in order effectually  to  protect property
rights and the rights  of persons  against injuries otherwise irremediable.").  The inade-
quacy or irreparable-injury  rule is usually stated to be a prerequisite  to equitable re-
lief.  See,  e.g.,  Knaebel  v.  Heiner,  663  P.2d  551,  553  (Alaska  1983);  Brownfield  v.
Daniel Freeman  Marina  Hosp.,  256  Cal. Rptr. 240,  243  (Cal.  Ct.  App.  1989);  In  re
Marriage  of Strauss,  539  N.E.2d  808,  812  (Ill.  App. Ct.  1989); Borom  v.  City of St.
Paul,  184 N.W.2d  595,  598  (Minn.  1971).  But there  is some doubt as to  whether  the
rule has any bite. See Douglas Laycock,  The Death  of the Irreparable Injury Rule 4-
5,  22-23  (1991)  (arguing that the American legal system does not prefer damages and
that the irreparable injury rule has little effect).Exclusion and Nuisance
tent with this cost structure. In nuisance situations where determin-
ing damages  based  on  use  is  costly,  we  expect  a more  exclusion-
based rule because it is likely to be most cost-effective.  And in this
case, much of the cost of delineation is borne by the judges making
the rules.  It may be that  in such  situations  the rule  is not  as me-
chanical as in classical  trespass  (as  Merrill argued),  but the irrepa-
rable injury rule  is hardly less exclusion-like  where it applies.  And
this is what we expect;  in high measurement-cost situations,  an ex-
clusion-type approach  is likely to be most cost-effective  through a
larger range of activities.
A system resting on a foundation of exclusion economizes on in-
formation costs  because it defines  rights in an implicit and sweep-
ing  way.  By  resolving  all  but  the  most  difficult  and  high-stakes
cases in terms  of who crossed  a boundary-with  objects  or sound
waves  or odors or so forth-the law  can rely on a basic and cheap
package  of rights with a high degree of salience  and ease of proc-
essing. Although it is hard to say exactly when to depart from this
approach,' 26  the  maxim sic utere and the  nuisance  cases  reflect  a
very strong presumption against the Coasean and realist use-by-use
approach.
On the  information-cost  theory,  nuisance  and liability rules are
used to fine-tune the basic exclusionary  regime. If so, it should not
be surprising that nuisance retains much of the flavor of-and cer-
tainly  does  not  repudiate-the  basic  exclusionary  regime  that  it
supplements.  Land is a convenient  and low-cost  anchor for a wide
range  of  rights,  because  an  exclusionary  regime-and  its  refine-
ments-can  rely  on  highly stable  and  salient  locational variables.
For courts and dutyholders, making sense  of who owes what duties
to whom is  far easier when there is  a strong presumption that the
package of rights is defined around land rather than as a list of use
rights. To be sure, on the list-of-use-rights  approach, the most effi-
cient result could be achieved in each of the potential use-conflicts,
but this is likely to be very costly indeed.
III. THE RARITY OF RULE 4
Nuisance  analysis in contemporary  law and economics has been
profoundly shaped by Guido Calabresi  and A. Douglas Melamed's
26 See infra Part IV.
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famous  framework  of property rules  and liability rules  as alterna-
tive  methods  of  protecting  "entitlements."'27   Calabresi  and
Melamed  took  as  their primary  example  the  classic  nuisance  dis-
pute,  and this has  been the practice in this corner of the law-and-
economics  literature  ever  since.  It  is  not  hard  to  see  why.
Calabresi and Melamed's framework, like Coase's, presupposes the
list-of-uses  vision of  property.' 29  Nuisance  comes  closer  to  imple-
menting the use-by-use  approach than do other aspects  of property
law but, as I argue, law and economics has tended  to overlook the
exclusionary elements in nuisance  law."n  It has also missed the role
that exclusion plays in determining how entitlements are protected.
Calabresi and Melamed  noticed two cross-cutting  distinctions in
the law,  one relating  to  the nature  of the entitlement's  protection
and  the  other  relating  to  who  holds  the  entitlement  in  the  first
place. As for protection, the law sometimes gives someone an enti-
tlement  but allows others to take it  as long  as the taker pays  offi-
cially determined damages.  Calabresi and Melamed called this a li-
ability rule.' 3'  Examples  include  eminent  domain  and  the  law  of
negligence.'  By  contrast, a property rule protects  the  entitlement
with supracompensatory  damages  or injunctions, so that a transfer
must occur with the consent of the current holder.' 33 The possibility
of damages  versus injunctions is a major issue in nuisance  disputes,
one to which I return in Section IV.D.
Cutting  across  the  property  rule-liability  rule  distinction  is  the
question of who has the entitlement.  If causation  is reciprocal  the
potential  assignment of entitlements  is as  well,  and Calabresi  and
Melamed argued that antecedent  to the question of protecting enti-
tlements is to whom  and under what  circumstances  collectively to
127 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 2.
See supra note 2; infra note 144.
121  See Merrill & Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, supra
note 3, at 379-81.
See id. at 394-97.
131  Id.  at 1092.
.32  Id. at 1106-07 (eminent domain); id. at 1108-09 (law of accidents).
"' Id.  at 1092.  Calabresi and Melemed also proposed a third category of inalienabil-
ity rules, under  which an  entitlement is nontransferable  even between a  willing buyer
and  willing  seller.  Id.  at  1092-93.  Inalienability  rules  are  not  characteristic  of  the
common  law of nuisance.Exclusion and Nuisance
"grant"  the entitlement.  In a pollution conflict the  "entitlement"
could be either in the pollutee or the polluter.35
Either of the two parties in a resource conflict could hold the en-
titlement  with  either  form  of protection,  leading  to four possible
situations. First, the victim could have the right to be free from pol-
lution with property rule protection in the form of an injunction or
supracompensatory  damages  (Rule  1).  Second,  the  victim  could
have the entitlement to be free from pollution, but in this case only
protected by  a liability rule in the form of compensatory damages
(Rule 2). Third, the law could afford the polluter an "entitlement"
to pollute, protected by a property rule  (Rule 3). One might imag-
ine  a polluter  able  to get  an injunction against  a pollutee  who re-
fuses to accept pollution, but Calabresi and Melamed seem to have
in mind a simple inability of the pollutee to stop the polluter. I re-
turn to the nature of the polluter's entitlement shortly. Fourth and
finally,  the  cross-cutting  distinction  of protection  and location  of
the entitlement generates  a final scenario where the polluter would
have the entitlement, but protected only by a liability rule (Rule 4).
In other  words,  under Rule 4, the pollutee  could  sue the polluter
but  would  have to pay  the  polluter's  costs  of abating  or  shutting
down.'36  This  final  rule,  termed  a  "compensated  injunction"  by
Robert  Ellickson,  was  a purely  theoretical  prediction.'37  Only  the
first three can be found extensively in the case law."'
The  deduction  of the  possibility of  the fourth  rule,  the  famous
Rule 4, was the most startling and, to nuisance  commentators,  one
of the most influential aspects  of Calabresi  and Melamed's  frame-
work.'39 Under  Rule  4, the  pollutee  could  enjoin the  polluter but
"3  Id. at 1090-93.
135  Id. at 1090.
' 36 Id. at 1115-16.
. 37  Ellickson,  Alternatives  to  Zoning,  supra  note  114,  at  738  n.202.  Calabresi  and
Melamed did  assert that "[i]ndeed,  in one form or another, [Rule  4]  may well be the
most frequent  device  employed,"  Calabresi &  Melamed,  supra note  2,  at 1117,  but
only provided  their interpretation  of eminent domain  over nonconforming  uses and
ecological easements as possible examples, id. at 1117 n.58.
...  See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 2, at 1115-17.
"9 Id. at  1116 ("The  very statement  of [Rules  1-3] in the context  of our framework
suggests  that something  is missing.  Missing is  a  fourth rule  ...  .").  Guido  Calabresi
has pointed out that, unknown  to him and  Melamed at the time, James Atwood  had
suggested in a student note the possibility of a remedy like  Rule 4 three years before
their article.  Guido  Calabresi,  Remarks:  The  Simple  Virtues  of  The Cathedral, 106
2004] 1009Virginia Law Review
would  have  to pay  damages  for  the  polluter's  cost  of abating  or
shutting  down.  What was  even  more  surprising  was  the nearly  si-
multaneous  adoption of something like Rule 4 by the Arizona Su-
preme Court in the coming-to-the-nuisance  case of Spur Industries,
Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co.'" In the Spur case, the Ari-
zona Supreme Court required a plaintiff developer to pay damages
to a defendant feedlot that would be shut down by an injunction in
its nuisance suit.
14' Rule 4 has found great favor with commentators
on nuisance law" 42 and among proponents  of liability rules, leading
to  many  further  elaborations. 1 3  Nevertheless,  Rule  4  has  never
been used in a nuisance case since Spur, and the Spur case has not
heralded  a new approach  to  liability. The information-cost  theory
of exclusion can help explain why.'"
Mostly commentators  have treated the lack of Rule 4 treatment
as a curious gap in the law, perhaps to be explained by the adminis-
trative  costs of gathering relevant parties, valuing abatement  costs,
and  apportioning  liability.14 5 In  a rare  exception,  Richard  Epstein
criticizes Rule 4 as destabilizing the property system."  For  Epstein,
liability rules  are  only justified when the holdout risk clearly  out-
Yale  L.J.  2201,  2204 (1997)  (citing  and discussing James R. Atwood, Note, An Eco-
nomic Analysis of Land Use Conflicts, 21  Stan. L. Rev. 293, 315  (1969)).
140 494 P.2d 700, 708 (Ariz. 1972) (en banc).
"  494 P.2d at 708 (en banc).
1
4 2 See,  e.g., Ellickson, Alternatives  to Zoning, supra note  114, 744-46  (arguing  for
use  of Rule 4 as  a second  stage  option  for the plaintiff  when a nuisance  defendant
opts to pay Rule  2 damages  and continue the nuisance); Jeff L. Lewin, Compensated
Injunctions and  the Evolution of Nuisance  Law, 71  Iowa L. Rev. 775,  827-31  (1986)
(arguing for limited use of compensated injunctions in the interest of fairness);  Rabin,
supra  note  114, at 1339-46 (advocating compensated  injunctions in cases of deserving
plaintiffs only).
143  See,  e.g., Ayres & Goldbart, Optimal Delegation, supra note  2; Krier & Schwab,
supra note 2; Saul Levmore, Unifying Remedies: Property Rules,  Liability Rules, and
Startling Rules, 106 Yale L.J. 2149 (1997).
" This despite  Calabresi  and  Melamed's  assertion  that  "in  one form  or  another,
[Rule 4] may well be the most frequent device employed."  Calabresi & Melamed,  su-
pra note 2, at 1117.
',
5 See,  e.g., id. at 1122 & n.62; Krier & Schwab, supra note 2,  at 475-77; Lewin,  su-
pra note 142, at 790-91.
"4  Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral:  The Dominance of Property
Rules, 106 Yale  L.J. 2091, 2103-05  (1997)  [hereinafter Epstein, A Clear View] (refer-
ring to Rule 4 as posing  an "enormous  risk," "grotesque,"  "wholly subversive  of any
account of ordinary property rights,"  and "misguided").
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weighs the risk of undercompensation.' 47  But commentators  favor-
ing liability rules do not see undercompensation as inevitable. They
further cite the benefits of allowing  one party to choose who winds
up using the entitlement even where, for distributional reasons, the
other party should not have to bear the entire loss.'48
The  information-cost  theory  allows  a  fuller explanation  of the
rarity  of Rule 4. The  deduction that Calabresi  and Melamed per-
formed rests on the very Coasean  assumption that causation  is re-
ciprocal  and that locating  "the"  entitlement  in  either party  is the
mirror image of giving it to the other party. This premise, however,
is questionable at best. Consider Rules 1 and 3, which accord prop-
erty rule protection to the polluter and pollutee, respectively. If the
pollutee  has the entitlement  under  a property rule (Rule  1),  then
the  pollutee  can  sue  in nuisance  to enjoin  the  polluter whenever
sufficient  odor comes  onto the pollutee's  land and disturbs her  in
the  quiet enjoyment  of her land. But what  if things were  decided
the  other  way?  Does  the  polluter  have  "the  entitlement  to  pol-
lute?"
A. A Right to Pollute?
Here  some  Hohfeldian  analysis  is  helpful.' 49 The  pollutee  who
has property  rule  protection  (Rule  1) has  a  claim-right based  on
her package of rights to quiet enjoyment  of her land. The pollutee
can  sue to  enforce  the correlative  duty of the polluter not to pol-
'
47 Id. at 2094.
'  See Ronen Avraham,  Modular Liability Rules  3-4 (John M. Olin Center for Law
& Econ.,  Working  Paper  No.  01-003,  2001)  (referring  to  recent  studies  that  have
"demonstrated  how [l]iability  [r]ules achieve  higher  social welfare  by  harnessing one
party's private information about its own valuation to the process of optimally allocat-
ing  the  entitlement  between  the parties");  Ayres  & Goldbart,  Optimal  Delegation,
supra note  2, at 9 (asserting  that "from  an  efficiency perspective  liability  rules are a
means  by  which an imperfectly informed  court can delegate the allocative  choice  to
private  litigants who potentially have superior allocative information").
' Jeanne Schroeder applies Hohfeldian analysis and suggests that the polluter does
not have a right to pollute  for a different reason: the polluter's entitlement  does not
require  affirmative  action  on  the  part  of  the  putative  dutyholder.  See  Jeanne  L.
Schroeder, Three's  a Crowd: A Feminist  Critique  of Calabresi  and  Melamed's  One
View of the Cathedral,  84 Cornell  L. Rev. 394, 438  (1999). She  diagnoses the problem
with  Calabresi  and  Melamed's  framework  differently,  although  her  objection  that
there  is no single thing to which the polluter  or the pollutee might be entitled  is con-
sistent with the analysis here.
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lute. But if, as under Rule  3,  the polluter can  pollute, what  is  the
nature  of its  entitlement?  Does  it  have  a  "right  to  pollute,"  as
Calabresi  and Melamed  and all proponents of the liability rule as-
sume?"' Imagine  that the pollutee  has technological  means-giant
fans perhaps-to prevent the odor from entering her land. Assume
that this causes the pollution to back up in the factory preventing it
from operating properly. Could the polluter in our legal system sue
to enjoin the pollutee's operation of the fans?
Very  probably  the  polluter  could not sue,  which  indicates  that
the  polluter  in the  Rule  3  scenario  is  exercising  a privilege, not  a
right, to pollute. In terms of Hohfeld's famous classification of jural
relations,  a privilege  or liberty correlates  with  a "no-right"  in the
other party:  If A  has a privilege to pollute, B cannot  sue to stop A
from polluting, but A  cannot call upon the law's aid  to ensure the
ability to pollute. By  contrast, if A  had a right or claim to pollute,
then B would be under a correlative duty to accept pollution."'  But
far from granting the polluter  a right to  pollute, the law gives the
right to the pollutee  to take feasible  efforts to block  the pollution,
even  if this causes inconvenience  to the polluter. The problem for
the pollutee  is  that such  measures  are  usually not feasible. 2  De-
'50 See, e.g., Ayres & Goldbart, Optimal  Delegation, supra note 2, at  46 (discussing
the "right to  pollute" in  the property rule versus liability rule  framework);  Calabresi
& Melamed,  supra note  2,  at  1118-19  (discussing the  "right  to pollute");  Kaplow  &
Shavell, supra note 2, at 719 n.14 (noting alternative of protecting a polluter's right to
pollute  with  a  property  rule);  Rabin,  supra  note 114,  at  1343  (arguing that  it  is  an
oversimplification  to speak  of a "right to  pollute" because  the polluter "actually  has
only a qualified right to pollute  in quantities  reasonable for the time and place, given
the present state of the art of pollution abatement").  For a very careful formulation of
how the failure  of a plaintiff's suit against a polluter results "in  effect"  that the defen-
dant has "enjoined"  the plaintiff and enjoys "what  amounts to a property  right," see
Kenneth S. Abraham, The Forms and Functions of Tort Law 176-77 (2d ed. 2002).
...  See Hohfeld, supra note 31,  at 8-9. In the hypothetical  scenario,  the fans  merely
prevent  the smoke from  coming  onto  the fan-operator's  land.  Blowing  back  smoke
that has already entered land might be a situation of reciprocal  nuisance.
12 The treatise upon which Coase relied states unequivocally that:
[T]he right to a lateral passage of air, as well as to a flow of water, superadds a
privilege to the ordinary rights of property,  and is quite distinct from that right
which every owner of a tenement, whether  ancient or modern, possesses to pre-
vent his neighbour transmitting to him air or water in impure condition;  this lat-
ter right is  one of the ordinary incidents  of property, requiring no easement  to
support it, and can be countervailed  only by the acquisition of an easement  for
that purpose by the party causing the nuisance.
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spite Coase's best  efforts to portray  the nuisance cases as recipro-
cal in more  than just theory and to find that judges  had some  im-
plicit understanding  of the  "economic  problem,"  the  access  to  air
cases turn out, on closer examination, to be very asymmetric.
Under the  English  law  Coase  examined,  there was  no  right to
the  free  circulation  of air--contrary  to what  one might  have  ex-
pected  on the reciprocal view of causation. For example, in Bryant
v.  Lefever, the  defendants  tore  down  their  house,  erected  a new
taller one, and stacked lumber on the roof. 153  Thereafter, the smoke
would  back  up  in  the  chimneys  of  the plaintiffs  adjacent  house.
Coase  discusses  this case  at length  and  emphasizes  that  although
the  smoke nuisance  was caused  by both parties, the judges  found
no liability because they took too narrow a view of the case:
Who caused the smoke nuisance?  The answer seems fairly clear.
The smoke  nuisance  was caused  both by the man who built the
wall  and by  the  man  who  lit  the  fires.  Given  the  fires,  there
would have been  no smoke nuisance  without the wall; given the
wall, there would have been no smoke nuisance without the fires.
Eliminate  the  wall  or the  fires  and  the  smoke  nuisance  would
disappear. On the  marginal principle  it is clear that both are re-
sponsible and  both should be forced  to include the loss of amen-
ity due to the smoke as a cost in deciding whether to continue the
activity which gives rise to the smoke....
The judges'  contention  that it was the  man  who  lit the  fires
who  alone caused  the smoke  nuisance  is true only if we  assume
that the wall is the given factor. This is what the judges did by de-
ciding that the man who erected the higher wall had  a legal right
to do so.154
Gale on Easements 241 (Michael  Bowles ed., 13th ed. 1959). Notice that the lack of a
right to pollute  and the right to keep off pollution are  both consistent with the  loca-
tional  approach  of  an  exclusionary  regime.  See  also  John  Pugh-Smith  et  al.,
Neighbours and the Law § 2.26, at 56 (3d ed. 2001)  ("[T]he  right to prevent the access
of impure air is a  right of property  in itself and  does not require an easement  to up-
hold  the injured  party's rights."  (citing  Curriers'  Co.  v.  Corbett, 46  Eng. Rep.  1119
(L.R.-Ch.  1865))).
'  4 C.P.D. 172, 175-76  (1879)  (Eng.). Coase discusses this case  in his famous treat-
ment of nuisance. Coase, supra note 1, at 11-13.
" Coase, supra note 1, at 13.
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Indeed, the judges  noted  that the defendants  had a  right to  build
and, although their right to build was subject to the rights of others,
the cases  did not  support  a generalized  right  to  the circulation  of
air.' 55 Further, they noted that a prescriptive easement (affording its
owner  the  ability  to  require  the  owner  of  the  servient  estate  to
maintain  the free flow  of air) based  on having  a  house  would be
too vague and uncertain.  Lord Justice Bramwell couched his con-
clusion in terms of causation:
No doubt there is a nuisance, but it is not of the defendants'  caus-
ing. They have done nothing in causing the nuisance. Their house
and  their  timber  are  harmless  enough.  It  is  the  plaintiff  who
causes the nuisance by lighting a coal fire in a place the chimney
of which  is placed  so  near the defendants'  wall, that  the smoke
does  not escape,  but  comes  into  the  house....  But  (what  is  in
truth  the  same  answer),  if  the  defendants  cause  the  nuisance,
they have  a right to do so ....  "Sic utere tuo ut alienum non lae-
das"  is a good maxim,  but in our opinion the  defendants  do not
infringe it: the plaintiff would if he succeeded.57
Coase notes that if the defendant  wall-builder in the case  had suf-
fered damage to his timber from the smoke,
[t]he  case  would  then  have  closely  paralleled  [the  physician-
confectioner  case  of] Sturges v. Bridgman and there can be  little
doubt that the  man who lit  the fires would  have  been liable  for
the  ensuing  damage  to  the  timber,  in  spite  of the  fact  that no
damage  had  occurred  until  the  high wall  was  built  by the  man
who owned the timber.
58
Interestingly,  Coase  implicitly  admits that, however  unjustified  in
his  opinion  the  judges'  views  were  economically,  they  were  very
predictable on the basis of locationally defined property.
Coase's patience with the judges'  reasoning wears especially thin
when it comes to the final nuisance  case he discusses, Bass v.  Greg-
151 See,  e.g.,  Bryant, 4  C.P.D. at  176  (holding that  "a right  the wind should  not  be
checked"  is  constrained  by the rights of neighbors  "to use  their property  in  the vari-
ous ways in which property is commonly and lawfully used").
156  See  id.  at 178.  On acquiring  easements  for the passage  of air through  "defined
channels," see infra note 161 and accompanying text.
5  Bryant, 4 C.P.D. at 179.
'  Coase, supra note 1, at 13.Exclusion and Nuisance
ory, where  the plaintiff claimed  a right to  have  air pass  from  his
cellar  brewery  out  through  the  defendant's  disused  courtyard
well.9  Because the passage  of air was through "a  defined channel"
and had been  occurring  for  at least forty  years,  the court, in con-
trast  to  the  result  in  Bryant v.  Lefever, decided  that the  plaintiff
had an easement for the passage of air, using the notorious fiction
that the long acquiescence of the defendant  was evidence of a "lost
grant"  of the  easement.'"  Coase,  noting  the  contrast  to  Bryant,
dismisses  the  notion  of a "defined  channel"  with  the observation
that  "[a]n  economist might be  tempted to add 'but  the air moved
all the  same."'61 To Coase,  the legal doctrines  do not address  the
economic problem:
The  reasoning  employed  by  the  courts  in  determining  legal
rights  will often seem  strange  to an economist  because  many of
the factors  on which  the decision  turns  are,  to an economist,  ir-
relevant. Because of this, situations which are, from an economic
point  of view,  identical  will  be treated  quite  differently  by the
courts.  The  economic  problem  in  all  cases  of  harmful effects  is
how to maximise  the value of production.  In the case of Bass v.
Gregory fresh air was drawn in through the well which facilitated
the production  of beer but foul air was  expelled through the well
which  made  life  in the  adjoining  houses  less pleasant.  The eco-
nomic problem  was  to decide  which  to  choose:  a lower  cost  of
beer and worsened amenities in adjoining houses or a higher cost
of beer  and  improved  amenities.  In  deciding  this  question,  the
"doctrine  of lost grant"  is about as  relevant as  the colour of the
judge's eyes.'62
To Coase, again, questions of "property" are really the outcome  of
decisions about more valuable  uses,  and property  is the collection
of use rights that emerges from this process. In effect, the judge is a
miniature  central  planner  rather  than  the  enforcer  of antecedent
'5925  Q.B.D. 481 (1890)  (Eng.).
English judges would presume a lost grant of an easement for what were in effect
prescriptive  easements, but this fiction  has been  abandoned  in  England and  in most
American states. Robert Megarry & H.W.R. Wade, The Law of Real Property 876-78
(5th  ed.  1984);  7  Thompson  on  Real  Property  § 60.03(b)(6)(ii),  at  435  (David  A.
Thomas ed.,  1994).
161 Coase, supra note 1, at 14.
162 Id. at 15.
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rights to things good against the world, that is, property in the tra-
ditional sense.
B. Information Costs and Rights to the Flow of  Air
I  argue  that the  law's  approach  to  smoke and  air circulation  is
not just predictable but reflects the low information costs of defin-
ing  rights  using  exclusion  for  the  basics  and  governance  for  the
fine-tuning of use-entitlements.  The presumption  is that people get
to exclude  unwanted  objects, odors, and so on from the column of
space  around the  land as  defined by the  ad coelum rule,  and that
this  implicitly protects  a privilege-but  not  a right-to  engage  in
activities  such as  lighting  fires  and polluting.63 In Bryant, the  de-
fendant  wall-builder  and  timber-stacker  did  not  move  anything
from its land to the plaintiffs'. This approach based on location and
directional  causation  may  be  arbitrary  in  some  theoretical  sense
and would  be irrelevant  to the  economic  choice  of which  activity
should ultimately "win out"-as long as information costs are sup-
pressed.
Once information costs enter the picture, the situations in Bryant
v.  Lefever and Bass v.  Gregory are not, pace Coase, economically
identical.  Arguably,  situations  of  air  traveling  in  "defined  chan-
nels" for lengthy periods of time are a sensible exception to the ba-
sic  exclusionary  regime:  The  defined  channel  makes  the  right
claimed  more  obvious,  thereby  reducing  information  costs to the
supposed dutyholder. Where  the benefits  of detailed dispute  reso-
lution exceed the costs  of doing so (by party contracting  or judge-
made law),  we might  expect  such  exceptions.'"  In Coase's  access-
to-air  cases,  the  air  may  move  "all  the  same,"  but  the  claimed
dutyholder would not notice just the same. In ordinary cases, how-
ever,  when judges  stick  to  the  strong  presumptions  in  the  exclu-
sionary regime  based  on the ad coelum rule and  pay attention  to
who  moved  what  where,  their  approach  does  make  economic
sense.'  The  stakes have to be  very high and  the parties'  ability to
163  See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
Another example  would be the airplane overflight cases;  the stakes are very high
and a judge-made governance-style  exception  to the ad coelum rule makes  eminent
sense. See supra note 80.
'6 I  leave open the question of how conscious  the judges are about this. After all,  if
the information-cost  theory  is correct, then the same  information costs  would shapeExclusion and Nuisance
contract  quite  limited before  a court-supplied  governance  regime
of use-by-use determination is worthwhile.
Again, the  delineation of rights has a highly locational flavor, as
expected on the information-cost  theory. In the nuisance cases, the
package of rights does  not include  even the right of access  to air.
Where air  is blocked, nothing, not even an  odor, has passed from
one  parcel  to  another.  By  contrast,  pollutees  who  do  receive
"things"  onto their  land have  a right to take action  (to the  extent
feasible)  to  prevent  the  pollution  from  entering  their  land.  And
when  the polluter has  a  true  entitlement  to  pollute,  the  issue  is
framed in terms of whether the polluter has an easement-whether
a right has been carved out of the pollutee's package  and given  to
the polluter.66
In  the case  of air,  the pollutee  usually cannot  prevent,  in self-
help fashion, the pollution from entering her land, and thus  a pol-
luter who has a privilege to pollute is easy to confuse with one who
has a right to pollute. A better test case is the law of surface water,
because  water  and  water  pollution  are  easier  to  divert.  Accord-
ingly, the law has faced  more squarely the question  of liability for
diverting diffuse surface water (water outside a watercourse).  Basi-
cally, the English and "classic"  American doctrine  applying  to dif-
fuse  surface  water  is the  "common enemy"  doctrine,  under  which
each landowner  has an  absolute right to defend  against  inflows  of
these  waters-to  combat  the  common  enemy  of surface  water-
even  if this causes  damaging  flooding to  other landowners. 1 6  This
doctrine  is one of exclusion. The owner has  a privilege to keep out
the  "common  nuisance"  from the  column  of space  defined by the
ad coelum rule.  Notice,  though,  that  if  one  landowner  dams  his
the types of customs that the law built on  as well as people's  basic "common  sense"
view of causation that law and economics joins legal realism in disdaining.
"The  formulation in the text in  terms of carving out and giving  is particularly  apt
when  courts  face grantor-grantee  situations and  where courts  use  the fiction  of the
lost grant. See supra note 160.
167  Argyelan  v.  Haviland, 435  N.E.2d  973, 975-77  (Ind.  1982);  Slade  Luther v.  Win-
nisimmet  Co.,  63  Mass.  (9  Cush.)  171,  172-73  (1851)  (adopting the common  enemy
rule for the first time); Bowlsby v. Speer, 31 N.J.L. 351,  353-55  (N.J.  1865); Kossoff v.
Rathgeb-Walsh,  Inc.,  148 N.E.2d  132,  134-35 (N.Y. 1958); 2 Waters and Water Rights
§ 10.03(b)(1)  (Robert E.  Beck  ed.,  1991);  5  Waters  and Water  Rights § 59.02(b)(2)
(Robert  E. Berk ed.,  1991)  (citing first American  case and  quick adoption by English
courts); Stanley V. Kinyon  & Robert C. McClure,  Interferences with Surface Waters,
24 Minn. L. Rev. 891,  898-904 (1940).
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land and causes the surface water to flow to a second owner's land,
the second owner is similarly privileged  to dam her land  and send
the water back. The first landowner cannot sue  the second to pre-
vent this flow-indeed neither can sue the other'--indicating that
each  enjoys  a  Hohfeldian  privilege,  and not a right, to  dispose  of
unwanted  water.  This  is  a  regime  of exclusion  if  there  ever  was
one:  The  rights  of each  party  are  defined  in  a strictly  locational
manner 1 69 and  have  the  effect  of  keeping  the  privilege  to  repel
groundwater  "a submerged part of a general estate in the  land,"'7
as  exclusion does generally  by protecting privileges of (undefined)
use  with  a  (defined)  right  to  exclude  from  a  column  of  space
around the land. More recently, as conflicts have  arguably become
more intense, the common enemy doctrine has been supplemented
in those jurisdictions  still  adhering  to  it  with several  governance-
like limitations.'7' It has similarly been replaced elsewhere  by judi-
cial doctrines closer to the governance end of the spectrum.'72
'6' 5 Waters and Water Rights, supra note 167, § 59.02(b)(2). "9  See 2  Waters and  Water  Rights, supra  note  167,  § 10.03(b)(1)  ("[Tihe  common
enemy rule  treated the  diffused water  as a nuisance  which  all landowners  were  per-
mitted to dispose of as each owner choose [sic],  so long as they took measures on their
own land and not on that of their neighbors.") (citations omitted).
70  3 Waters and Water Rights, supra note 167, § 20.03.
171  5 id. § 59.02(b)(2).
172 Although it exceeds the scope of this Article, it  is worth  noting that more recent
developments in surface  water law fit very well with the dynamic theory of exclusion
versus  governance.  As  resource  conflict  has  become  more  intense,  many  courts
adopted  the  civil-law  doctrine of natural  flow or, more  recently,  the reasonable  use
doctrine. The  natural flow doctrine  is a  compromise  between exclusion  and govern-
ance; it establishes  a flat rule that each landowner must leave the drainage in its natu-
ral state, thus giving each landowner a servitude over the other for natural flow. 2 id. §
10.03(b)(2);  5 id.  § 59.02(b)(3);  Kinyon & McClure,  supra note  167, at 893-97. As its
name  suggests, reasonable  use  doctrine picks out  and evaluates in  detail the  use ac-
tivities of the owners, 2  Waters and  Water Rights, supra note 167,  § 10.03(b)(3); 5  id.
§ 59.02(b)(4);  Kinyon  & McClure,  supra  note  167,  at 904-13,  and  so  is  close  to the
governance  end  of the  spectrum. In  effect,  reasonable  use assimilates  surface water
drainage to  nuisance law,  as is made explicit  in Restatement (Second)  of Torts § 833
(1979).  Consistent with the information-cost approach,  there  is a general  recognition
that  replacing  the  common-law  rule of the  common  enemy  (or the  civil-law  rule  of
natural flow)  with the doctrine  of reasonable  use takes  surface water  drainage  out of
property  law and places  it in tort law. 5  Waters and  Water Rights, supra note 167,  §
59.02(a).  As expected,  exclusion tends to  give  way to governance  as pressure  on the
resource  has  increased.  Smith, Exclusion  versus Governance,  supra note  3,  at S473-
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C. Asymmetry and the Rule 4 "Gap"
Returning  to  Calabresi  and  Melamed's  four-way  typology  of
rules, the polluter  has  a package  of rights  in  land that would pre-
vent the pollutee from coming onto the polluter's land to abate the
nuisance,  and  in that  sense  the rights  it has  under  the ad coelum
rule do indirectly protect its activity of polluting in the Rule 3  sce-
nario. But what the polluter does not have is a right "symmetric"  to
the  pollutee's  entitlement  to be  free from pollution  in  the Rule  1
scenario.  It is not as if there are two  activities-polluting  and pre-
venting pollution-and that Rules 3  and 1, respectively,  symmetri-
cally  vindicate  these use interests. Instead, Rule  1 protects the in-
terest  in  being  free  from  invasions  by  pollution,  whereas  in  the
Rule 3  situation the "entitlement"  to pollute is not a separately de-
lineated right but an undifferentiated  privilege.13
Thus,  when  we  come  to  the  liability rules  (Rules  2  and  4)  we
have  to ask what  the nature of the entitlement  should  be. Rule 2
allows  the  polluter  to  pollute  (to  take  the  victim's  entitlement  to
clean  air)  as  long as  the  polluter pays  officially  determined  dam-
ages, and Rule 4 allows the pollutee to require the polluter to stop
polluting as long as the pollutee pays  the costs of abating or shut-
ting  down. If the  entitlement  is  not symmetric  in  the case  of the
property  rules (Rules 1 and 3),  what should we  expect in the case
of the liability rules?  Here it would seem that the liability rule lit-
erature,  from  Calabresi  and  Melamed  onwards,  simply  (but
wrongly)  assumes  that  the  use  rights  really  are  symmetrical.  We
have  two conflicting  uses,  for example  a feedlot  and a retirement
community, and the conflict is solved by giving one party a right to
stop  the  other  and  pay  damages-or,  under  Calabresi  and
Melamed's  formulation,  the  "entitlement"  to  do  something  like
emit odors and receive payment  from the other for losing this "en-
titlement."
Why  is symmetry  important?  Besides its contribution  to the de-
ductive  quality of the  derivation  of Rule 4, it matters  because the
lack of symmetry here points to the way entitlements are really de-
lineated  in the  law.  In the  property rule case,  we are  not dealing
with Party A with use 1 versus Party B with use 2 and simply decid-
173  Given the  basic exclusion  approach  based on the ad coelum rule, protection of a
true right to pollute would require the additional delineation of an easement.
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ing whether A has a right to engage in use 1 and to stop B from use
2 or vice versa. Instead,  A  and B each  has a right to  exclude that
implicitly  defines  a package  of use-privileges  in a  parcel  of land,
with  further  fine-tuning  of  certain  specific  rights.  In  this  implicit
definition of use-privileges, location matters a great deal, as we saw
in the nuisance cases."  So in the imaginary  scenario where B is us-
ing giant fans to ward off pollution, the fact that the fans are on B's
property  makes  all  the  difference.  If the  fans  encroached  on A's
property or if B went onto A's land to abate the pollution, then the
polluter's actual exclusionary rights do kick in. The important thing
is that delineation proceeds around a package of rights in land, not
synthetically  as  a  list  of use  rights  as  it  would  on the  bundle-of-
rights picture of property. Thus, the lack of symmetry between  the
Rule 1 and Rule  3 cases suggests what  is wrong with the way enti-
tlements  are  conceived  in  the  liability  rule  literature  in  the  first
place.
This misconception  about the method  of delineating rights  sug-
gests  why  Rule  2 is  more  common than  Rule  4.  (I  return  to  the
question  of Rule  2  damages  versus  Rule  1 injunctions  in Section
IV.D.)  As we saw with trespass and nuisance, governance rules are
sometimes used in high-stakes  situations to fine-tune  the basic ex-
clusionary  regime. But  the basic exclusionary  regime  does not  re-
flect a reciprocal  view of causation or a symmetric approach to en-
titlements.  Instead  it  gives  both  landowners  a  right  against
incursions  based  on  location  under  the  ad coelum  rule.  When  it
comes to fine-tuning the basic regime, the governance-style liability
rules  pegged  at particular  uses can  piggyback  on  the basic  exclu-
sionary set-up. If so, then Rule 2 allows damages for harms that oc-
cur on the land, as defined in the rougher exclusionary regime. Ba-
sically,  Rule  2,  by  allowing  the  polluter  to  pollute  and  pay
damages,  loosens and fine-tunes the  basic exclusionary  rights that
have been delineated in a low-cost way by the ad coelum rule. Rule
2 is still mainly about physical invasions but provides weaker pro-
tection than under a trespass-like  regime. But Rule 4 goes beyond
this:  Here  the  polluter's  package  of entitlements  surrounding  its
land is not being treated in the same way. Contrary to the assump-
tions behind Rule 4, the polluter has no right to pollute in the first
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place;  the privilege to  pollute  is  simply  one  of  many  unspecified
privileges  it has.  If we  "supplement"  the basic  exclusionary  pack-
age with Rule 4, we are  now elevating the privilege  to pollute not
just to  a right but to an individualized  stick in a previously  undif-
ferentiated bundle.
Why  does  it  matter?  Again,  the  basic  exclusion  strategy  with
land as an anchor  and proxy variables based on location and entry
is a low-cost strategy for owners, courts, and, importantly, for those
who have to respect rights. As Merrill and I have argued, the need
for third  parties  to  deal with the  information  about  in rem rights
helps  explain  why  causation  is  not  treated  as  reciprocal  and  why
the package of rights in land is a robust one."'
The Rule 2 analog, bearing the same relationship as Rule 1 does
to Rule 3,  would,  if such  were  possible, be  a  privilege  in the pol-
luter  protected  indirectly  by  a  liability  rule  protecting  the  rights
against  physical  invasions  by the pollutee. But  the pollutee  is  not
physically invading the polluter's land (and any self-help is likely to
involve trespass where injunctions  are robustly used to protect the
exclusionary regime).  The Rule 4 "gap"  can be explained  in terms
of information costs: Rule 2 is the needed fine-tuning to a package
of rights that centers on land and employs location as its main vari-
able. Versions  of Rule 4 do not take  advantage  of the low-cost ex-
clusionary  regime  but  instead  undermine  it  by  transforming  an
otherwise  undifferentiated  privilege  into  a  separate  right.  Thus,
like other liability rules but only more so, Rule 4 presents high in-
formation costs for courts and potential defendants, and these go a
long way toward explaining why we see fewer instances  of liability
rules,  and  Rule  4  in  particular,  than  one  might  expect  on  the
(post)realist  view  of property  generally  assumed  in law  and eco-
nomics.
IV. DELEGATION IN TORT AND PROPERTY LAW
Exclusion permits the law to delegate  information gathering and
evaluation  to owners. Because nuisance  law rests on a foundation
of exclusion  rights with land as a major, salient  focal point, the law
of nuisance  is less  like other  areas  of tort law-such as  the law  of
'  Merrill  & Smith,  What Happened  to  Property  in  Law  and  Economics?,  supra
note 3,  at 391-94.
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accidents-than  theorists  expect.  In this Part, I will  first compare
the type of "delegation,"  decentralization,  and information forcing
in the information-cost  theory with  the  kinds  of delegation  advo-
cated in traditional law and economics.  I then turn to the  difficult
question of the scope of the delegation of information  gathering to
owners:  When  do  changed  circumstances,  high  stakes,  and  high
transaction  costs  call  for  judicial  solutions  to  use-conflicts  of  a
more  fine-grained,  governance  type? After identifying  the factors
relevant to answering  this question, I offer reasons to favor an ap-
proach  based on protecting against physical  invasions  by means of
injunctions  with a preference  for largely  nonjudicial supplementa-
tion by governance rules.
A. Exclusion and Delegation in Tort Theory
Paying  attention  to  how  governance  supplements  exclusion  in
the  law  of  nuisance  allows  a  different  view  of  "delegation"  and
"decentralization"  in  the  law  of torts.  Commentators  have  long
been aware that there is some informational problem lurking in the
identification  and  internalization  of externalities.  What  they have
assumed  is that all  these problems  share the same  set of informa-
tional choices familiar from core areas of tort, such as accident law.
Two approaches have received the most attention from commenta-
tors. On one, courts  can in a direct, "centralized"  fashion evaluate
activities in terms of their costs and benefits and bring home to the
actors engaging in them the costs of those activities to others. 1 76 Di-
rect  balancing  is  characteristic  of the  Learned  Hand  cost-benefit
test and various sanctions that prescribe proper behavior based on
a cost-benefit test.'"  Or, on the other approach, courts can proceed
in  a  more  "decentralized"  way  by  selecting  the  cheapest  cost-
avoider  and  placing  liability  on  that  actor.78  That  actor  is  then
"'See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note  2,  at  1092 ("Property rules  involve a
collective  decision  as to  who  is  to  be given  an  initial  entitlement  but not  as to  the
value  of the entitlement.");  Robert  Cooter, Prices and Sanctions,  84  Colum. L. Rev.
1523,  1532-37  (1984)  (distinguishing  informational requirements for prices  and sanc-
tions);  Ellickson,  Alternatives  to  Zoning,  supra  note  114, at  686-87  (distinguishing
zoning, nuisance, and covenants as involving decreasing  centralization).
" See  Calabresi  & Hirschoff,  supra  note  9,  at  1056-59  (explaining  the  Learned
Hand  test); Cooter, supra  note  176, at 1537-38  (analyzing  utility of prices  and sanc-
tions on the basis of a cost-benefit test); Posner, supra note 7, at 32-33.
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delegated the choice  between  harms  and their prevention  because
the actor will weigh the benefits of the activity against the costs of
liability,  which  are  a stand-in  for  the  otherwise  external  costs.  In
this cheapest-cost-avoider  mode,  tort  law  typically  will select  out
classes of activity for strict liability, for example  by announcing  ex
ante strict liability for all blasting operations rather than determin-
ing liability  ex post for  the  particular  explosions  on an  individual
construction site.'79 The  strict  liability  and damages  harness  infor-
mation  about  precaution  cost  in  the  possession  of the  cheapest
cost-avoider  and  delegate  the  actual,  first-order  trade-off  to  that
actor.
The  exclusion strategy  points  to  a more  radical  form of decen-
tralization  and delegation  pervasive  in the law of property. Exclu-
sion protects  a  wide  and  indefinite  range  of uses  by  giving  the
owner the right to exclude-the  gatekeeper  right."f  The great vir-
tue and the main limitation of this approach  is that it does not sin-
gle  out individual  uses.  The  owner can  choose  among  them,  and
within what the general law allows, can do so without answering to
third parties. By contrast, both the direct balancing  and cheapest-
cost-avoider  approaches  to nuisance  require courts  to identify and
evaluate  particular  activities.  Direct  reasonableness  inquiries  in
nuisance  are  governance  rules.  Likewise,  cheapest-cost-avoider
analysis is all  about placing  liability on certain activities  or classes
of activities,  which requires  more  individuation and  evaluation  of
activities than does an exclusion regime and a property right.'
Moreover,  when  it  comes  to  nuisance  law,  the  delegation  to
owners  implicit in an  exclusion regime  allows  for a very  sweeping
ex  ante  determination.  When  a  dispute  arises,  a  court  is  called
upon  to  vindicate  the already  determined  exclusion right-not  to
engage  in cost-benefit  analysis  and  a fresh  allocation  of the  enti-
tlement.  More  tort-like  approaches,  based  on governing  activities
...  See  Calabresi,  supra  note  9,  at  146  (discussing  the  costs  of subcategorization);
Michelman,  supra note  11,  at 656, 665  (noting  that Calabresi's  prospective  rules will
tend to be framed  in  terms of broad classes of activities such as driving). But cf. Kap-
low & Shavell, supra note 2, at 719 (arguing that liability rules with damages based on
"the average harm for cases characterized  by the facts the court observes" will suffice). '0  See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
.81  Calabresi  often  uses  the  locution  to  place  liability  on  or  allocate  costs  to  an
"activity,"  see, for example,  Calabresi,  supra note 9, at  135, and  whether activities  or
combinations of activities can achieve cost reduction, see, for example, id. at 141, 150.
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rather  than  exclusion  from  things,  envision  a  more  ex  post  ap-
proach.  There  is  a  tendency  for  very  detailed  judicial  doctrines
governing use to be  standards;  ex ante  detail is difficult for courts
to furnish while  deciding one case  at  a time."n  The  great virtue  of
these  standards  is  that  they  are  flexible  enough  to  respond  to
changing conditions,  whereas  the rougher  approach  in a  legal  re-
gime of exclusion  by itself inevitably leads  to  some overinclusive-
ness and underinclusiveness. The rough, ex ante regime can be sof-
tened, if at all, through  (usually standard-like) judicial governance
regimes, legislative  or administrative  schemes,  informal  norms,  or
private contracting.
B. The Limits of Exclusion
On the information-cost  view, part  of the law of nuisance  fulfills
precisely this softening function. Nuisance rests  on a foundation  of
exclusion,  whether  this is labeled  trespass  or  nuisance,  but it  also
fine-tunes this hard-edged  regime where the stakes are high enough
and courts  have some  advantage  in providing  off-the-rack  govern-
ance rules.
This dual  role of nuisance  points to one  of the most  difficult is-
sues facing tort and property law. I have argued that, in a wide vari-
ety of contexts, delegation to owners through the exclusion strategy
makes sense but has been largely ignored in law and economics, es-
pecially in the economic analysis of nuisance law. Sometimes,  how-
ever, judicial fine-tuning through governance  rules is advisable. The
question is when to shift from exclusion to governance.  This prob-
lem presents itself in areas  such as easements  by necessity,' 83 water
"' Administrative  agencies often  promulgate very detailed rules. For a comparison
of rules  and  standards,  see  Louis  Kaplow,  Rules  Versus  Standards:  An  Economic
Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557, 568-88 (1992).
183  The familiar doctrine of easements  by private  necessity in eastern states only ap-
plies between parcels that were once  united and so governs relations between a gran-
tor and his successors on the one hand and a grantee and his successors on the other,
as a default  rule  in a  situation  already  governed  by contract.  See,  e.g., Goulding  v.
Cook, 661  N.E.2d 1322,  1325 (Mass.  1996)  (holding that a court  could  not  order one
landowner  to  grant  another  an  easement  for  compensation  because  this  would
amount to  private  eminent  domain).  On  easements  by  necessity  in grantor-grantee
situations,  see, for  example, Hollywyle Ass'n  v.  Hollister, 324 A.2d  247,  252  (Conn.
1973);  3  R. Powell,  Real Property $  410  (1978).  In what  seems at first blush to  be a
major departure,  doctrines giving nonconsensual  access  through  neighboring  private
lands  by means  of easements by  necessity  for landlocked  owners are  common  in the2004] Exclusion and Nuisance 1025
law,'"  the law  of caves,85 and  many  others, but  perhaps  nowhere
are the alleged inefficiencies  of exclusionary  rights and traditional
formalistic modes of judicial reasoning in property law more noto-
rious  and  more  often  deplored  than  in  the  law  of  oil  and  gas.
Where exactly to draw the line between  exclusion and governance
is ultimately  an empirical question.  In this Part, I use the example
of oil and  gas to suggest that the presumption for exclusion can be
fairly strong as long as other institutions generally, and administra-
tive agencies  in particular, can be expected  to furnish  a better gov-
ernance regime than unilateral court activity.
Before  offering  some  tentative  thoughts  on  what  is,  after  all,
primarily  an empirical  question,  it  is worthwhile  to  take  stock  of
what  the  information-cost  theory  already  provides.  The  informa-
tion-cost  theory  points  to  a  whole  class  of costs:  the  information
costs  in  selecting  uses,  evaluating  them,  and  communicating  the
rights  over them to  third parties.  By contrast,  one reason why the
tort  approach  is  so  attractive  takes  us  back  to  Coase.  It  is  very
natural  to  connect  externalities  with  the  activities  that  produce
them. If activities  become the focus  of attention,  it is an  easy step
to assume that the law must regulate activities  directly or to assign
western United States; these doctrines arose  because of the checkerboard  pattern  of
land disposal  by the federal government, and application to officials, hearings, bonds,
and compensation are required.  See, e.g.,  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-9-101,  103 (2003); see
also Leo  Sheep  Co. v.  United States, 440 U.S.  668, 679-80  (1979)  (discussing  law of
easement  by necessity  and  "private"  eminent  domain in  the western  states);  Smith,
Property and Property Rules, supra note 24.
" Interestingly,  in  terms of the exclusion-versus-governance  framework,  prior  ap-
propriation  is  further  towards  the governance  end of  the  spectrum  than is  usually
thought (although not as governance-like  as riparianism). Instead, first-appropriation,
like the  law  of oil  and  gas, focuses  on  high-visibility  actions taken  by appropriators
and,  until recently,  did not  involve  direct  measurement  of volume.  Thus, what Eric
Freyfogle  identifies  as  a sensitivity  to  context  in  prior-appropriation  law  makes  it
more of a  governance  regime  than  the conventional  story would  have  it.  Compare
Eric T. Freyfogle, Context and Accommodation  in Modern Property Law, 41 Stan. L.
Rev. 1529, 1530 (1989)  (arguing that in the law of surface water "[a]utonomous  secure
property rights have largely given way to use entitlements that are interconnected  and
relative"), with Terry L. Anderson  & P.J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A
Study of the American  West, 18 J.L. & Econ. 163,  176-78  (1975)  (predicting instead
"exclusivity"  in water  law where reserves  are scarce).  Also, as the demand for preci-
sion has increased, water law, like the law of oil and gas, has become  largely adminis-
trative.  On  casual  surface  water  in  this  framework,  see  supra  notes  167-172  and
accompanying text.
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entitlements  over them.  If the Coasean,  (post)realist  approach  to
nuisance  law-with  its  heavy  reliance  on  liability  rules  and  even
Rule  4-style compensated  injunctions-focuses  on the  benefits  of
what I am calling governance  regimes, without  a full accounting  of
their costs, it  is no wonder that law  and economics  has tended  to
treat nuisance  as being  all  about torts and  its regulation  of activi-
ties, rather  than about  exclusion  and  property. Information  costs,
however, point to a basic and pervasive,  but not exclusive, role for
exclusion.
The  pressing but  difficult  question  is when  to shift  from  exclu-
sion to governance with respect to a given resource-or, more pre-
cisely, when to move along the spectrum of informational variables
from boundaries  to more  use-based  tailoring. Some cases  are not
all  that  difficult.  When  high-altitude  overflights  conflicted  with
strict  application  of the  ad coelum  principle  that  ownership  ex-
tended  indefinitely  upward  from  a  parcel  of  land,  courts  were
ready to define the property rights away from the owner in the face
of the enormous  transaction costs  (and perhaps holdout potential)
facing  airlines if they  had to negotiate  with all  those owning land
lying under  the  flight  path of  their airplanes.1"  Interestingly,  one
method of doing so was to  redefine overflights as falling under the
domain of nuisance rather than trespass. Substituting a governance
rule for the  exclusion approach, these  courts held that only flights
that actually interfered  with the use  of the land were actionable."
Nor is the benefit from vindicating the exclusion  strategy here very
great; as long as planes are  flying too high to interfere with existing
uses  of the land,  it  is  unlikely  that losing  the right  to control  the
upper airspace  defeats  any preexisting investments  or expectations
of the existing owners.  But note that the pure balancing approach
'8  See, e.g., Brown  v. United States, 73 F.3d 1100,  1103-04 (Fed. Cir. 1996);  Merrill,
supra note  13, at 36-45.  The Supreme Court has held that deferral statutes have cre-
ated a public highway at certain minimum altitudes. United States v.  Causby, 328 U.S.
256, 260-61  (1946).  For  a  general  discussion of the various  theories  initially used  to
soften  the ad coelum rule in  the context  of overflights  and  subsequent statutory  de-
velopments, see Prosser and Keeton on Torts, supra note 79, § 13,  at 79-82; Colin Ca-
hoon,  Low  Altitude  Airspace:  A  Property  Rights  No-Man's  Land,  56  J.  Air  L. &
Com. 157 (1990).
.See,  e.g.,  Swetland  v.  Curtiss  Airports  Corp.,  55  F.2d  201,  203  (6th  Cir.  1932);
Delta Air Corp. v.  Kersey, 20 S.E.2d 245,  249 (Ga.  1942). The First Restatement also
created a classic governance  regime. Restatement (First) of Torts § 194 (1934).
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(on which the more valuable activity wins)  might have allowed air-
lines  to  escape  liability for  very  valuable  low-altitude  flights  and
thereby  condemn  property near  airports  without  the  need  for an
exercise of eminent domain.
At least in  hindsight, we can find  examples  where strict  adher-
ence to the exclusion strategy  was probably a mistake. Withdrawal
of  the  delegation  to  owners  and  some  limited  creativity  in  the
(re)definition  of property rights would have made  sense. But even
in these cases, it is often less clear that courts would have been the
best innovators in these areas.
C. Exclusion and its Limits in the Law of Oil and Gas
A prime-and perhaps the  most famous-example  of exclusion
is  oil  and  gas.  Under the  exclusionary  approach  of  the  common
law, withdrawing oil on one's land is one of the large and indefinite
class of uses that is indirectly protected  by the right to exclude.  If
this type of use is not curbed, wasteful racing results. But, as is well
known, most oil and gas fields involve too many and too heteroge-
neous a set of participants  to allow for private bargaining to an ef-
ficient solution  such  as consensual  unitization,  under  which  each
owner would take shares in a field under unitary management."'
Extending  each  private  owner's  exclusion  rights  in  land to  the
actual  stocks  of  oil  would  in  theory  prevent  waste,  but  this  ap-
proach  appeared  expensive  because  the  oil  was  out  of sight  and
"'Courts have  sometimes  noted  that  the  denial  of  an  injunction  would  allow  a
plaintiff in effect to exercise the power of eminent domain without constraints like the
public use  requirement.  See, e.g.,  Hulbert  v.  Cal. Portland  Cement  Co.,  118  P. 928,
930  (Cal.  1911)  ("To  permit  the cement company to continue its operations, even  to
the extent of destroying the  property of  the  two  plaintiffs and  requiring  payment of
the  full value thereof, would be, in  effect, allowing the seizure of private property for
a use other than a public one-something  unheard  of and totally unauthorized  in the
law."); Boomer v.  Atl. Cement  Co.,  257  N.E.2d 870,  875,  876-97 (N.Y.  1970) (Jasen,
J.,  dissenting);  Arnold v.  Melani,  449- P.2d  800,  805  (Wash.  1968)  (arguing  that the
state constitutional provision prohibiting the taking of private property for private use
other  than for private ways of necessity and so  forth does  not divest courts  of power
to refuse injunctions).
'" See, e.g., Gary D. Libecap, Contracting for  Property Rights  95-107 (1989);  Gary
D. Libecap  & James  L. Smith, Regulatory Remedies to  the Common  Pool: The Lim-
its to Oil Field Unitization,  22 Energy J. 1 (2001); Gary D. Libecap  & James L. Smith,
The  Self-Enforcing  Provisions  of  Oil  and  Gas  Unit  Operating  Agreements:  Theory
and Evidence,  15 J.L. Econ. & Org. 526 (1999).
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moved around in response to drilling activities. It would be difficult
to know  how  much  oil, much  less  whether  particular  oil,  existed
under a given parcel."  Given that the United States does not have
a regime like that in civil-law countries  in which  the state  owns all
minerals in place  under both private  and public  land, early courts
faced the problem of clarifying  neighbors'  rights  in oil and  gas.  In
one  of  the  most  criticized  examples  of  "formalistic"  reasoning,
common-law  courts  analogized  oil  and  gas  to  other  fugitive  re-
sources, especially wild animals, and concluded  that oil and gas are
subject to a "rule  of capture."  Landowners  are privileged  to pump
and they own  any oil they reduce  to possession  at the surface.  In-
deed,  pragmatist  and  realist  commentators  hold  up  the  leading
cases drawing  the  wild-animal  analogy  as Exhibit  A in  their case
against  "myopic"  formalism;  look,  they  say,  at  how  wrong  the
analogy  is and what disastrous  results  it led  to in  terms of wasted
resources.9 ' To focus on but one example, Richard Posner takes oil
and gas as a prime area where judicial pragmatism and attention to
contextual  detail would have produced  superior results to  the for-
malism behind the wild-animal  analogy:
0 See, e.g., Gary D. Libecap & James  L. Smith, The Economic Evolution of Petro-
leum Property  Rights  in the  United States,  31  J.  Legal  Stud.  S589,  S592-93  (2002);
Dean Lueck, The Rule of First Possession and the Design of the Law, 38 J.L. & Econ.
393, 425-26 (1995).
' This literature  is vast. See, e.g., Bruce  M. Kramer  & Patrick H. Martin, The  Law
of Pooling  and Unitization  2-5  (3d  ed.  1989);  Laura  H. Burney,  A Pragmatic  Ap-
proach to  Decision Making in the Next Era of Oil  and  Gas Jurisprudence,  16 J.  En-
ergy  Nat. Resources  & Envtl. L.  1,  11  (1996)  ("To clarify  the contours  of the prag-
matic  approach  I  envision,  and  to  demonstrate  its  value,  I  will  contrast  it  to  two
formalistic approaches  used throughout  the Great Era. As noted  above,  by analogiz-
ing to the law of wild  animals, many early judges myopically adhered  to common-law
rules rather  than venturing  to fashion a  unique  jurisprudence  for  oil  and  gas law.");
John Parmerlee, Mines and Minerals-Leases-Rentals  Accruing Under a Subterranean
Gas Storage Lease, 21  U. Kan. City L. Rev. 217, 219-20 (1953)  ("If the law pertaining
to minerals  in this country is to retain its stability  and uniformity  it is mandatory that
this vicious  analogy  drawn  between natural  gas and animals  ferae naturae which  has
reared  its ugly head be  destroyed without delay."); Kenneth  J. Vandevelde, The  New
Property  of the Nineteenth  Century:  The  Development  of the  Modern  Concept  of
Property, 29 Buff. L. Rev. 325,  354-57 (1980).  See generally  Rance  L. Craft, Of Res-
ervoir Hogs and  Pelt Fiction: Defending the Ferae Naturae  Analogy  Between  Petro-
leum and Wildlife, 44  Emory L.J. 697,  699, 713-14  (1995)  (documenting  hostility and
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Armed with the legal rule that there are no nonpossessory  rights
in wild animals, all you need to know to apply the rule is whether
an  animal is wild or domesticated.  Legal rules economize  on in-
formation,  and that is a good thing. The danger comes when, for
example,  the rule  about  nonpossessory  rights  in wild  animals  is
thought  to  generalize  automatically  to  a  rule  that there  are  no
such  rights  in  any nonstationary  natural  resource.  Then  we  can
obtain the 'correct'  rule for property rights in oil and gas without
having to delve into the economics of developing these resources,
all right, but the risk that the resulting regime for oil and gas will
be inefficient is very great. The  pragmatic approach reverses  the
sequence.  It  asks:  What  is  the  right rule-the  sensible,  the  so-
cially apt, the  reasonable,  the  efficient rule-for  oil  and gas?  In
the course  of investigating  this question the pragmatist  will con-
sult  wild-animal  law  for  what  (little)  light  it  may  throw  on  the
question, but the emphasis will be empirical from the start.'"
Posner  goes  on  to  announce  that  the  "intelligent"  answer  to
whether oil and gas cannot be owned until reduced to possession  is
"No,"  and blames  the  opposite  answer-the  rule  of capture-for
impairing incentives to conserve. 193 Very tellingly, he does not offer
any details of how property rights in oil and  gas should be deline-
ated. Property  casebooks  often  likewise  present  oil  and  gas  as  a
morality tale of the perverse  results obtained under formalism and
the need  for context-sensitive  decisionmaking  that will respond  to
society's  needs.9 "  On  this  view,  competitive  pumping,  expensive
1.  Richard A. Posner, Overcoming  Law 399 (1995).
' Id.  at 520.
"  See,  e.g.,  A.  James  Casner  et  al.,  Cases  and  Text  on  Property  44-45  (4th  ed.
2000); Charles Donahue, Jr. et al.,  Cases and Materials on Property: An Introduction
to the Concept and the Institution 262 (3d  ed. 1993) (noting  late development  of sci-
entific information  about petroleum geology but introducing  gas storage  by  injection
case by stating that "[tjhe  following case, if it does nothing else, illustrates  the dangers
of carrying arguments  by analogy  to their illogical conclusion"); Jesse  Dukeminier &
James  E.  Krier,  Property  39-40  (5th  ed.  2002)  [hereinafter  Dukeminier  &  Krier,
Property]  (outlining  criticisms  of  "strained  analogies"  and  other  problems);  Jesse
Dukeminier & James  Krier, Teacher's  Manual: Property  27  (5th ed. 1998)  [hereinaf-
ter Dukeminier  & Krier, Teacher's  Manual]  (criticizing the  rule of capture  in oil and
gas and endorsing judicial suggestions that one landowner  might be able to enjoin ex-
cessive drilling by another); see  also Joseph William Singer, Property Law: Rules  and
Policies, and Practices 87-89 (3d ed. 2002) (excerpting critique of rule of capture).
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and dangerous surface storage, and so on can be laid at formalism's
door.
The information-cost  theory calls this gloomy picture into ques-
tion. Despite  the  beating  that the  analogy  of oil  and  gas  to  wild
animals  has  taken  among  commentators,  it  does  reflect  the  fact
that the costs of delineating  rights to stocks of migratory resources
tend  to  be  higher  than  for  stationary  ones.' 9  Interestingly,  com-
mentary  sometimes  conflates  two  traditional  approaches  to  the
rule of capture in oil and gas law, each of which is consistent with
an  exclusion  regime. Under the most extreme,  unqualified  rule of
capture, no one has title to oil and gas until it is reduced  to posses-
sion by extraction.96 In the case that often leads this parade of hor-
ribles  of  formalistic  reasoning,  Hammonds  v.  Central Kentucky
Natural Gas Co., the  court used the wild-animal  analogy  and rule
of capture to  find that owners of extracted gas lose their property
in the gas when  they reinject it into a gasless  underground  forma-
tion  lying  under  a  neighbor's  land."9  In  Hammonds, the  storing
company  had secured  rights to all the 15,000-acre  surface over the
storage  formation  except  for  the  fifty-four  acres  of  Della
Hammonds,  who  sued  in trespass.'98 The  court found  no trespass
because  the gas  was no longer the  company's, but this meant that
plaintiff  Hammonds  could  have  tapped  the formation  and  taken
the gas.
Many states, even from the birth of the wild-animal  analogy, did
recognize  property in the oil and gas when it was under an owner's
land, but  held that  the title  disappeared  as  soon as  the  oil or  gas
migrated away-even  if because  of a well drilled by another  land-
owner  on  his  land.1"  Under  this  latter,  qualified  rule  of  capture,
some  judicial  governance  rules  of  "correlative  rights"  and  "fair
share"  against the grossest forms of waste can  build on the exclu-
sionary  regime,  in  a  manner  sounding  somewhat  like  the  law  of
'9  See, e.g., Craft, supra note 191,  707-10; Lueck, supra note 190, at 425.
196  See, e.g., Hammonds  v.  Cent. Ky. Natural Gas Co.,  75  S.W.2d 204, 205  (Ky.  1934),
overruled  by  Tex.  Am.  Energy  Corp.  v.  Citizens  Fidelity  Bank  &  Trust  Co.,  736
S.W.2d 25 (Ky.  1987).
'9'75 S.W.2d at 206.
'" Id. at 204.
'99 The leading  case is  Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v.  DeWitt, 18 A.
724, 725 (Pa. 1889).
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ground water.2" These rules do target high-visibility actions such as
negligently  drilling a  well that causes  the well to blow out, crater,
and catch  fire. 2 "'  Correlative  rights  include  the right against  other
superincumbent  owners  engaging  in  "waste"  and  "spoilage,"  but
these  doctrines only police  obvious actions like allowing gas to es-
cape into the air for no legitimate purpose 2 and leaving unplugged
abandoned  wells.2 3 Very strikingly,  cases that flesh out correlative
rights  consistently  rely  on  legislative  and  administrative  pro-
nouncements."l  Sometimes  these judicial  doctrines  of  correlative
rights  and fair shares  have built  up around statutes prescribing  an
equal and just opportunity to extract oil and gas."  As expected,  all
2 0
0 See, e.g.,  1 Eugene Kuntz, A Treatise  on the Law  of Oil and  Gas § 4.3  (1987);  1
W.L. Summers, The  Law of Oil  and Gas  §§ 63-65  (1954).  For explicit recognition  of
the parallels to and differences  from the problems of other resources like ground wa-
ter, see id. § 62, at 164-73, § 63,  at 184.
201 See Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 562-63  (Tex. 1948).
202  See,  e.g., Louisville  Gas  Co. v. Ky. Heating  Co.,  77 S.W.  368 (Ky.  1903).  But cf.
Hague v.  Wheeler,  27 A.  714, 719  (Pa.  1893)  (letting  gas escape  without malice  not
en)oinable). See  also 1 Kuntz, supra note 200, § 4.4.
03  See,  e.g.,  Higgins  Oil  &  Fuel  Co.  v.  Guar.  Oil Co.,  82  So.  206,  212  (La.  1919)
(spoilage from unplugged abandoned  well enjoinable); 1 Kuntz, supra note 200, § 4.5,
at 123.
2041efore  distinguishing  duties  arising from purely judicial  doctrine  and those  aris-
ing from legislation and regulation, Summers summarizes:
While  litigation,  apart  from statute,  has  not  often  arisen  in which  the courts
have  had the opportunity  to determine  a standard  of performance  of the duty
not to injure  a source of supply  of  oil and  gas, conservation  statutes,  defining
and prohibiting waste and giving administrative agencies authority to make and
enforce  rules  for  its  prevention,  do  determine  such  a  standard  of  perform-
ance....  A standard  of the performance  of the duty of a landowner  not to take
an undue proportion of the oil and gas can  only be determined  on the basis  of
scientific  information  respecting  the  physical  facts  of the  common  source  of
supply.  Usually  such  information  is  not  available  to  a  landowner  in  a  suit
against his neighbor.
1 Summers, supra  note 200, § 63,  at 184-88.  Very  interestingly and consistently  with
the  information-cost  theory,  one  case  Kuntz cites  as  a detailed  purely judicial  rule
against excessively quick withdrawal,  1 Kuntz, supra note 200, § 4.5, at  123 n.2, is ac-
tually a case  about a statute and whether it effects a taking. See Mfrs. Gas & Oil  Co.
v. Ind. Natural Gas & Oil Co., 57 N.E. 912, 917  (Ind. 1900).
20'See,  e.g.,  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 30-5-101(a)(ix)  (2003)  (defining correlative  rights as
"the opportunity afforded the owner of each property in a pool to produce, so far as it
is reasonably praticable to do  so without waste, his just and equitable  share of the oil
or  gas,  or  both,  in  the  pool");  Anschutz  Corp.  v.  Wyo.  Oil  &  Gas  Conservation
Comm'n, 923  P.2d 751,  757 (Wyo.  1996)  (quoting this provision); see also Schrimsher
Oil & Gas Exploration  v. Stoll, 484  N.E.2d  166,  168  (Ohio Ct. App.  1984) (recogniz-
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the  purely judicial  doctrines  aim  at very  easy-to-monitor  actions,
typically  occurring at the surface,  and do not include  any attempt
at direct regulation of the quantity of oil removed or the rate of ex-
traction.
On their  own, however, these judicial  doctrines  do not prevent
other forms of waste such as drilling too many wells, as long as the
wells are  not drilled in a negligent manner.'  As a leading treatise
puts it:
Perhaps most important, it should not be concluded  that there
is a  special  correlative  rights  doctrine  which  renders  the law  of
capture  obsolete, and which  is  designed to assure to each owner
an ascertainable  share of the common source of supply to be de-
rived from calculations designed to do complete justice. Correla-
tive rights are  complementary to the law of capture  in that they
provide the refinements required to describe fair play under such
law. 2 7
As expected  on the information-cost  theory, a judicial governance
regime  supplements  the  basic  exclusionary  regime,  including  its
privilege of extraction protected by the right to exclude. Where the
cost to courts of supplying such governance  rules is high, we  get a
very unambitious governance regime. Thus, when judicial doctrines
aim at "waste"  in the context of oil and gas, it is, as expected on the
information-cost theory, a narrow class of easily monitored waste.
Furthermore, the qualified rule of capture forms the foundation
for rules  of governance  by administrative  bodies, which  can claim
to  be  operating  consistently  with  all  owners'  exclusion  rights.  In-
deed,  perhaps  the  most important  contribution  of the correlative
rights doctrine, if any, is not that it involved courts in supervising (a
highly limited  class of) wasteful activities. Rather, it is that it may
have  eased  the  way  for  legislatures  and  administrative  agencies
(such  as  the  Texas  Railroad  Commission)  to  intervene,  without
206  1 Kuntz, supra note 200, § 4.2;  1 Patrick H. Martin & Bruce M.  Kramer, Williams
& Meyers  on  Oil and Gas Law § 204.4  (1997);  1 Summers, supra note 200,  §§  61-65;
Thomas  M.  Golden,  Secondary  Recovery  Operations-Protection  of  Correlative
Rights, 2  Land & Water L. Rev. 129,  141  (1967)  (noting that  the right to  a fair share
"does  not assure a proportionate share of the minerals; it simply means that he has a
right to a fair opportunity  to extract oil and gas")  (citing 1 Kuntz, supra note  200, §§
4.1, 4.2, 4.7).
207  1  Kuntz, supra note 200, § 4.3, at 120-21.Exclusion and Nuisance
having  to worry about takings  claims. Under the correlative  rights
doctrine,  surface  owners  did  have property  in oil  and  gas  under-
ground, and such statutes can be regarded  as securing the property
rights  of  all  the  owners."  These  legislative  and  administrative
measures aimed at preventing both injury to the common pool and
landowners  from  taking  an  undue  proportion  of  the  resource.2°
These  measures  included  well-spacing  rules,  regulations  about
rates of extraction, and detailed rules about drilling and extraction
procedures,  as well  as  legislative  schemes for  forced  unitization. 21 0
Most statutes give an administrative  authority over the governance
regime,:2  and  these regimes regulate far more than the gross waste
that purely judicial doctrines targeted.
Legislation did not necessarily reflect a failure of courts to "get it
right."  In light of their greater expertise and ability to deal with the
problem  on a  field-wide  basis,  these  statutory  and  administrative
schemes are probably more successful than  a judicial conservation
governance  regime  could  have  been.  Judicial  attempts  to  imple-
ment  a more  comprehensive  governance  regime  might  well  have
taken  the  pressure  off  other  bodies  to  do  something  about  the
problem.  Furthermore,  when  comparing  institutions'  abilities  in
devising governance  regimes, the rule of capture looks better when
we realize that nothing in the courts'  traditional approach-the ad
coelum  rule  or  the  analogy  of  oil  and  gas  to  wild  animals-
prevented a court from upholding these legislative and administra-
tive  measures  as  exercises  of the  police  power.12  As we  will  see
shortly, even the  formalistic  approach  of Hammonds did  not pre-
clude  legislatures  from  solving  the underground  storage  problem
through  condemnation  statutes, without  running  afoul  of public-
use requirements.  While  it is also true that the legislative and ad-
ministrative schemes put in place were far from perfect, perfection
cannot be the proper standard. Those criticizing the courts for fail-
ing to  apply scientific expertise  and blaming  formalistic exclusion-
208 Ohio Oil  Co.  v. Indiana,  177 U.S.  190, 209-10 (1900);  Schrimsher Oil, 484 N.E.2d
at 168.
200  1 Summers, supra note 200, § 63, at 183-84.
210  See id. §§ 71-98; Martin & Kramer, supra note 206, § 5.01.
211 See  1 Summers, supra note 200, § 71,  at 198.
22 Indeed,  most courts did  uphold these policy  measures.  See,  e.g., id. § 62,  at 167-
69.
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based analogical  reasoning for the failures of oil and  gas law have
not presented  reasons  to think that  a judicial  governance  scheme
would  have  been more  successful,  or  cheaper,  than  the imperfect
mixed  judicial-legislative-administrative  regime  that  actually  de-
veloped.
As I have noted, the Hammonds decision, which applied a pure
rule of capture  and  a  very  strict  approach  to  the ad coelum rule,
has been  roundly  condemned  as an example  of wrongheaded  for-
malistic reasoning  leading to  economic  waste."'  Many commenta-
tors have  struggled  with  the  Hammonds problem  of underground
storage, and  a variety  of judicial solutions-along  the  lines of air-
plane  overflights-have  been  suggested  in  which  the  property
rights over the storage would be defined  away from  owners  of the
surface  land."'  By  contrast  to  the  correct  approach  in  airplane
overflights,  it  is  said,  decisions  like  Hammonds prevented  eco-
nomic storage of natural gas."' But it should be noted that these so-
lutions are not as easy to implement in the case of underground gas
storage because, unlike with the distant sky, owners  may well find a
use of the underground space taken by the stored gas." 16
The commentators'  dire claims regarding Hammonds are at best
overstated.  Whether  courts  followed  the  Hammonds unqualified
rule of capture  or the  qualified rule  of capture,  the result  was  to
place the problem of economic  storage of natural gas in a different
213 See, e.g., Lone Star Gas Co. v. Murchison, 353 S.W.2d 870, 876-77, 879 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1962)  (rejecting Hammonds and  documenting  that "Hammonds,  in  its applica-
tion  of ferae  naturae  doctrine,  has  been  the subject  of violent  adverse  criticism  by
many authors and law review writers"); Burney, supra note 191, at 22-26.
114 See,  e.g., Note,  The  Ownership  of Natural  Gas  and  Some Real  Property  Con-
cepts, 36 Va. L. Rev. 947,  954 (1950)  (claiming to apply  Pollock's doctrine  of possible
effective  possession,  see Frederick  Pollock  & Robert  Samuel  Wright,  An Essay on
Possession in the Common Law (Oxford,  Clarendon Press  1888)). The implication  in
much of the critique of the rule of capture is that a more elaborate judicial doctrine  of
reasonable use or correlative  rights would be  best. This type of commentary does not
inuire into the difficulties of courts supervising such a rule. 25See, e.g., Charles Donahue, Jr., Thomas E. Kauper, & Peter W. Martin, Teacher's
Manual to Accompany  Property: An Introduction  to the Concept and the Institution
66-67 (3d ed. 1993);  Dukeminier & Krier, Property, supra  note 194, at 39 ("There is a
reason independent of strained  analogies to discard the rule in Hammonds: It denied
society at large the benefits of economical underground storage.").
216  See infra note 221 and  accompanying text.
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arena."7 Private parties negotiated  for storage where holdouts were
not  preclusive,  and  many  states  passed  condemnation  statutes.28
The  condemnation  statutes,  as well  as  the  spacing,  pumping,  and
unitization  regulations,  are  detailed  and comprehensive  in  a  way
that would have  been difficult for judges to achieve  through  rules
of decision. Judges cooperated  in finding that these  condemnation
statutes did not violate the relevant public-use requirements  for an
exercise  of eminent domain.29 Even the much-maligned  Kentucky
Supreme  Court, the originator of the most extreme rule of capture
decision in Hammonds, found a storage condemnation statute con-
stitutional in Cornwell v. Central  Kentucky Natural Gas, thus allow-
ing  a solution  to the holdout problem.2
'  The provisions  about and
the market rents paid for storage and rights to apparently depleted
221 strata  reflect the view that they are not worthless  or de minimis.
In particular, surface  owners or their mineral grantees  (or lessees)
may have  an interest in  developing  strata  below  the storage  stra-
tum. Reconciling these multiple uses requires a more context sensi-
tive  governance  regime,  which  both  condemnation  statutes  and
privately  negotiated  divisions of rights furnish.  It is far from clear
that  a pragmatic judge,  seeking  the  optimal solution,  would have
even  addressed  this  part  of the  problem,  and  the  various  "solu-
tions"  to  the  Hammonds problem  by commentators  do  not  give
grounds  for  optimism.  Eminent  domain,  with compensation  and
various  procedural  safeguards,  is  superior  to  judicial  "redefini-
tions" of property rights that allow gas storage companies  to inject
gas with no liability at all, as well as to protecting a landowner with
only a liability rule.2
2 7 See Alan Stamm,  Legal Problems in the Underground Storage of Natural Gas, 36
Tex. L. Rev. 161 (1957).
2' See, e.g., Stamm, supra note 217,  at 174-84.
21 9  Id.
...  249 S.W.2d  531 (Ky.  1952).
221 See,  e.g.,  Stamm,  supra  note  217,  at  172-74  (examining  storage  provisions  in
leases). One reason for treating "apparently"  exhausted strata as valuable  is that they
may  contain  native  oil  or  gas that  will  become  economically  extractable  at  a later
date. Id.  at  168;  Note,  Oil  and  Gas:  Substratum  Storage  Problems,  7  Okla. L. Rev.
225,  227  (1954)  (citing  Engineering Committee,  Interstate  Oil Compact  Commission,
Oil and Gas Production 47-50 (1951)).
"2See  supra  notes  58-61  and  accompanying  text;  see  also  Smith,  Property  and
Property Rules, supra note 24.
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Judicial policing of certain actions like burning  off oil can be ob-
served  by courts  and  subjected  to governance  rules,  but  detailed
rules relating to the rate of extraction are likely to be more difficult
for courts to devise and monitor than in the cases of water and wild
animals.  The  point  is  not  so  much  that  the  analogy  to  water  or
wildlife does not solve  the problem of waste, but rather what  type
and degree  of judicial  softening  of the exclusion  regime  is  appro-
priate,  given that  legislatures  and  administrative  agencies  are  in  a
much better position to address the  problem technically,  if not po-
litically  (or even militarily). 223 Perhaps  it is more  important in case
of the discovery of a new dimension to a resource to use the exclu-
sion regime in a way that does not preclude or delay legislative  and
administrative  efforts  to  devise  governance  regimes. 224  Whether
courts  should  get more  involved  in  devising  governance  rules  in
light of the  difficult  public-choice  dynamics  of regulating  oil  and
gas extraction  is a tough question, particularly at the (early) time a
rule  is called for.25 Given the high delineation  costs of oil and gas,
'  See Craft, supra note  191,  at 718-21  (arguing that courts did not have the author-
ity or capacity to provide  a better rule than the rule of capture such as those later de-
veloped  in  the  administrative  context).  As  Libecap  and  Wiggins  document,  when
ownership  of  oil  was  very  dispersed  (with  an  inverse  of  the  Herfindahl  index  of
greater  than around  10-12),  enforcement  of limits on  extraction  required  the  use  of
troops.  Gary  D. Libecap  & Steven N.  Wiggins,  Contractual Responses  to the  Com-
mon Pool: Prorationing of Crude Oil Production, 74 Am. Econ. Rev. 87, 96  (1984).
22,Another  possible  example  comes  from the  law  of cave  ownership,  a  problem
Coase noted  in  a  discussion  foreshadowing  what  would  come  to  be  known  as  the
Coase Theorem.  R.H.  Coase,  The  Federal  Communications  Commission,  2  J.L.  &
Econ. 1, 25 (1959).  In the  leading but much-criticized  decision in Edwards v. Sims (au-
thored  by  none  other  than  Commissioner  Stanley,  who  wrote  the  opinion  in
Hammonds),  ownership  of the Great  Onyx Cave, a potential  tourist site, was held to
be  in the surface  owners, according  to  the ad coelum rule.  24 S.W.2d  619,  621  (Ky.
1929). After much litigation, the state exercised its power of eminent domain and op-
erated the  cave itself. Edwards v.  Lee's Adm'r, 96 S.W.2d  1028,  1029 (Ky.  1936). Ar-
guing in favor of departing in this  context  from the ad inferos part of the ad coelum
rule  (as by holding that the owner of the mouth gets the cave), Richard  Epstein esti-
mates  that the problem  of holdout  is  great  and  the likely externality  (for  example,
from mining by the non-cave-owning  surface  owner) is  small.  See  Epstein, Holdouts,
supra note 78, at 563-67.
115 This question turns  in part  on how subject  to capture legislatures  and  courts are
and how to define capture in the first  place. See, e.g., Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest
Group Theory Justify More  Intrusive Judicial  Review?,  101  Yale L.J.  31  (1991);  Wil-
liam N. Eskridge,  Jr., Politics Without  Romance:  Implications  of Public Choice The-
ory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 Va. L. Rev. 275, 285 (1988).2004] Exclusion and Nuisance 1037
the limited rule of capture with governance  rules  prohibiting gross
waste is defensible if supplemented by public regulation.
D. The Limits of Injunctive Relief
In another common situation that commentators usually treat as
calling  for  a softening  of the  exclusion regime-this  time  through
replacing  traditional  injunctions  with  damage  awards-the  defen-
dant's industrial  use is thought to be  more valuable and  the plain-
tiffs  so  numerous  and  uncoordinated  as  to  present  an overriding
danger of high transaction costs and holdout behavior in particular.
The formative  period of nuisance  law in the nineteenth  century
witnessed  a  concern  for  maintaining  the  exclusionary  aspect  of
property  even  where  rich  and  powerful  industrial  interests  no
doubt would have preferred weaker forms of protection. 6 Interest-
ingly, the traditional strong protection of property  through the ex-
clusionary aspect of nuisance  was remarkably  robust in the face of
claims that it might retard economic development.1 2 7 It is only more
recently that concerns about shutting down plants have come  to be
216 Courts occasionally made statements to this effect:
Although the damage to the plaintiff may  be slight as compared with the defen-
dant's expense  of abating  the condition,  that is not a  good  reason for refusing
an injunction. Neither courts of equity nor law can be guided by such a rule, for
if followed to its logical conclusion  it would deprive the poor litigant of his little
property  by  giving it  to those  already  rich. It  is  always  to be remembered  in
such  cases that "denying the injunction puts the hardship  on the party in whose
favor the legal right exists, instead of on the wrongdoer."
Whalen  v.  Union  Bag  &  Paper  Co.,  101  N.E.  805,  806  (N.Y.  1913)  (quoting  5
Pomeroy's  Equitable  Jurisprudence  §  530  (San  Francisco,  Bancroft-Whitney  1886-
17)1
8)A.W.B.  Simpson, Leading  Cases in the  Common Law 163-94  (1995)  (discussing
Tipping v.  St. Helen's Smelting Co., 4  B.  &  S.  608, 616,  122 E.R. 588,  591,  11  H.L.C.
642, 11 E.R. 1483,  1 Ch. App. Cas. 66  (1865)). The thesis that nineteenth-century  tort
law  softened  liability  for  business  as  a  "subsidy"  has  come  into  serious  question.
Compare Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American  Law 475 (2d  ed. 1985),  and
Morton Horwitz, The Transformation  of American  Law, 1780-1860,  at 85-89  (1977),
with  Simpson, supra,  at  191-94  (discussing  victory  of a wealthy  landowner in  a nui-
sance  case  against an industrial  polluter  but expressing  skepticism  that English  nui-
sance  law  had  much  effect  on  pollution  or  the  pace  of  industrialization),  Gary  T.
Schwartz, The Character of Early American Tort Law, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 641,  642-43
(1989)  (arguing that courts in the nineteenth century were generous in upholding tort
liability  against defendants  in  emerging  industry),  Gary  T. Schwartz,  Tort  Law  and
the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A Reinterpretation,  90 Yale L.J.  1717,
1735-58  (1981)  (critiquing the subsidy thesis).Virginia Law Review [Vol. 90:965
widely  viewed  as  trumping  strong  property  protection  for  resi-
dents.2"
The  now  classic  example  of  this  situation  and  of  the  modern
loosening  approach is the case of Boomer v.  Atlantic Cement Co.229
In  that  case,  a  cement  plant  caused  pollution  that  disturbed
neighboring  landowners.  Traditionally  New York law would  have
almost automatically  awarded the plaintiffs an injunction on these
facts.2" The fear was that the large number of plaintiffs would pre-
sent high transaction costs, especially holdout problems, that would
make bargaining around an injunction impossible."'  If so, the result
of  an  injunction  would  be  to  force  the  plant  to  shut  down.  In
Boomer, the trial court found a substantial nuisance but refused to
grant  an  injunction  and  the  Court  of  Appeals  affirmed. 232  In up-
holding  the refusal  of the injunction,  the  court  was  softening the
exclusion  regime  to  capture  value  that  a  crude  exclusion  regime
apparently could not.
Interestingly, this cautionary tale of high transaction costs seems
less  straightforward  than it  once did. First, the disturbance  to  the
228  Louise Halper  has argued  that damages remedies  were  not as unprecedented  in
pre-Boomer New York nuisance law as  the  conventional  view holds.  See  Louise  A.
Halper, Nuisance, Courts and Markets in the New York Court of Appeals, 1850-1915,
54 Alb. L. Rev.  301, 303-06  (1990);  cf. Joel  C. Dobris, Boomer Twenty  Years Later:
An  Introduction,  with  Some  Footnotes  about  "Theory,"  54  Alb. L.  Rev.  171,  179
(1990)  (arguing  that Boomer was  a watershed  in  applying  balance  of the  equities  to
the issue of injunctions in New York nuisance law).  Halper emphasizes what  I would
call the governance component of nuisance law. See Halper, supra, at 349-54; see also
Carol M.  Rose,  The  Several  Futures  of  Property:  Of  Cyberspace  and  Folk  Tales,
Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 129,  179 (1998)  (arguing that turn-
of-the-century  nuisance law specified  a commons  much like that in riparianism  in wa-
ter law).
229  257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y.  1970).
2  See, e.g., Whalen  v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 101  N.E. 805  (N.Y.  1913)  (reversing
the Appellate  Division's reversal of a grant of an injunction where the plaintiff's harm
was  $100  a year and the value of the offending paper mill  was more than  $1,000,000,
with 400 to 500 employees).
231  See,  e.g.,  Robert  Cooter  & Thomas  Ulen,  Law  and  Economics  170-80  (1988);
Richard  A.  Posner,  Economic  Analysis  of  Law  16,  68-71,  79-81  (5th  ed.  1998);
Calabresi  & Melamed,  supra note  2, at  1106-10; Robert  Cooter, Unity in Tort, Con-
tract, and  Property:  The  Model  of Precaution,  73  Cal.  L. Rev.  1, 26-27  (1985);  A.
Mitchell  Polinsky,  Controlling  Externalities  and  Protecting  Entitlements:  Property
Rights, Liability  Rule, and  Tax-Subsidy  Approaches, 8  J. Legal Stud.  1, 4 (1979);  A.
Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive
and Damage Remedies, 32 Stan. L. Rev. 1075,  1076 (1980).
22 257 N.E.2d at 875.
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nearest  neighbors was far greater than the Court of Appeals  deci-
sion indicated. 3  On the  other  hand,  the permanent  damages  for
the  nuisance  (in  a  sense  the  purchase  price  for  an  easement)
awarded  on remand were  much higher than  the  apparent diminu-
tion in fair market value that the court suggested  as the standard.
Furthermore, as some authors have pointed out, it is not at all clear
that  Atlantic  Cement  had  no  alternatives  ex  ante.  Possibilities
might  include  assembling  a larger  tract  for  the  plant, 23 5  acquiring
the  tract  it  did acquire  but  negotiating  for easements,  or  finding
another  site  altogether.  To this  we  can  add that  under the  loose
approach  to the public  use requirement  in federal  and much state
takings law, companies  like Atlantic will sometimes be able to con-
demn the desired tract. 236
Despite  these  considerations,  one  might-as  many  do-argue
that in  high-transaction-cost  situations  with  potential  holding  out
and other strategic behavior,  the exclusion  strategy has been  car-
ried too far  in  the  past  and that  a little realist  innovation  on  the
part  of judges  would  have  helped. Although  each  of these  situa-
tions looks like  an obvious  case for softening  the exclusionary  re-
gime, a wider view of what the defendant could have done ex ante
and  which  other  institutions  might  have  dealt  with  the  holdout
233  See  Daniel  A.  Farber,  Reassessing  Boomer: Justice,  Efficiency,  and  Nuisance
Law, in Property  Law and Legal Education: Essays in Honor of John E. Cribbet  7, 7-
8 (Peter Hay & Michael H. Hoeflich  eds., 1988).
3 Id.  at  11-12  (noting  that after remand  Atlantic  Cement's  total liability  came  to
around four times the amount mentioned  in the Court of Appeals decision).
...  This possibility was noted by Lord Justice Thesiger in Sturges v. Bridgman, 11 Ch.
D. 852,  865  (1879)  (Eng.)  ("The smith  in  the  case  supposed  [a  nuisance causing the
defendant  harm]  might protect  himself by taking a sufficient curtilage to ensure  what
he does from being at any time an annoyance to his neighbor ....  ").
"6 The leading case of a weak public use requirement  in the federal  Takings Clause
in  the face  of government  use of eminent domain followed by transfer to private par-
ties  is  Hawaii Housing Authority  v.  Midkiff, 467  U.S.  229  (1984),  which  upheld  a
transfer title  from landlords  to tenants upon  payment of compensation  as  furthering
public purpose  of reducing  concentration  of land  ownership. On  the  approaches  of
various  states  and  how acquisition  for transfer  has  been  held  consistent  with state
public use requirements, see David A. Dana & Thomas W. Merrill, Property: Takings
207-08, 207 n.323 (2002)  (discussing and citing cases). In New York, the state in which
the Boomer case  arose, a court has  upheld the  use  of eminent domain  to assemble a
parcel for a private shopping center because it would "reduce  urban physical  and eco-
nomic blight  and promote economic revitalization  of the acquisition  site."  Sun Co. v.
City of Syracuse Indus. Dev. Agency, 625 N.Y.S.2d 371, 377 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
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problem makes the case for expansion of judicial governance  a ten-
tative one at best.
Two qualifications  to the need  for more judicial governance  are
in order. First, the exclusion strategy may be  "working" even if we
can  point in retrospect to  places where  it did  not lead to  ideal re-
suits. To avoid  the  nirvana  fallacy  of comparing  an  actual  system
with  an idealized  alternative,  we  must compare  the  feasible  alter-
natives.2  The question is how strong a presumption for delegation
through the exclusion rules gives the best result in the long run, not
in any given  situation. If we stick  with exclusion come  what may,
obvious  problems like the waste of the common-law  rules applied
to oil and gas would become commonplace-so  commonplace  that
some  judicial  fine-tuning  through  governance  rules  might  make
sense.  The  strictest  approach to  exclusion  would  have  prevented
the law of nuisance from ever having developed  in the first place.
At the opposite extreme, if courts afford no weight to the presump-
tion  for  exclusion,  then  owners  and  takers  would  know  that the
delegation  is meaningless. Under the weakest presumption  for ex-
clusion, courts  can  be forced  to evaluate  uses  even where  owners
and takers have an advantage in doing so.
If a presumption of decentralization  and delegation  to owners is
valuable  for  reasons  of  information  costs,  as  I  have  argued,  the
question  then  becomes:  How high  do  the  stakes  have  to  be  and
how dire do transaction costs or holdout problems have to become
for it to make sense for the law to engage  in the type of fine-tuning
through governance  rules that the law-and-economics  literature  as-
sumes should be routine? The simple answer to this question is that
we  do  not  have  the  empirical  data  to  give  an  exact  or  even  re-
motely certain  answer.  But we  do have  some  information.  Again,
exclusion  is  ubiquitous  in customary  systems  where  many  of the
costs of creating  the exclusion  rules  are largely internalized to the
producers  of  the  institution.  This  suggests  that  exclusion  makes
sense  in  a  wide  range  of situations.3  Likewise,  the  widespread,
237  Harold  Demsetz,  Information  and  Efficiency:  Another  Viewpoint,  12  J.L.  &
Econ. 1, 1-4 (1969)  (identifying and discussing the nirvana fallacy).
2  Robert  Ellickson  has  hypothesized  that institutions  worked  out by members  of
close-knit  communities are  wealth-maximizing  for the group. Ellickson, Order with-
out  Law, supra  note  65,  at  167-84;  Ellickson,  Property  in  Land,  supra  note  46,  at
1320-21.  If so,  then the widespread  use  of exclusion among such groups is a  positive
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though  often unacknowledged,  use  of exclusion  in ours and  other
legal systems suggests that exclusion has some rationale and should
not be  dismissed lightly.2 39 Also, the more difficult  that uses  are to
separate or to evaluate the more we should expect exclusion.
Thus,  even  as  a  rough  guess,  the  presumption  for  exclusion
should be  higher  than  current  commentary  and the  Restatement
would have  it. Treating  the resource  conflicts  among neighboring
landowners  as  immediately  calling  for  reasonableness  inquiries,
balancing  of  utilities,  and  denials  of  injunctions  gives  too  little
weight  to  the  information-cost  advantage  of  exclusion-not  to
mention the values of liberty and personhood  that groups like resi-
dential homeowners enjoy under a strong property regime.
The  question  is when  holdout problems  become  so  great  as  to
overcome  the  presumption  built  into  the  exclusion  regime.  The
Boomer approach  deals with  the  situation  after the plant is  built.
At this stage  there is no question that there would be high transac-
tion costs and holdouts  if injunctions were used. Is an ex ante per-
spective possible on the Boomer approach? The  relevant question
is the holdout potential and difficulty  of assembling a large enough
parcel before the factory  is  built  (or expanded).  In  the  face  of an
existing  factory  that  might  have  to  shut  down  in  the  absence  of
bargaining  around  an  injunction,  the  tendency  will  be  to  sympa-
thize  with the problems  involved  in land  assembly. Although it is
true that  purchases  disguised  through  agents  and  other  such  de-
vices are costly, so is removing property rule protection  from other
landowners. Moreover, at the time of assembly  one would want to
ask whether the site involving the homeowners is the most suitable
site and how much more suitable it is than the next best site. Only
in the  case of industrial  operations that need  to be  located near a
source  of  raw  materials,  a  waterway,  or  some  other  facility  will
these considerations  point towards  a need  to loosen property rule
protection for those already owning land in the area.
sign. Notice that Ellickson does not claim that the norms and institutions of close-knit
groups  are necessarily  wealth-maximizing  for a wider set of people.  Ellickson,  Order
without  Law, supra  note  65,  at  169;  Ellickson,  Property  in  Land,  supra note  46,  at
1400.
239 See,  e.g., Epstein,  A Clear  View,  supra  note  146;  Smith,  Property  and Property
Rules, supra note 24.
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These  ex  ante  considerations  are  difficult  to  consider  on  the
Boomer liability-rule  approach.  Because  in a nuisance  action  the
plant  is  already  built,  ex  ante  considerations  will  be  difficult  to
prove  and to  act  on even  if proved. (A court  will be  reluctant  to
shut down  a plant  even if the landowners  can  point to  an alterna-
tive  site that  could have  been chosen.)  Some  kind  of safety valve
from  a strict exclusion-based  approach  may  be necessary  because
courts may not stick with bright-line  exclusionary rules. As Robert
Ellickson  argues,  one response  of courts to rules requiring  injunc-
tions even in the face of massive hardship is to manipulate the find-
ings of liability. Given a choice between finding a nuisance with an
automatic  injunction  and  finding no nuisance,  courts  may opt for
the  latter, leaving  plaintiffs  without  even  a damage  remedy. 2"  In
general,  the  traditional rule  that equity  abhors forfeitures  accom-
modated  this  tendency. 241  Courts  find  it  hard  to  resist  trying  to
avoid  unfairness  or waste ex post when  faced  by a concrete  prob-
lem. As Carol Rose points out, this is one reason that "crystal"  or
bright-line rules come to be "muddy"  after judges make exceptions
and introduce balancing  tests in order  to save unfortunate  and  ig-
norant parties from harsh results. 24 2
In  the past,  the law has  favored  legislative  schemes  tailored  to
the  "unique"  resource  problem  as  a very limited  safety valve  for
the Boomer problem.  Thus,  the  famous  Mill  Acts43  and  Western
2 See Ellickson,  Alternatives  to Zoning, supra note 114,  at 720.  As a prime  exam-
ple, Ellickson  cites and discusses Bove v.  Donner-Hanna  Coke Corp., 258 N.Y.S. 229,
233-36  (N.Y.  App. Div. 1932),  in which the nuisance from  the defendant's plant was
severe,  and  if  recognized  would  have  led  to  automatic  availability  of an injunction
shutting  the  plant  down.  The  court  avoided  finding  nuisance  by  wrongly  invoking
coming to the nuisance and permissive zoning.
241  See, e.g., Roger A. Cunningham  et al., The Law of Property § 6.76 (1984).  Some-
times courts announce  that this maxim is to be applied with caution, lest it destroy es-
tablished  rights. See, e.g., Dunkin'  Donuts v.  Middletown  Donut  Corp.,  495  A.2d 66
(N.J.  1985).
242 Carol M.  Rose,  Crystals and Mud  in Property Law, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 577, 601-04
(1988).  In passing, Rose notes that "nuisance  is one of those extraordinarily  shapeless
doctrinal areas  in the  law of property,"  id.  at 579,  although  I  would  argue  that nui-
sance is a complex blend of exclusion crystal and muddy governance.
243 See,  e.g.,  New  Hampshire  Mill  Act,  1868  N.H.  Laws  ch.  20,  §  3;  see  Head  v.
Amoskeag  Mfg.  Co.,  113  U.S.  9,  10-11  (1885)  (quoting  and  discussing  the act); Ep-
stein,  A  Clear View,  supra  note  146,  at  2114; see  also John F.  Hart, The  Maryland
Mill Act, 1669-1766:  Economic Policy  and the Confiscatory Redistribution  of Private
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easement-by-necessity  statutes 244 are tailored to situations in which
ex ante the one proposing  the new use  has limited options in who
to deal with. Possible mill sites are limited in number as are poten-
tial servient plots over which easements  for landlocked  and water-
less plots might be located. Furthermore, these schemes require the
one  proposing  to  condemn  rights  to justify  the  condemnation  as
consistent with the public interest, in a manner  at least as stringent
as  that required  in  exercises  of eminent  domain. 24 5 The  potential
condemnees  have  a  chance  to  object  and  to  introduce  evidence
about  alternatives,  because  the  would-be  condemnor  cannot  pre-
sent the world with a fait accompli. By refusing a blanket after-the-
fact Boomer-style liability rule approach and requiring such ex ante
safeguards  in  any legislative  solutions  to the  holdout and transac-
tion-cost  problems  involved  in  unique  siting  situations,  one  can
solve  the  most  compelling  concerns  motivating  the  Boomer ap-
proach with minimal impact on the basic exclusionary regime.
In the nuisance  area, it is not clear that the safety valve has to be
all  that large in order  to capture  most of its benefits, for two rea-
sons. First, as long as actors like Atlantic Cement  in Boomer know
that they will most likely  face injunction for nuisances, the factory
owner  can  sometimes buy up more  land in  the  neighborhood  be-
fore building the plant, especially  if it uses an agent who maintains
secrecy about the principal's identity and plans. 246 Second, promot-
Property, 39 Am. J.  Legal Hist. 1, 3-5  (1995)  (comparing the Maryland  Mill Act with
a Virginia statute meant to encourage the erection of mills).
244  See,  e.g.,  Wyo.  Stat. Ann.  §§  24-9-101  to -103  (2003); Leo  Sheep  Co.  v.  United
States,  440  U.S.  668,  680  (1979)  (discussing  law  of easement  by  necessity  and "pri-
vate"  eminent domain in the western states).
141 See,  e.g., Epstein,  A Clear View, supra note 146,  at 2111-20; Smith, Property and
Property Rules, supra note  24; see also Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public
Use, 72  Cornell  L. Rev.  61,  81  (1986)  (noting  how  cumbersomeness  of eminent  do-
main acts as a "due process tax" on exercises of the power).
116 Although  many  economists  have  often expressed  theoretical  worries  about  the
high  transaction  costs of land assembly  using  market  transactions, the  case  for emi-
nent domain as a device for lowering transaction  costs is tenuous. See  Robert C. El-
lickson  & Vicki  L. Been,  Land  Use  Controls:  Cases  and  Materials  1029-40  (2d  ed.
2000)  (discussing  how  private  firms  assembling  land  deal  with  holdouts  by  various
methods,  including  secrecy,  threats  to  build  around,  offers  conditional  on  all  land-
owners  accepting,  and  other more  colorful  methods);  Patricia  Munch,  An Economic
Analysis  of Eminent  Domain,  84  J.  Pol.  Econ.  473  (1976)  (presenting  a  theoretical
model  of land  assembly  under eminent  domain  and  voluntary transactions  and pro-
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ing bargaining  ex ante  also avoids the problems of rancor that be-
set negotiations ex post. 2 4 7
The information-cost  theory suggests that a legislative scheme of
compensation with a variety of procedural safeguards  is superior to
a judicial expansion  of liability rules. Aside from  questions  about
whether  courts  or agencies  are  better at setting compensation  for
pollutees,  judicial  liability  rules  destabilize  expectations  under
property  regimes  by allowing the polluter  to initiate a nonconsen-
sual transaction  with no warning, and with no need to justify itself
to the public. Although  the provisions for bonds, hearings,  and  so
on, under  schemes  like  the  Mill  Acts and  Western  easement-by-
necessity  statutes  are surely  imperfect,  they do place  some  obsta-
cles  in the way  of the opportunistic  use  of liability  rules. Perhaps
more importantly, if the information-cost theory is correct, an enti-
tlement  scheme  is  undermined  by each  new  application  of the li-
ability  rule  approach. Where  the  limited number  of such  innova-
tions should be applied requires a comprehensive  view that  is very
difficult for courts to take. As is generally  the case, legislatures  are
institutionally  superior  to  courts  in  revising  the  structure  of enti-
tlements. 248
Nuisance  is not the only, nor the most effective,  method of land
use control,  and nuisance  plays only a  small part  in controlling  air
pollution. 249 The existence of these other methods takes some of the
pressure  off nuisance  and allows  it  to be  simpler and more  exclu-
viding  empirical  study of urban renewal  in Chicago suggesting that assembly by  con-
sensual transactions is more efficient  than by forced sales).
247  In a suggestive  study of twenty nuisance cases resulting in a "property rule"  result
(injunction  or  no  liability)  litigated  to  the  written  appellate  decision  stage,  Ward
Farnsworth  found  that  no  set  of parties  bargained  around  the  result.  Ward  Farns-
worth, Do Parties to Nuisance  Cases Bargain  After Judgment? A Glimpse Inside the
Cathedral, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 373 (1999). The lawyers interviewed  attributed the lack
of trades to enmity, which  is probably more  likely in cases that have been litigated  to
an appellate decision than in the total universe of nuisance disputes.
248  For  an  extended  argument  to  this  effect  in  the  context  of the numerus clausus
principle, see Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property, supra
note 28, at 58-68.
211 See  Boomer  v.  Atlantic  Cement  Co.,  257  N.E.2d  870,  871  (N.Y.  1970);  Duke-
minier & Krier, Teacher's  Manual,  supra  note  194,  at  822; Martin  H. Belsky, Envi-
ronmental  Policy  Law  in the  1980's:  Shifting  Back the Burden  of Proof, 12  Ecology
L.Q. 1, 6-10, 13-14 (1984);  Rose,  Rethinking Environmental  Controls, supra note 35,
at 25-26.
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sionary"  Although some judicial relaxation of the ad coelum rule
makes  sense,  given  the  abilities  of  private  parties  sometimes  to
bargain  ex  ante  and  the  general  superiority  of  legislatures  and
agencies  to  courts  in supplying  detail and  providing implicit  com-
pensation, small shifts by courts from exclusion  to governance  go a
long way. What the best-and politically feasible-mix  of controls
is out of a set that includes not only  nuisance  but covenants,  zon-
ing,  and  pollution  regulation,  is  beyond  the scope  of this Article.
When  greater  precision  of  use  rights  is valuable,  we  may expect
some tendency  to  shift along the  spectrum from exclusion to  gov-
ernance  but  this may  take the  form  of movement from  courts  to
some other institution or to private parties.
Thus, the problem in Boomer is to determine when high transac-
tion costs and potential holdouts make it advantageous  to back off
the  exclusionary  regime  somewhat  and  split  the  entitlement  be-
tween  the  homeowners  and  the  polluter.  The  big  mistake  in  the
majority's opinion in Boomer is to take this problem as calling im-
mediately for reasonableness balancing  of the costs and benefits  of
activities, under an  elaborate judicial governance  regime.  One al-
ternative  view of  the Boomer problem  is that  it  is  really  a  very
narrow  one  relating  to  nearly  "unique"  sites,  a  problem  best
solved,  as  it has  been  in  the  past,  with  tailored  legislative  con-
demnation  schemes  characterized  by  up-front  procedural  safe-
guards. If, as  the information-cost  theory suggests, the  delegation
of  use-determinations  to  owners  has  some  presumptive  value,
limiting  the  departures  from  it  in  the  direction  of  governance
makes  sense,  and  these  departures  will  often  best  be  supplied
legislatively or administratively, if not through private transacting.
CONCLUSION
Nuisance  law  is  a  window onto the  impact of information costs
on the  law. Contrary  to  a growing  conventional  wisdom, nuisance
law is not simply a tort-like regulation of activities projected onto a
m Cf. Merrill, supra note  13, at 46 (suggesting that a very judgmental regime of pub-
lic nuisance could allow private nuisance law to be more bright line). Recognizing the
same  relationship,  Ellickson  conversely  argues  that improvements  to  nuisance  doc-
trine  would  allow nuisance  to  take  back some  of the domain  it  has ceded  to other
forms of land-use control.  See  Ellickson,  Alternatives  to Zoning, supra  note 114,  at
722.
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backdrop  of  land  ownership.  Nor  is  nuisance  just  like  trespass,
which  is  for the  most part  based  on simple  signals  like  boundary
crossings and on rights to exclude, but again it is easy to forget how
much of nuisance still does resemble the law of trespass. In this Ar-
ticle  I have argued  that nuisance  shares features of both torts and
regulation on the one hand and core property  and trespass  on the
other. In the terms of this Article, nuisance carries forward  the ba-
sic  exclusion  strategy based  on the  ad coelum rule  from  trespass
and  supplements-but  does  not  supplant-this  exclusion  regime
with governance  rules of a more tort-like sort.
Exclusion and governance,  and the various strategies in between,
have  their  own characteristic  sets  of costs  and  benefits,  and  it  is
these  that help  explain  and justify the  complex  hybrid of rules in
the  law  of nuisance.  Exclusion  is low  cost  but  low  precision  and
makes  sense  where  the benefits  of tailoring-in  terms  of special-
ized multiple use of a resource-are at their weakest and where the
benefits  of  delegation  to  owners  are  strongest.  Exclusion  allows
third  parties  like  legislatures,  courts,  and  officials  to  limit  them-
selves  to  second-order  questions  of who  is  the  best  chooser  on  a
first-order level among the uses to which resources can be put. As a
first approximation,  owners can choose  among  a large and  indefi-
nite set of uses of land without having  to justify  or even articulate
the  hunches  and values  upon which  those  decisions rest. Further-
more,  these  simple  rules  of exclusion  are easy  to communicate  to
third parties, who can mostly contribute to the value of a resource
by keeping off. The ease with which both third-party enforcers  and
third-party dutyholders can deal with exclusion makes  it an attrac-
tive one  to  choose,  and this  choice  has been made  at many  times
and places  both  as a  matter of custom  and of law,  and in groups
both close-knit and impersonal. It is so basic that it is easy to over-
look,  especially  in  an  otherwise  complicated  area  like  nuisance.
Despite  Coasean  insights  about  causation  and  realist  concerns
about  context, nuisance  law  contains  a  heavy  strain of locational
thinking-who acted so as to invade someone else's rights-and re-
sembles  the  law  of trespass  in cases  of substantial  nuisances  and
nuisances  per se.  Injunctions  are  still  a possible remedy for viola-
tions of this exclusion regime backed up by property rules.
But nuisance  does more than  reinforce  the exclusion  regime  of
trespass, because  it supplements the basic exclusionary regime with
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rules  of proper  use.  Where  use  conflict  is  high stakes  and  other
methods  of  resolution,  including  private  contracting  and  social
norms, fail,  nuisance  can supply an off-the-rack  scheme for proper
use. Nuisance itself has largely given way to potentially more effec-
tive rules of proper  use from other sources, such  as pollution  con-
trol  and zoning. How  extensive  and detailed  such  rules  of proper
use should  be  is  a  difficult empirical  question, but any legal  solu-
tion  must confront  the  question  whether  a  governance  scheme  is
worth  incurring  the costs of a partial withdrawal of the delegation
to owners of use-decisions  in the basic exclusionary  regime. Courts
face some but not all of the costs of setting up governance regimes,
and those  courts  and commentators  who  focus  on the benefits  of
governance  have  tended  to  downplay  the  importance  of the  low-
cost  exclusion  rules. Interestingly,  when  it comes  to  implementa-
tion, courts  have  retained  more  of the  exclusionary  flavor of nui-
sance law than their nods to realism would indicate.
The information-cost  theory shows why nuisance  partakes  both
of  the  low-cost,  low-precision  exclusion  regime  characteristic  of
property  generally,  but  also  supplements-not  replaces-this
foundation  of exclusion  with fine-tuning through governance  rules
where stakes and transaction costs are  high. But where courts face
high information  costs  of delineating  use rights,  we  expect  a  ten-
dency  towards  exclusion  even  where  stakes  and  private-party
transaction costs are also high.
The view of nuisance  as a hybrid between  a foundation of exclu-
sion  and  a superstructure  of governance  allows  an explanation  of
the rarity of Calabresi  and Melamed's  Rule 4. The "Blackstonian"
package  of "entitlements"  in the exclusion  regime is supplemented
by rules of proper use, which involve softening the harshness  of in-
junctions  and  giving  damages  instead.  If  so,  a  pollution  victim's
right to exclude pollution  is  sometimes qualified  and reduced  to a
right to compensation by damages under Rule 2, particularly where
the nuisance  is not  substantial. But Rule 4 is not merely  a relaxa-
tion of the exclusion  regime. Under the basic ad coelum approach,
the polluter does  not  have a "right"  to pollute but rather  a privi-
lege to do so, indirectly protected by the right to exclude the world,
including the victim, from its land. To give property rule protection
to a "right" to pollute or even to soften such a "right" with a limita-
tion to lesser liability rule protection, winds up elevating an undif-
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ferentiated  privilege  into a full-blown  separately  delineated  right.
A right in the polluter to pollute protected  by a property rule or a
liability rule undermines  the exclusion-type ad coelum regime, and
involves  the  high  information  costs  characteristic  of  easements.
And it is precisely under easements that the law has treated the ex-
ceptional  situations in which  polluters  have  acquired  a  "right"  to
pollute through transactions or prescription.
The difficult normative question presented by nuisance is a quite
general  one of when  it makes  sense to supplement  a low-cost  ex-
clusion  regime  with  governance  rules,  and  when  in  particular
courts are the best suppliers of such governance rules. In a range of
situations  including  airplane  overflights,  building  encroachments,
and  water,  courts  and  other  official  institutions  have  at  various
times  supplemented  exclusion  with governance.  Particularly  noto-
rious has  been the problem  of oil  and  gas, in which parcel  defini-
tion was  inappropriate when  a new dimension of the resource  was
discovered.  I have suggested  in this Article that courts'  abilities to
devise and administer their own governance  regimes are quite lim-
ited and that the common law of oil and gas can be seen as a foun-
dation  upon  which  other  legislative  and  administrative  solutions
were  allowed  to  build. What  the best  feasible  mix of judicial  and
other  official efforts would  have been  is beyond  the scope  of this
Article, but to blame the waste  in the history of oil and gas  devel-
opment in the United States on the ad coelum rule is unwarranted.
Similarly, the problem of when  to back off exclusion  in the law
of nuisance  by reducing the protection  of landowners'  rights  from
property rule to liability rule has focused  mostly on the benefits  of
judicial governance rules rather than on their information costs and
the relative merits of other solutions. Cases like Boomer v. Atlantic
Cement Co., that are  heralded  as the dawn  of a more enlightened
and realist  approach  to  nuisance,  ignore  the benefits  of exclusion
and property rule  protection. Moreover,  the safety  valves  needed
to mitigate the harsh impact  of exclusion  in the context of indus-
trial pollution need not be all that large. In other areas in which ex-
clusion has been attenuated with liability rules, legislative schemes
with  ex  ante  procedural  safeguards  have  been  quite  common.
Companies  with  needs  for  large  parcels  do  sometimes  assemble
them consensually and where this is not possible, requiring them to
justify the  special need for a particular  site ex  ante at least  allowsExclusion and Nuisance
the potential  victims  to point  to  alternatives  before  the  question
becomes  one  of  shutting  down  an  existing  plant.  Again,  supple-
mentation  of  exclusion  with  governance  may  be  required  but  it
should be undertaken cautiously  and courts should be  encouraged
to take seriously the abilities of other institutions and actors, public
and private, to supply governance  more cost-effectively.
Seeing the exclusion element in nuisance  as a second-order dele-
gation  to owners of first-order choices  among an indefinite  class of
uses  also  allows  us to explain  nuisance  law without  committing  to
either corrective or utilitarian visions of tort law. The information-
cost  theory  suggests  that  utilitarian  and  libertarian  or  corrective
justice  accounts of nuisance law would be closer to each other than
previously thought.
Nuisance  law  seems like  a mess  because it is being  asked to  do
something for which it is not suited. Nuisance  is not the law  of ac-
cident projected onto  landowner disputes, and  tort law  is  likewise
not one grand  governance  scheme  having  as  its  domain  all  activi-
ties  that  figure  in harmful  conflicts.  Rather,  the  information-cost
theory suggests  that certain  things, very prominently  among them
land,  are convenient  focal points for clusters  of use-privileges that
need not be delineated or evaluated by officials under an exclusion
regime. Nuisance is a governance regime resting on a foundation  of
exclusion.
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